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
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VALUE AND EXISTENCE

VALUE AND EXISTENCE

by

N. O. LOSSKY

*Professor of Philosophy in the
Russian University of Prague*

and

JOHN S. MARSHALL

*Professor of Philosophy
in Albion College*

PART ONE TRANSLATED FROM
THE RUSSIAN

by

SERGEI S. VINOKOOROFF

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ἵνα ζώῃν ἔχωσιν
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P R E F A C E

THE problem of value is primarily the problem of the concrete in contemporary philosophy. But paradoxical as it may seem the search for values by most of our philosophers has been a quest in terms of formal essences or abstract criteria. This is due to the fact that our philosophy is usually rooted in the formal side of Aristotle's logic, and so it has largely developed in the form of abstract concepts, notions of the mind, and formal essences. Hence by very necessity it has given itself over to the problems of formal logic and subjective epistemology rather than to the sphere of metaphysics.

But the Russian mind is primarily metaphysical, and has a tradition that is rooted in the concrete. Its epistemology leads it to the recognition of the possibility of knowing the concrete and thus makes an ontology possible. Both in epistemology and metaphysics this tradition is essentially Christian Neo-Platonism. Of course it is true that Schelling inspired Solovyof and thus caused the rise of a truly native Russian philosophy. But that does not mean that Russian philosophy was ever essentially committed to the thought of Schelling. It has a tradition of its own which was stimulated and brought to life by a similar impulse in Germany. Due to the tradition of the Church Russia had an implicit philosophy, a philosophy that was born of the Neo-Platonism of the Church Fathers.

This implicit Neo-Platonism is the true heritage of Russian thinking. It emerges when the Russian begins

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to reflect on the problem of reality. That is the reason it is so baffling. When we begin to read Solovyof, Kar-savin, or Bulgakov, we expect a type of thought that is identical with that known to us in Romantic German philosophy. We have an analogous situation in the revival of Neo-Platonism in England during the nineteenth century. That revival is also very difficult for most readers to understand. Many historians of philosophy find the thought of Coleridge and F. D. Maurice singularly difficult. That is because the thinking stimulated by Schelling gradually assumed the form of the long tradition of Neo-Platonism found in the seventeenth-century poets and the Cambridge Platonists. So the Russian tradition, although stimulated by German thought, has gradually become more and more Neo-Platonic.

The philosophical reader who first approaches the present work may be prone to suffer from an illusion: he may tend to think of the system as Hegelian. It is the same sort of illusion as the reader of Coleridge suffers from when he thinks that Coleridge is a follower of Schelling. In reality Coleridge uses the terminology of the Post-Kantian school, but actually follows the tradition of Cudworth and the seventeenth-century Platonic poets. So the present book uses German terminology and method, but its theory is essentially Christian Neo-Platonism. It is not a new development of the Hegelian theory of metaphysics and value.

The theory is not Hegelian. From its point of view Hegel suffers from a false type of concreteness. Hegel's thought is embodied in the concept of the world as a

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concrete universal. The concrete universal is the whole of reality as concretely interpenetrated. The world is already concrete. Seen as a whole in the full context of its environment every person or every event has a completely satisfactory place within the totality. The whole is already perfect. The individual is that which has value. However, the only true individual is the whole. Everything has a positive value when seen as an inevitable part of the perfect whole of things which we call the Absolute.

It may help us to contrast the general thought of the present volume with the Hegelian conception of the world. Both types of metaphysics believe in the concrete. Both of them consider the perfect, that which has value, to be the concrete whole. Both believe in the Absolute. But the Absolute and the concrete whole are differently conceived in the two systems. For Hegel the Absolute is the whole, the all-inclusive totality of reality. For the Christian Neo-Platonist the Absolute transcends the world. He considers the Absolute to be that which is autonomous all-sufficient existence. The Absolute is not the all-inclusive. He does consider the Absolute as the necessary complement to the contingent existence of the individual; but the individual is not included in Him. Rather, the Absolute stands over against the world. The world in a sense depends on God, but God does not depend on the world.

But even this distinction is not enough. Even the transcendence of the God of Plotinus is not sufficient; there is a hiatus between God and the world. God is the creator and sustainer of the world. He made the

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world out of nothing, *ex nihilo*. God is not that from which the world emanated; He is not the fulness of which the world is merely a derivation. God made the world out of nothing and projected it from His own being. Yet the world is sustained by Him and derives such value as it has from Him.

Now we can clearly see the difference between this theory and that of Hegel. For both of them the Absolute is that which has complete value. For both of them the Absolute alone has final autonomous value. But for Hegel every individual necessarily shares in this value because by necessity he is a part of the whole. From the higher point of view, from the standpoint of the whole, the cruelties of nature, the struggle for existence, war, famine, and crushing hate are all a part of that concrete perfection which can only be understood if seen in true perspective. Everything that exists has positive value when seen as an inevitable part of that perfect whole which we call the Absolute.

For Christian Neo-Platonism, on the other hand, not everything is good or beautiful. Only the Absolute has autonomous value; but It is beyond our world. There is evil in the world, and ugliness. The criterion of perfection is the same as that of Hegel: the complete interpenetration of all elements within a concrete whole. But our world is not completely interpenetrated. It is a maze of winding paths; it is illuminated by broken lights. There is order in our world, but the order is not complete. There is beauty in our world, but our world is not completely beautiful. We live in a world that is partly good and partly bad. From no higher point can the

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evil be seen as a necessary aspect of good. The higher the point of view the more distressing evil becomes. It is the sensitive soul that has found slavery and war horrible, and drunkenness ugly.

Even our limitations are an indication of the fact that our world is evil. The world lies in evil; this evil is rooted in the very character of material existence. Our Western thinking follows the thought of Aristotle which so easily blended with some of the implicit presuppositions of the Book of Genesis. For Augustine as for Aristotle every creature is an example of an eternal type. For Augustine as for the Book of Genesis God made every plant and animal that we now know and found them all "very good."

God did not create the cat, the wolf, and the tiger, or even man as he now is. God did not create the species of animals as we know them at all. The cat, the lion, and man were not created by God. Rather the present forms of life are the product of evolution. God created selves with a freedom of choice and created them with the possibility of entering the coöperative life of the Kingdom or of choosing an independent course of life.

This Kingdom of Heaven by participation in the Life of God has a derivative absolute value. Due to its love for God the Kingdom of Heaven entered into the fulness of the life of God Himself. But due to their power of choice the substantival agents could, after their creation, either enter the Kingdom of Heaven or else choose the path of independent life and reject the concrete fulness of the Kingdom of Heaven. When they so chose, as some of the selves did, they began a life of very abstract

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existence. They no longer had a concrete experience because they did not participate in a coöperative life with God. This coöperative life may be termed a concretely consubstantial life. The life that is lived as much as possible apart from God is called a life in which there is only abstract consubstantiality. No soul can wander completely away from God. There must be some of the forms of the Kingdom left in the experience of every ego if there is to be any experience at all.

Thus even evil involves some of the good, but it is a good that has been distorted into wickedness because it is lived in a spirit that is contrary to the life of the Kingdom of God. Hence all evil is self-contradictory and self-refuting. Even if it seems to aid the one who does it, as in the case of Napoleon, or Byron, yet it destroys the unity of the world and is hence wicked.

Now we are in a position to understand the theory of our present existence. The soul that did not enter the Kingdom of God fell into a state of isolation. Its connection with other beings was very slender. It did not live a life of the concrete fulness of being. Such a state is that of an electron whose relation to other electrons is highly mechanical and external. Our world of plants and animals has evolved due to the efforts of very elementary beings to coöperate with each other in a way to produce a concrete life.

But even the high degree of coöperation we have in plant and animal life is far from perfect. An animal body is a highly concrete whole as far as our world is concerned. But an animal body is not perfectly united and is full of imperfections. Helmholtz shocked his genera-

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tion by telling it that the eye was not perfect. Christian Neo-Platonism recognizes this same fact by telling us that coöperation is far from perfect even in animal organisms. But when we come to the organization which we term the State and the World we find that the coöperation is even more imperfect. Our age is attempting to achieve a deeper type of concrete consubstantiality, a politically united world; but due to hatred, ignorance, and fear, the world is filled with disruption and opposition and thus complete concreteness is not achieved.

The task that this book sets before itself is the task of showing where true absolute concrete consubstantiality lies, and how it is related to this world of ours. The book very frankly acknowledges the place of relative values in our world. In this sense it is critical of that extreme form of asceticism which would fail to realize the necessity of a normal evolution in the development of human experience.

Two streams of philosophy flowed from the spring of Plato's thought. The first was developed in part by Plato himself. The Ideas were really abstract although they probably had a polytheistic origin in the thought of Plato and thus did not seem so abstract to him. This abstract way of looking at the ultimate nature of reality was accentuated by the mathematical developments of the Platonic school and in Western Thought by the conception that morals were really commands of God. Thus some of the medieval thinkers even made the forms creations of God, thin, abstract rules of life and conduct.

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The other stream of thought was really a development from Aristotle's criticism of Plato. The work of Philo, Plotinus, and the Greek Fathers was an attempt to achieve a doctrine of concreteness. Plato's Demiurge was really the recognition by him of the need of concreteness. Following a hint in the *Republic*, Plotinus and the others made the Absolute the absolute fulness of being and then related all lesser categories to the one supreme ineffable Good.

The Christian thinker achieved a still richer concreteness in his living theory of the Trinity and the Incarnation. The Greek Fathers and all the followers of their tradition have made their special problem the nature of concreteness in relation to the Trinity and the Incarnation. Thus the problem of categories is a very different one for such a thinker than for a follower of the abstract tradition. Most philosophers tend to make the abstract categories ultimate. They are the true absolutes of our thinking. We see this in Newton's absolutes of space, time, and motion. For the Christian Neo-Platonist the real problem is rather the relation of abstract categories to that concrete fulness of being which he is convinced does exist and has been seen by the eye of the mystic. He believes in mathematics and logic, but he also believes that there are higher categories than these; he believes there are categories or forms of concrete existence. Our thin forms of life are merely the abstractions, the *vestigia* of a fuller life which is only found in the Kingdom of Heaven.

Thus our book presents us with a philosophy of value that rests on the rich tradition of a line of reflection which

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has made the problem of the concrete particularly its own in every field of human living. It is uniquely interested in the concrete within the sphere of ethics and aesthetics, for it is a philosophy whose central interest lies in the field of values.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

THE authors wish to record their very great obligation to Mr. Sergei Vinokooroff for his untiring efforts in translating Part I of this volume into English.

It is especially the authors' desire to explain that the dual authorship of the book is not strictly a collaboration. Part I was written alone by Professor Lossky and is a translation of his book on value, *Tsenmost i bytiye*, published by the Y.M.C.A. Press of Paris in 1931. The Preface and Part II were written by Professor Marshall as an explanation or commentary to make clear certain basic conceptions presented in Part I.

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NOTE: Chapter I in the present edition is the Introduction of the Russian edition. Thus Chapters I, II, III, and IV of the Russian edition become Chapters II, III, IV, and V of this edition.

PART I

*Value as the Absolute Fulness of Being:
God and the Kingdom of God as
the Foundation of Values*

CHAPTER I

Introduction

VALUE is something which pervades everything. It determines the meaning of the world as a whole, as well as the meaning of every person, every event, and every action. Even the smallest change introduced into the world by any agent has a value and is undertaken only on the ground and for the sake of some value moments. Everything that exists, and even everything that may exist or in any way belong to the composition of the world, is of such nature that it not only exists, but also contains within itself either the justification or condemnation of its being. It can be said of everything that it is either good or bad; it can be said whether it must or must not be, or that it ought or ought not to exist, that its existence is right or wrong (not in the judicial sense).

The omnipresence of the value moment does not help us, but rather makes it much more difficult to recognize it and to work out an abstract concept of value. When we meet the value moment in actual life, it is connected with existence; and it is difficult to differentiate them from each other in such a way as to perceive them as distinct concepts: existence purified from value, and value abstracted from existence. Moreover, it is possible that we can only come to recognize these two sides of the world even in the abstract form by the way not of mental differentiation—as when, for example, we mentally separate colour from length—but only by thinking of

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existence from a certain angle, an angle that opens out a definite aspect of it, an aspect which can be understood only on the ground of a peculiar combination of different sides of the world.

If this supposition is true, then we can expect that quite a number of philosophical theories will simplify the problem and will work out a concept of value by taking into consideration only one element of value, or by taking into consideration not even value itself, but some of the conditions that make value possible, or the consequences produced by it. Therefore we should expect the existence of a large number of theories of value that would necessarily be very different one from another, and often even partially contradictory. And this is actually the case. We will prove it by citing a number of well-known influential theories that are mutually contradictory.

Psychological theories of value are very widespread. They make value subjective and renounce the existence of absolute values. Ehrenfels' theory furnishes a good example in the field of axiology, or the theory of value, of *psychologism* followed by *subjectivism* and *relativism*. According to Ehrenfels the value of an object lies in a subject's *desire* for the object (*Begehrbarkeit*). But as far as the possibility of the rise of a desire is concerned, such a possibility exists when the vivid and clear imagination of the existence of an object promises a state of *pleasure* that lies higher on the scale of pleasure-displeasure than the portrayal of the object as not existing.¹ Desire and the intensity of pleasure are thus coördinated

¹ Chr. V. Ehrenfels, *System der Wert-theorie*, two volumes, see i, p. 65.

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and connected by a rule; and this connection is the value of an object.

Kreibig's theory of value is very similar to Ehrenfels'. Kreibig says that value is that meaning which a sensory or thought content has for a subject, a meaning caused by feelings directly, or by association connected with the content. These feelings may be real or they may exist only in the form of a disposition; they aid the psychic activity or else depress it.¹ The rejection of absolute values, the recognition of the relativity of values, and also the assertion of the subjectivity of values follow from this definition. Kreibig will, however, allow the use of the term "objective value" if we define it as the value of an object as judged correctly by an *ideal subject*, all of whose empirically possible reactions of feeling are consummated with a complete knowledge of the properties of the object.

The development of Meinong's theory is very interesting. This clever and careful analyst began with the development of a psychological, subjective theory of value (*Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-theorie*, 1894), but twenty-five years later, after excellent works had appeared in German upholding anti-psychologism, objectivism, and absolutism in the theory of value, in his last work (*Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Wert-theorie*, 1923) he took as he expresses it, "a reconciliatory position" between the two hostile camps. Even in his first work he objected to Ehrenfels, and pointed out that value cannot be deduced from desire, because

¹ I. C. Kreibig, *Psychologische Grundlegung eines Systems der Wert-theorie*, p. 12.

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the relation between these two moments is the very opposite: desire is founded on the feeling of value, and not the other way around (p. 15). Similarly, we cannot reduce value to usefulness, because usefulness depends on value: the useful is that which causes something valuable to exist (p. 13). We cannot refer to the labour, the investment costs, and sacrifices as the primal sources of value, because labour, sacrifice, and costs are directed to that which is already valuable; but they do not create the value (*Zur Grundl.*, p. 25). Finally, we cannot trace value to the satisfaction of a desire, i.e. the removal of dissatisfaction caused by the absence of some object, because many things are valuable whose absence produces no dissatisfaction. If we broaden the concept of desire, or more specifically, if we substitute for it the concept of *interest*, then, says Meinong, the connection between interest and value always will be present. However, this will not render us any help in our study because these two words are practically synonymous (*Zur Grundl.*, p. 19).

Rejecting the theories enumerated, Meinong finds, however, that in all of them there is a moment which actually enters into the concept of value. That moment is—relation to the subject. Any object can be valuable, says Meinong, and even though remaining unchanged can produce different experiences of value in different subjects and even in the same subject. From this it follows that not the object, but *our relation to the object*, is that which is important.¹

But what kind of a relation is this? The only thing

¹ Meinong, *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-theorie*, p. 14; *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Wert-theorie*, p. 33.

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in common in the most different cases of value, says Meinong, is the experiencing by the subject of the *feeling of value*, or to be exact, the possibility of such an experience: "an object is valuable in so far as it can serve as the real ground of the feeling of value in a normal and sufficiently oriented person" (*Untersuch.*, p. 25). The feeling of value, he adds, is the only *phenomenal* aspect of value, i.e. that aspect accessible to experience (p. 30).

From this formulation Meinong draws the conclusion that value is *relative* in two senses. In the first place it is relative in so far as value has the capacity to serve as the real ground of the feeling of value, and in the second place in so far as it is necessary to have the presence of the subject in whom the experience of the feeling of value is realized. He explains the attempts to find *absolute value* in an object as the search for that quality, immanent in the object producing the feeling of value, which belongs to that object even when there is no subject present. However, he says, such a concept of value is not the same as the one commonly admitted; in the usual sense value is attributed to an object only when there is *somebody present for whom* value is value (p. 29).

Meinong's definition of value, given above, astonishes us with its barrenness. In the end it can be reduced, as Meinong himself points out, to this: the valuable is that which I value (p. 14). If we take this theory as an assertion that the quality of an object which produces a feeling of value in the subject is valuable *only because* it produces a *feeling of value*, then Meinong's theory will prove to be a quite radical and rather poor psychologism. Nobody,

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of course, denies that the feeling of value is valuable, but it is still more obvious that these feelings are a *symptom* of a still greater and more fundamental *value of the content* of existence itself which awakens such feelings.

In Meinong's definition "the value of an object lies in the capacity of the object to serve as the foundation for the feeling of value in a normal person who is rightly oriented." If we put the accent on the word *capacity*, and also recall his statement that the feeling of value alone is *accessible to the experience*, we have the right to interpret this theory as an agnosticism, which stresses the feeling of value only because a deeper content of this aspect of the world is not given in experience. Because he pursues a tangible fact, Meinong does not penetrate into the dark depths of objective value. In the further development of his theory, Meinong gives only a hint of the fundamental meaning of value, saying that the primal source of the feeling of value is the evil or the good of that existing (p. 55). Further development of this thought must reveal that the feeling of value is only a symptom of value, and must lead to the theory of objectivism, or at least to a subjective-objective theory of value. Ehrenfels, who argues passionately against the transfer of value to the object, understood this possibility in Meinong's reflections, and consequently insists on the omission of the words "capacity [*Faehigkeit*] of the object" from the definition given by Meinong.¹

Twenty-five years later Meinong wrote a book, *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Wert-theorie*, in which "personal values" (*persönliche Werte*), i.e. values for

¹ Ehrenfels, i, p. 65.

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somebody, now serve only as the starting-point of the investigation. Speaking even of these values, he speaks of his position as reconciliatory in the dispute of the subjectivists and the objectivists and gives the following definition: "personal value is the qualification [*Eignung*] of the object to serve, because of its qualities and position, as the object of the experience of value" (p. 143). In other words, personal value is the significance of the existence of the object for the subject (*Seinsbedeutung für ein Subjekt*, p. 145). Moreover, he now admits that besides personal values, *impersonal* (*unpersönliche*) values also exist—for example, truth, beauty, and the moral good (p. 145). To accept them as values we need not have the experience of the feeling of value. These are absolute values, although of course even here relative values are added to the absolute ones: we can speak not only of the "impersonal value of o," but also of the "legitimate meaning of o" for a particular subject (p. 163). An absolute impersonal value "rightfully [*berechtigerweise*] must be value for any subject" (p. 165).

The theory of Heyde, a follower of Remke, is very close to Meinong's theory in this last stage of its development. According to Heyde "value is a certain *relation*, specifically a 'mutual complementing' [*Zugeordnetheit*]" existing between the object of value and the feeling of value (a special state of the subject of value). And since value is a relation, the members of that relation—the object of value or the subject of value, and the state of the subject—are considered only as data, and this independent of the fact whether they are real or not.¹

¹ I. E. Heyde, *Wert*, p. 153.

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From this definition it is clear that the existence of value presupposes a combination of the subject and the object. However, the properties of the object are not values, but only the ground on which value is raised, and similarly, the feeling of value experienced by the subject is not value; strictly and definitely Heyde defines the thought that value is a *relation* of an object to the state of the subject (p. 106). Having stressed this position of value as if "between" the object and the subject, Heyde says that his theory is neither subjectivism nor objectivism, that it does not fall into relativism and psychologism. Heyde says that although value is a relation one member of which is the subject, still value is *not subjective*; it is not a psychic experience of the subject; it is a relation (pp. 50, 63, 76, 83). Moreover, the connection with the subject does not prevent some values from being absolute. There are values that do not depend on the personal characteristics of the subject (*Subjekt-besonderheit*); they are absolute.

In strict opposition to Heyde stands the theory of Scheler. Scheler says that values—for example, "pleasant, charming, delightful, noble," etc.—are not relations, but peculiar *qualities* forming a special kingdom of objects with certain relations and ranks.¹ They cannot be deduced from or understood by the earmarks and properties which themselves do not belong to the realm of values (p. 9). The bearers of these qualities which are perceived through the *theoretic* functions of the intellect are *things* (*Dinge*); and the bearers of valuable qualities are *goods* (*Güter*). A good is "a unity of valuable qualities

¹ M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, pp. 10, 248.

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similar to a thing" (*dinghafte Einheit von Wertqualitäten*, p. 15). Goods and things are equally primal data: we cannot assert that a good is the foundation of a thing (as, for example, Mach or Bergson does), or that a thing is the foundation of a good (p. 16).

Scheler determines the self-sufficiency of the content of values by stressing the fact that values can be given in consciousness apart from their bearers. Thus a sensory quality, for example a red colour, may be perceived without the object to which it belongs; similarly, such values as "noble, dreadful, terrible" sometimes enter our consciousness separated from those goods which are their bearers, and are perceived even before the goods themselves (p. 12). A child, for example, perceives "kindness" or "animosity" in the face bent over his crib when he does not differentiate the faces themselves.

Values are perceived not by theoretic but by *emotional* intentional functions, by the activities of feeling (*Fühlen*). Analysing these experiences, Scheler distinguishes in them, as in the theoretic activities, the intentional function and the content or "appearance." It is *Erscheinung* in a sense similar to that given to this term by Stumpf in his treatise *Erscheinungen und Funktionen*. In the function of feeling (*Fühlen*) the value "appears" before me in a similar manner to that in which the object or thing in the function of perception appears before me. Here we must distinguish the "feeling of something" (*Fühlen von Etwas*) and the state itself that serves as the content of feeling (*Gefühlsgegenstand*)—for example, the feeling of pain and the pain itself which I "bear" or "experience" or "suffer" or "relish" (p. 263). This theory that values

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are perceived by means of feeling, as a special function directed upon them, Scheler calls "emotional intuitivism."

From all that has been said it becomes clear that Scheler is a determined defender of the *objectivity* of values. It is true some special form of perceiving is needed by which values may be *discovered* (p. 272), but the *existence* of the many values there are is not at all connected with the psycho-physical organization of man, and does not even presuppose the age or subject: values exist in all nature (p. 273). By asserting the objectivity of values, Scheler also defends the existence of *absolute values*.

N. Hartmann in many essential points agrees with Scheler. Values, he says, are not laws, but objective formations possessing material content.¹ They are *ideal*, they belong to the *an sich seiende ideale Sphäre* (i, p. 165), their being possesses no "existence" (*Existenz*), but their matter can be realized (i, pp. 175, 220). Values are essences (*Wesenheiten*); they represent a specific quality of things, relations, or persons. They are those essences which cause everything that is connected with them to be valuable. They are accessible not to thought but to emotional, intuitive "*Schau*" (i, p. 177). However, the knowledge of them, as any other knowledge, has a theoretic character (i, p. 219). By defending the objectivity of values, N. Hartmann, as Scheler, asserts the existence of absolute values.

I will also indicate the definition of value given by G. D. Gurvitch in his *Fichtes System der konkreten Ethik*. It differs materially from all preceding theories in that it connects value with the highest limit of existence.

¹ N. Hartmann, *Ethik* (English trans., i, pp. 169, 170).

Introduction

Gurvitch says that value is a moment of quantitative-qualitative positive infinity which is *a priori*. It is continuously passing over into a positive qualitative infinity due to the ideal which determines and anticipates it (p. 278). This *a priori* ideal moment may also permeate the empirically real (p. 274).

The theories we have given are enough to confuse a person inexperienced in philosophic investigation. If individuals who are highly gifted and meditative, and who have given all their lives to the solving of philosophic problems, come to such a difference of opinion, then, probably, the truth is hidden at a depth unattainable by the human mind. Some deduce the valuable aspect of the world from individually *psychic* experiences, others from *non-psychic* factors; some say that values are *subjective*, others say that they are *objective*; some assert the *relativity* of all values, others also insist on the existence of *absolute* values; some say that value is a *relation*, others that it is *quality*; some think that values are *ideal*, others that they are *real*, still others say that they are neither ideal nor real (for example, Heyde). However, let us not fall into despair; different as these theories are, each one takes into consideration some aspect of value, and the problem of our investigation is to find the place for each element of value in a complete theory, which will not only answer the question as to what value is, but will also explain how such a multitude of different theories is possible. Spinoza rightly says *veritas norma sui et falsi est*.

Let us begin with psychologism in the theory of value.

CHAPTER II

Critical Considerations Preparing the Way for the Theory of Value of Ideal Realism

I. PSYCHOLOGISM. THE THEORY OF HEYDE

The psychological theory of value asserts that any object, even an object of the outside world, has a value only in so far as it produces in the mental life of a subject certain *psychic experiences peculiar to the individual*. According to some theories this experience is the feeling of pleasure (or displeasure); according to others, desire; according to others, the feeling of value.

Let us begin with the theory that asserts that pleasure is the only intrinsic value (*Selbstwert, Eigenwert*); that is, primary and fundamental value. From ancient times up to the present the theory in ethics that pleasure is the only motive and the final aim of all human deeds has been very popular. According to this theory all the *objective* content of our strivings, desires, and aspirations, realized by our acts, is *only a means* of reaching our real aim, the experience of *pleasure*. This hedonism, as well as other tendencies in ethics closely related to it (Eudaemonism and Utilitarianism), represents in its totality the hedonistic theory of value. Mill, for example, basing his theory on hedonism, says, "that which is in itself valuable is in itself desirable"; "such are only pleasure and freedom from pain."¹ And so according to Mill only pleasure

¹ *Utilitarianism*, 10th ed., p. 10.

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and the absence of pain are intrinsic values. All other values are *derivative* from this value, they serve as means to its attainment.¹

For our critique of the hedonistic theory of value let us take a few examples of the act of will and analyse them in order to see their eidetical structure (i.e. to gain a *Wesensschau*, or "intuition of essence," of the act of will, to use the terminology of Husserl's school). Suppose a hunter takes aim at a flying bird, shoots, and the bird falls to the ground. Or again, suppose a father explains to his child what an eclipse of the sun is, and from the animated, meaningful expression of the child's face sees that the explanation is understood. According to the hedonistic theory the objective content of an act (the good shot, the child's understanding) is only a means, while the real aim is the subjective feeling of pleasure for the agent acting. The "means" is only a subordinate aspect of the value; it is an element of an act and is not valuable in itself. For example, when I climb up a ladder to get an apple off a tree, the means, the climbing up the ladder, has no value in itself and may be experienced by me as a burden and tedious.

Let us turn to the facts and in a rapid survey find out for ourselves what the real aim is and what is valuable for the agent acting. Is it true that a good shot, or a child's understanding, is only the instrument for producing *my* pleasure? If this question be put to a man who is merely observing concentratively and who has no preconceived

¹ Later it will often be necessary to distinguish primary and secondary values. Let us call the former *intrinsic values* and the latter *instrumental values* (*Dienstwert*, to use Stern's term).

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theories full of wrong assumptions, the question itself will produce an unpleasant impression of some perversion. It is all too evident that the objective content of the act is itself the valuable aim, and that it is not a means or instrument at all. The animated face of the child, full of understanding, this embodied spiritual and material understanding reached by him is the valuable aim, is *that on which* my interest is concentrated. But as to *my own* satisfaction, having reached my aim I do not care at all; I do not concentrate on that, do not live in it. If I make a series of movements, one following rapidly after another—as, for example, in tennis—I have no time to experience my feeling of pleasure due to the good shots, and do not care about the pleasure. It is more interesting to continue to play the game than to enjoy the satisfaction. If in some magic way the objective contents of the act were removed and the feeling of satisfaction remained and continued, how weary and empty our life would be! We would be extremely dissatisfied with our feeling of satisfaction, and would be constantly looking for other contents of the activities of life.

The objective content of the striving is clearly the real aim. (This content in some cases belongs to the system of the outer world, e.g. a good shot; in other cases, however, to the inner life of the agent, e.g. learning a language.) The objective content is that which attracts and is valued, whereas the feeling of satisfaction is only an indicator, a sign of reaching our aim. It is the final, self-evident stage of the act of the will. *When we strive for something, we desire that it should finally be reached, we*

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seek success which is *expressed in the feeling of satisfaction*, but we do not want unsuccess which is marked by a feeling of dissatisfaction. However, success means possession of the objective content, not possession of the feeling of success. Such a structure of the act of will is its essence (*Wesen*), its *eidos*. The law expressing this structure of the act of will is not established by induction, but by the analysis of at least one example of the act of the will, and by the intuition of the ideal structure of its essence coördinated in a law.¹

Thus the theory of hedonistic motivation (Eudæmonism, etc.) contains an undisputed truth. But this truth is not rich in significance. It reduces itself almost to a tautology and does not include what hedonism asserts. Our striving for anything is certainly likewise a striving for the successful solution of the problem. The sign of success is the feeling of satisfaction, but this feeling of satisfaction is a mere sign of reaching our aim and is not the aim itself. Spencer, in discussing the theories which assert that the aim of an act is not the feeling of satisfaction but the objective content of the deed, says that these theories take the *means for the end*. However, these theories are right, whereas Spencer made a mistake from the opposite direction, so to speak. He took the *sign* of reaching the aim for the *aim itself*. This mistake may be compared to that of a man who, when he is watching soldiers shoot at a target and sees the

¹ According to Scheler and N. Hartmann, such an insight is knowledge *a priori*. According to the system of logic developed in my book, *Handbuch der Logik* ("Die unmittelbare Verifizierung der Urteile," §§ 73-78), it is a case of intuition *immediately* establishing the *common situation*.

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waving of a flag that shows that the marksman has hit the target, decides that the reason for the shooting is not the hitting of the mark but the waving of the flag.

Certainly the feeling of pleasure at reaching the aim is also a positive value. When it is experienced, it raises the value of reaching the objective content, but still its value is something which is secondary and complementary to the value of the success itself.

The theory of the significance of pleasure given above is expressed by many philosophers and is given sometimes in almost identical words. So, for example, V. Solovyof develops it in his *Justification of the Good* (English trans., pp. 117-19) and his *Critique of Abstract Principles*, F. Paulsen in his *A System of Ethics* (p. 251), Münsterberg in his *The Eternal Values* (pp. 65 ff.).¹ G. E. Moore reminds us in his *Principia Ethica* of Plato's dialogue, *The Philebus*, in which it is persuasively proved that pleasure is not the only good. Plato shows that pleasure without memory—for example, without conclusions of reasoning about the future—is not a good. Pleasure, he says, is desirable, but the consciousness of pleasure is still more desirable; therefore pleasure is not the only good. Further, by the same method Plato shows that even the consciousness of pleasure is not the only good, since, for example, the pleasure experienced in the presence of other people is higher than pleasure experienced in solitude.

Moore makes some very fine observations about the combination of the value of pleasure and pain with

¹ See also my *Die Grundlehren der Psychologie vom Standpunkte des Voluntarismus*, chap. vi.

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other values. He says that the beauty which we see and which gives pleasure is a higher value than the isolated pleasure of beauty. We would not want to live a life filled with the feeling of pleasure if there were no objective content to the pleasure. The mere increase of the intensity of pleasure without the objective content is not a great good; but the increase of suffering, even without objective content, is a great evil. On the other hand, pleasure in combination with an objective content considerably increases the positive value of the whole, whereas pain added to a negative objective content increases the negative character of the whole only to the extent of its own pleasure. If the feeling of pleasure is directed to some disgusting, unbecoming content, then from this there arises a whole which is a greater evil than the unbecoming content in itself, and the increase of pleasure in this case is an increase of evil. And conversely, the addition of suffering sometimes does not increase, but rather lessens the negative value of the whole. For example, if a disgusting deed is accompanied by the suffering of punishment, then the negative value becomes less than if the deed had remained unpunished.¹

All that has been said about the feeling of pleasure following a deed may be repeated in a slightly changed form about the feeling of pleasure preceding a deed, and included in the preliminary judgment of the aim of the deed. This feeling of pleasure is not the aim of the deed and it is not it that first creates the value of the objective content of the striving; it is only a subjective way of experiencing the objective value; it is its sign. The

¹ *Principia Ethica*, 1st ed., pp. 94, 213.

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same should be said also of the feeling of value which, as Meinong rightly pointed out, should be distinguished from the feeling of pleasure caused by the object. The feeling of value is the subjective clothing in which the objective values appear in our mind.

If the theory of Meinong given in his first work on value is understood as the theory that the property of an object coördinated with the feeling of value has value only because it is connected with this feeling, then his theory is not adequate; it takes a subjective sign of value for the value itself. Besides the feeling of pleasure (pain) and the feeling of value, there are many other feelings which have the character of subjective experiences of positive and negative objective values. Such, for example, are the feelings of trust, of triumphant exultation, of serene quiet, and so on; or the feelings of dread, anxious restlessness, gloomy irritableness, and so on. Each of these feelings has a value in itself; but more than that it is a sign of a value that lies deeper, a value of the object of the feeling itself.

Feeling is the clothing in which objective values appear in consciousness. As far as desires are concerned, they are a *consequence* of value. Striving, inclination, want, and desire are conditioned by the value of an object, and are not the source of the value, as Ehrenfels wrongly asserts.¹ Duty (obligation) stands in the same relation to value. There is no obligation in the value itself. Accord-

¹ See the objections to Ehrenfels' theory and to the deduction of values from desire given by Meinong in his *Psych.-eth. Untersuchungen*, pp. 15, 70. Also his *Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie*, pp. 37-42. Also Heyde, *Wert*, p. 109. As to desires and value, see M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. 364.

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ing to Münsterberg, obligation is only a *possible consequence* of value in those cases where in our behaviour we have to choose between several contradictory values.¹ In the same way Heyde also objects to the theory of Rickert. Rickert's theory is that value is validity (*Geltung*). Heyde shows that validity (*Geltung*) is not a characteristic of value in general at all, because it, like obligation, exists only where there is value to be realized—for example, a moral request not yet fulfilled.²

All the theories of value mentioned in this chapter, except the theory of Rickert, are psychological. All of them take the solving of the problem of value as a problem of psychology, and all of them make a mistake analogous to that which is so often made in gnoseology in solving the problem of truth. True knowledge can be reached by the subject only by the help of the individually subjective psychic acts of attention, differentiation, representation, reminiscence, discussion, etc., and also only in connection with the non-intellectual functions of will and feeling. Investigation of all of these psychic acts involved in the discovery of truth belongs to the *psychology of knowledge*, but the psychology of knowledge does not answer the question as to the properties of truth itself. The study of truth itself, especially its structure, is taken up by *gnoseology* and *logic*, sciences which investigate not the subjective psychic side of consciousness but its objective side. They have nothing in common with psychology because, for example, the logical structure of the judgment or syllogism is some-

¹ Münsterberg, *The Eternal Values*, pp. 51-7.

² Heyde, *Wert*, p. 71.

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thing *toto genere* different from psychic acts, experiences, etc. It is the greatest error to mix gnoseological and logical problems and the logical subject-matter of research with the psychological. By hard work for over half a century at the hands of very many great scholars modern philosophy has reached a clear separation of these two spheres. Hence, when we meet the same mistake in the theory of value, we can afford not to lose too much time in the task of proving that the psychological theories of value are wrong. The psychology of *valuation* and *will* is a science of the psychic processes connected with values, but does not extend as far as a science of the values themselves.

As is true in the case of gnoseological and logical problems the followers of the intuitional theory—e.g. Scheler, the followers of Remke, and also the author of this book—can escape falling into psychologism especially well. Indeed, those who believe in the intuitional theory say that besides the psycho-individual experiences of the subject there may be also present in consciousness many parts of the outside world and different kinds of existence—material existence, the psychic existence of others, ideal being, etc. Understanding the structure of consciousness in this way, it is natural to look for values not in a subjective feeling caused by them but deeper, and moving in the direction of the objects of the feelings. This is exactly what Heyde has done. For him value is found neither in the subject nor in the object; it is the *relation* between the subject and the object, or better, it is the relation between the subject and that property of an object which serves as

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one part of the relation. Value has its foundation in these absolute properties of an object, but only in so far as they are connected with a subject. However, value is not composed of any properties of the object itself, but rather of the relation in which the object stands to "special states of the subject" (p. 172), specifically to the feeling of pleasure and the organic sensations (*Innenempfindungen*) out of which the feeling of value is built. It follows from this definition that if there were no feeling of value, then no object would have a value—that is, it would have no such relation to a subject as is value, according to Heyde. In other words, the theory of Heyde, materially, is the same as the early theory of Meinong. Although it is not psychological, it falls under the same criticism as the psychological theory, only it is stated in a different way. Indeed, the whole structure of valuable existence Heyde outlines in the same way as Meinong does personal values. The distinction and originality of Heyde consist only in that seeing the whole as consisting of three parts, the object, the relation, and the feeling of value on the part of the subject, he gave the name "value" to the middle part of the whole, the relation, and developed a corresponding concept of value, quite consistently working it out and showing that the theory removing value from both the subject and the object frees us from the extremes of both subjectivism and objectivism. Nevertheless, the objections which were urged against the theory of Meinong remain in force against Heyde also, only with the following difference: Meinong took the sign of value (the feeling of value) for the value, whereas Heyde took the *relation* of

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the valuable existence to the sign of value for the value.

As will be seen farther on, I do not deny that value is only possible where there is a relation to a subject, or better a person, but this relation is much deeper; it penetrates the whole structure of personality and of the world much more than does a relation to the *feeling of value*.

Moreover, no matter how much we agree with Heyde that the concept of value is very closely connected with the concept of *relation* (actually following Stern I think that the concept of value is connected with the concept of *meaning* (*Bedeutung*) and relation is included here only in so far as every meaning contains a relation in itself), still we cannot accept as true the basic assertion of Heyde that "value is a relation." Illustrating his theory by the case of a beautiful vase which awakens in the subject who sees it the feeling of value, Heyde reasons in the following manner. Before us is: (1) a complicated part of the world, a valuable object (*Wertobjekt*), a beautiful vase; (2) a subject experiencing the feeling of value; and (3) the relation between the subject and the object. Which of the elements of this whole is value? Only the *relation* of the object to the subject, or precisely the connection with the feeling of value is value, says Heyde. But as far as the valuable object is concerned, it is not the value; it only contains in itself the *basis* of value, the value ground (*Wertgrund*)—that is, qualities, or in general such particularities as due to which it is connected with the feeling of value of the subject. True enough, we often say, "The vase is a value," but this is only a vague

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expression which means, "The vase *has* value," i.e. it is the source of the relation to the subject pointed out above.

Heyde further points out that there are two types of relational concepts: one type, such as position and likeness, shows relation (*etwas das Beziehung ist*), the other type, such as father, teacher, indicates something that includes the relation in itself (*etwas das Beziehung hat*). Value according to his theory belongs to the first type, it *is* a relation, and the valuable object belongs to the second type, it stands in relation. Hence, according to Heyde, value *has no content*. We can say of a content that it is valuable, but only in the sense that it has a relation called value. This depriving value of substance (dematerialization) is doubtful. It can only be done by taking value out of the object in the way Heyde does when he says that a valuable object has value because of its relation to that which is foreign to it and outside of its sphere; the object has value because of its relation to the feeling experienced by a subject. Later, when we substitute for Heyde's relation the concept of meaning (and not simply for the feeling of value alone), it will be proved that the content of existence itself is in a certain sense a value also. With this understanding value is to a certain extent made substantial. It becomes *ontological*. The concept of value becomes analogous, if not to the concept of father (or teacher, etc.), then at least to the concept of fatherhood understood in a certain particular way. Indeed, the word fatherhood can express two different concepts: first, the concept of relation between the person A and his child B, and second, the

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ontological content itself of the person A including in itself the relation to B. We think of the concept of value as similar to this second concept of fatherhood. Thought of in this way it represents a particular category that cannot be brought under any other category, and therefore cannot be defined in the usual way, i.e. by indicating the proximate *genus* and the *differentiae*. In this lies an indirect indication of the correctness of the method chosen by us, whereas Heyde's theory undoubtedly involves a falsity. Indeed, in the beginning of his work Heyde agrees that value as something elementary and primal cannot be defined in the usual way, but can be defined by showing its relation to the other elements of the world (p. 31), but he finishes his work by giving the definition of value through the proximate *genus* and the *differentiae*, i.e. he includes the concept of value under the concept of relation. Later, when I shall try to give the definition of the concept of value, it will be shown that it cannot be decomposed into *genus* and the *differentiae*.

2. SCHELER'S THEORY

The thought that value is ontological and substantial leads us to the question as to whether we should agree without any reservations with the assertion of Scheler that value is not a relation but a quality, that value is fully objective. Of course, according to Scheler value is a quality in a very unusual sense of the word. It is a quality not of an *object* (as, for example, blue is a quality of the sky), but a quality of the *Good* (*Gut*). "The Good is the substantial unity of the value qualities." Examples of such value qualities are expressed in the words

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"pleasing, delightful, tender, charming, noble, pure, exalted, kind, evil, shy," etc. The value qualities represent a special *kingdom of objects* which are given by intuition (*anschaulich*), or may be reduced to a special datum. Scheler says that they cannot be defined or reasoned out from earmarks and properties which themselves do not belong to the realm of values. As blue things are blue, and their blueness cannot be reduced to something that is not blue, so kind deeds are kind.¹ Value, according to Scheler, is to such an extent a special datum that sometimes it is perceived even before the perception of the bearer of the value takes place (p. 12).

The "material" data possessing content, described by Scheler, certainly are values; however, his theory that values are a kingdom of such qualities, that, after we subtract them the remainder is not a value, cannot be accepted. The first reason for not accepting this theory is that if values were only such a content as the qualities "delightful," "tender," etc., then there would be no reason for emphasizing them as ideal. But Scheler stresses them as ideal, and indeed, experience reveals to a person with long practice in examining such problems that value is something ideal or else at least includes in itself an ideal moment as something substantial. Our second objection may be examined in this way: just imagine that we are living in a kingdom of "delightfulness, tenderness, exaltedness," etc., without anything being delightful, tender, exalted, etc.; such severed values would depre-

¹ Max Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. 15, l. 9. In exactly the same way Moore writes about the good as an intrinsic value. Good is a simple and indefinable quality. Good is good in the same way as yellow is yellow (*Principia Ethica*, 1st ed., pp. 6-9).

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ciate, and would even become disgusting shadows. From this it becomes clear that the values pointed out by Scheler are only values which are complementary and symptomatic to the values of their bearers, so that the bearers themselves are also values and basic values besides. And indeed, literally any content of existence is a positive or negative value *not because of some one of its own separate qualities, but because of its whole existing content*. For example, the wonderful pure blue colour in the spectrum is a value not only for its wonderfulness, but also for the blue colour alone. This observation leads us to the thought that existence itself, *esse* itself, is not only existence but also a value. Such a theory has been held by philosophers of great importance in the history of philosophy.

St. Augustine, on the basis of God having created every existence and existence only existing by the will of God, asserts: "in so far as anything exists, it is good" (in quantum est quidquid est, bonum est. *De vera religione*, chap. xi, 21). Evil can be brought into the goodness of existence by spoiling existence. In such a case the good in the object lessens, but it cannot be entirely removed from any existing thing because the existence itself would then cease.¹

According to Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius), existence is only possible on the basis of it participating in goodness to some extent (see, for example, in his *Concerning the Divine Names*, chap. iv, 4). Albertus Magnus and St. Thomas Aquinas assert that the terms

¹ *Si autem omni bono privabuntur, omnino non erunt, Confess.*, bk. vii, chap. xii, 8; *De natura boni contra Manichaeos*, bk. i, chap. xvii.

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ens and *bonum* relate to the same thing only used in different relations.¹

According to Erigena, who in this question refers to Dionysius the Areopagite, everything exists in so far as it participates in goodness ("*in quantam participant bonitatem*," *De divisione naturae*, bk. iii, 3).

In modern philosophy Spinoza with sharp discrimination identifies existence and perfection. According to this theory the concepts of "reality" and "perfection" are coincident. "By reality and perfection I understand the same thing" ("*Per realitatem et perfectionem idem intelligo*," *Ethica* ii, Definition vi). In his letter to I. Hudde he says that "perfection consists in existence and imperfection in the shortage of existence" ("*Perfectionem in τὸ εἶναι esse et imperfectionem in privatione τοῦ εἶναι consistere*").²

I will examine this theory of the identification of being and value in the form it took in the correspondence of Leibniz and Arnold Eckhart, the Professor of Mathematics.

3. THE DISPUTE OF LEIBNIZ AND ARNOLD ECKHART ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF VALUE

The exchange of opinions between Leibniz and Eckhart began April 5, 1677, with a discussion as to the concept of perfection. There was a difference of opinion on this

¹ Albertus Magnus, *Summa theologica*, pt. i, tr. vi, qu. xxviii; St. Thomas Aquinas: "existence in so far as it is existence, exists '*in actu*,' but any actuality is '*perfectio quaedam*'"; "*perfectum vero habet rationem appetibilis, et boni*" (*Summa theologica*, pt. i, qu. v, art. iii; pt. i, qu. xlix, art. iii).

² *Epistola xxxvi*, *Opera*, iv, ed. C. Gebhardt.

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question. Moreover, a correspondence started which ended with the admission by Leibniz that most of his objections had disappeared. Leibniz's final opinion is not given in the correspondence, but Eckhart's theory is given quite clearly and this I shall examine for the most part.¹

Eckhart asserts that perfection is any kind of reality. *Ens* (being that exists) and *perfectio* are differentiated by the intellect alone (*sola ratione*). The difference between *ens* and *perfectum* is only a distinction of reason (*distinctio rationis*). In other words, existence and perfection are the same thing, only examined by the mind from different points of view. Leibniz objects to this, for if this is true even pain would be perfection. In his opinion perfection is not only *esse*, but *bene esse*—that is, perfection is not simply an existence, but a positively valuable existence. He explains that *bene esse* is "the quantity or grade of reality or existence" ("*Quantitas seu gradus realitatis seu essentiae*," p. 225). Formulated in this way the thought of Leibniz certainly is not satisfactory: the *degree* of reality can be a positive value only in the case that reality itself is a positive value. Hence farther on in the dispute Eckhart easily forces Leibniz to approach his own position. Eckhart further develops his identification of existence and perfection, pointing out that the difference between these two concepts is simply the following: both *ens* and *perfectum* presuppose something in objects, but if I think of something as *ens* I have in mind an attribute without relation to its opposite, that is non-

¹ *Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W. Leibniz*, edited by Gerhardt, i, pp. 214-18, 221.

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existence; the same *ens* I think of as *perfectum*, if I examine it in its relation to non-existence and prefer it to non-existence (p. 228). From this it follows that the comparative degree "better," "more perfect" can be used where there is more reality, while the superlative degree "the best," "the most perfect" is that which contains within itself the whole of reality (p. 229).

Leibniz takes up this thought and says that in this metaphysical sense even in a suffering person there is really more perfection than in a person who is not suffering, and also not enjoying anything, but is dull and indifferent (p. 230). Eckhart develops this thought in detail, and says that suffering contains in itself feeling (*sensus*) which except for its "sharpness" or "bitterness" has a *positive content*, and hence in this its own aspect is perfection. But in addition to this positive content suffering contains within itself the presence of something we *do not want*, or the *absence* of something wanted. This *negative* moment is—imperfection; it is the insufficiency of the power of our will (p. 232). The discussion was not finished. In his last letter Leibniz remarks that existence itself is not valuable, but that it is the sense-experience of existence that is valuable, i.e. in our day we would say *conscious existence*.

The general result of the discussion is that any content of existence is a positive value in comparison with non-existence. However, we cannot speak of a perfect identity of existence and value, because existence as a value is looked upon in a different correlation from that of simple existence. Moreover, the difference between existence and positive value comes out more clearly if

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we pass over from the examination of the isolated abstract contents of existence to the same contents, but taken in the complex concrete system of existence. To be sure, every content of existent A taken abstractly is a positive value in so far as it represents something moving away from non-existence, or reversely, in so far as its content is approaching full reality, i.e. the absolute fulness of being. But let us take this same content of existence no longer isolated and abstracted from the world, but in a system. We must make such an examination because every existent in reality exists only in the system of the world. Taken as a part of the world, existent A may happen to be leading other kinds of existence to destruction, and thus leading to the lowering of the existing contents of the world system. In such a case A is bringing an "approachment" to non-existence into the world, a departure from the fulness of being. If positive value is existence in its significance of departing from non-existence, and approaching the fulness of being, then A whom we are examining is not a positive but a negative value. Hence Leibniz is right: *bene esse* and *male esse* must be differentiated.

4. VALUE AND THE ABSOLUTE FULNESS OF LIFE

After this, when we speak of perfection—that is, of positive value—we will take existence not in its relation to non-existence but in relation to the absolute fulness of being. Perfect non-existence is really only a *problem of thought*; it is an ideally established limit. Perfect non-existence cannot be given; only a greater or less approach to perfect destruction is possible.

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There is another even more essential consideration that induces us to discuss existence in its correlation with the absolute fulness of being. In religious experience the absolute fulness of being is given—as God. Hence the theory of perfection explained can be formulated thus: positive value is existence in its significance for approaching God and the Divine fulness of being.¹ From this formulation it is clear that the study of existence in its correlation with the highest limit gives us an absolutely obvious truth in regard to values and serves us as a basis for more diverse and more significant inferences than in correlation with non-existence.

Indeed, a communion with the absolute fulness of being, even though most distant, a vision of the Divine Being as “through a glass darkly,” is accompanied by an undoubtedly obvious discovery that God is the absolute perfection. His existence contains within itself an absolute self-justification, an unquestionable right to be preferred above everything else; God is that which is unquestionably worth existing. The symptom of the absolute character of this value is “rejoicing in the Lord,” the highest satisfaction that comes simply from the thought that such beauty and such goodness exist, even if I do not belong to His Kingdom. Out of the infinite number of cases of such a religious experience we shall give one of the visions of the German mystic, Seuse. Once on St. Agnes Day he was in a condition of extreme depression, when he saw and heard something indescribable. It was “something without form or species,

¹ As to God and His relation to the world, see my books: *The World as an Organic Whole*, and *Freedom of the Will*.

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but it contained within itself the joyous charm of all forms and species"; "it was sweetness flowing out of the ever-existing life in quiet feeling"; "if this is not the Kingdom of Heaven, what can be called by this name? No suffering that can be expressed in words is worthy of such joy, a joy that is destined for permanent possession."¹

An experience of the directly opposite type, an approach to absolute destruction and extreme suffering, was experienced in a dream by Father P. Florensky. "There were no images, only purely inward experiences. A darkness without a ray of light, almost palpably dense, surrounded me. Some force was dragging me to the brink; I felt that this was the limit of God's being, and that beyond it was absolute nothingness. I wanted to cry out and could not. I knew that in another moment I should be thrust into outer darkness. Darkness began to fill my whole being. I almost lost consciousness of myself, and I knew that this was absolute, metaphysical annihilation. In utter despair I cried out in a voice unlike my own: 'Out of the deep have I cried unto Thee; O Lord, hear my prayer.' My whole soul was poured out in these words. Some powerful hands seized me just as I was sinking and threw me far away from the abyss. The shock was sudden and violent. All at once I found myself in my usual surroundings, in my own room; it was as though from mystical non-being I was transferred to ordinary everyday existence. Then I suddenly felt that I was before the face of God and woke up, bathed in a cold sweat. Almost four years have passed since then, but I still shudder at the mention of the words *second*

¹ H. Seuse, *Deutsche Schriften*, i, p. 9 (ed. E. Diederichs).

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death, of outer darkness, and of casting out of the kingdom. Even now I tremble all over when I read, 'Let me not be alone except in Thee who hast given me my breath, my life, my gladness, my salvation,' that is, let me not be in the darkness which is outside of Life, Breath, and Gladness. And even now with sorrow and excitement I hear the words of the Psalmist, 'Cast me not away from thy presence, and take not thy holy spirit from me.'"¹

If we bring together the opposite extremes of the absolute fulness of being, and the infernal nearness to absolute destruction, there is exhibited with particular brightness the essence of positive and negative values. The Absolute fulness of the Divine Being is absolute perfection, worthy of unconditional approval—something of such a character that it not only exists, but is worth existing. It is Goodness itself, not only in the sense of morality, but in the all-embracing sense of the word, the First Principle which Plato called τὸ ἀγαθόν. It stands "on the other side of Being," not because It does not exist, but because there is no distinction between being and value in It. *It is existence as Existing Meaning, Existing Significance itself.*² It is impossible to seek any other definition of the good except that of pointing to the Good Itself; it is impossible because the Good is

¹ P. Florensky, *The Pillar and Foundation of Truth* (in Russian). From a translation by Natalie A. Duddington in the *Slavonic Review*, iii, No. 7, pp. 99, 100. By permission of the Editors.

² W. Stern defines any intrinsic value (*Selbstwert*) as "*in sich ruhende Bedeutung, der in sich Erfüllung suchende und findende Sinn*" ("Meaning that rests in itself; purpose, seeking realization and finding it in itself," *Wert-philosophie*, p. 43). He adds that here we have to use imperfect descriptions to tell about that which is really "*already indefinable.*"

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primal, it is the absolute positive value, an intrinsic value (self-value). Even the smallest derivative good becomes good *only by communing with the Good Itself*. Therefore, our further investigation of values will consist of an examination of the different moments, ways, and means of the communion of the world with It. Everything that is connected in any degree with the Good, that is with God, as the Absolute Fulness of Being, contains within itself the justification and worthiness of its existence. This positive value of that which is connected in any degree with the Good has, as the symptom of its dependence upon this participation in various ways, an infinite number of diverse positive feelings—the feelings of pleasure, delight, exaltedness, quietness, belief, hope, and so on. These feelings make us foretaste the fulness of bliss of the Divine Being. On the other hand, everything that is an obstacle to the realization of the Absolute Fulness of Existence is not worth existing. Such negative values are expressed symptomatically in the negative feelings of suffering, repulsion, lowness, insipidness, dread, restlessness, forsakenness, and so on. These feelings make us foretaste the extreme sufferings of the hellish disintegration of being.

In addition to the divine fulness of being as the Good Itself with positive and negative values thought of as depending on It, we can also try to imagine a system of existence in which nothing would have positive or negative value. Such an imagined indifferent existence we shall now examine particularly. Its examination will reveal to us the essential conditions of the possibility of value in general, and at the same time will deepen our under-

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standing of the nature of value. In making this examination we shall also find out whether being can really exist without value, or whether being without value is only built up in imagination as a subjective project, the product of a mental experiment. If being cannot exist without value, then this will mean that the condition of existence and the conditions of value either correspond or else are necessarily connected with each other in such a way that existence must be either of good quality or the opposite; but it cannot be indifferent.

CHAPTER III

The Conditions that Make Value Possible

I. THE EXISTENCE OF THE SUBSTANTIVAL AGENT FOR HIMSELF

Let us imagine a world in which everything that exists should be deprived of existence for itself and existence for others, i.e. the kind of a world in which there would be no *experience of self* and *experience of others*, in which *consciousness* would be impossible. Let us imagine a world consisting of the atoms of Democritus without the existence in it of living, feeling, and conscious beings. In such a world there would be nothing except hard particles that move in space, strike each other by chance, and rebound. This changes their velocity and direction of movement, but all these changes occur accidentally, without sense and without reason. We would have to say of such existence that it does not exist for itself or for anybody else. It has no meaning for itself or for anybody else. It is also clear that it has *no value*.

Now let us ask ourselves if a world can exist in which nothing that exists lives for itself and experiences the existence of others, a world in which nothing has any meaning for itself or for others. Such a world, as we find it in the multitude of Democritus' atoms, fails to possess that particular form of *unity* by which parts of the whole, its aspects or elements, are not imprisoned within the space and time interval which they occupy, or are not locked in general in their content as separate

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particles, but rather *transcend* the limits of the space and time which they occupy as well as their own content of existence, so that they can exist for themselves and for others in the form of personal experience and of being experienced by other beings. Such a world contains within itself only limited and particular contents of existence, i.e. contents subordinated to the law of identity, contradiction, and the excluded middle; such contents cannot of themselves transcend their own limits. Examining such contents of existence separately, it is impossible to understand the transcendence by them of their own limits, such a transcendence as the experience of themselves and experience of them by other beings. We cannot even understand such a transcendence as the forming of any kind of *relations* among them, such as the relations of proximity, distance, before, after, identity, similarity, difference, causality, etc. However, apart from these relations, especially such relations as identity and contradiction, these definite, limited contents cannot exist; they cannot exist on their own account. Hence it follows that they are not self-sufficient; they presuppose some other more fundamental being which forms their foundation as definite contents, in accordance with the relation of identity and contradiction, and *realizes* them with all their interrelations in accordance with the forms of *space and time*. To avoid a *regressus in infinitum*, the ground of these definite contents and their relations, the ground which lies on a higher level than they, may be thought of only as a principle that is *super-temporal*, *super-spatial*, and *super-logical*, i.e. not subordinated to *formal logical* definitions, but *metalogical*. This principle

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is not only ideal, but also *concretely-ideal* existence. It is the creative source of *real existence*, i.e. of events that have temporal and spatio-temporal existence.¹

In themselves events occupy only a particular interval of time and a position in space. They can transcend the limits of a given space and a given time interval (e.g. the motion of a mass, or the sense of danger) only in so far as they are so closely connected with a concretely-ideal existent that they form with it one whole, and existing in it they are not isolated but are *related* to each other and have a *meaning* for each other. This is possible only if the concretely-ideal existent *creates* real processes as *its own manifestations*. This concretely-ideal existent is not only the cause of events, but also their possessor and bearer.

The concretely-ideal existent as the creative source and the bearer of its own manifestations may be termed *substance* or *subject*. To make it more concrete and comprehensible I will call it the *substantival agent*.

An example of the substantival agent familiar to each one of us through direct observation, a subject that creates real being, is our own "self" or "ego." Each of my feelings, desires, and actions belongs to the sphere of the *real*, i.e. temporal existence, and therefore differs radically from my ego, which is super-temporal and super-spatial—that is, is *concretely-ideal*. Indeed, my feelings appear and later disappear; they have a definite flow in time. Repulsions that I perform have, besides a

¹ By the term *ideal existence* we indicate everything that has no spatial and temporal form; by *concretely-ideal* existence we mean an ideal existence which produces events and processes, i.e. real existence.

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time interval, a particular spatial form as well. But my ego itself, the cause of these events, has no spatial form; it is not linear, not a surface, not cubic, etc. Likewise, my ego has no temporal form; it does not flow in time as do sensations and desires. It does not appear and disappear; it is super-temporal; it is a deep-lying inner existence, while sensations, desires, and actions are only temporal existence. Nevertheless, feelings, desires, and actions are most closely connected with the ego. They are its manifestations, *its experiences*. When the ego creates them, they not only exist, but they exist for that ego, as that *in which* the ego lives, and in which the ego has existence for itself. The ego's experience of itself in its own manifestations is something simpler than consciousness in which subject and object are separated and distinguished through the act of attention. It may be termed *pre-consciousness*, because it is a condition which makes consciousness possible, inasmuch as it already contains the most important elements of the structure of consciousness. In particular, pre-consciousness involves the presence of the ego and the ego's manifestations characterized by the ego's *immanence in all of them*. Hence, every manifestation transcends the limits of its own being, is immanent in every other, and is a *meaning* for the ego.

The structure of existence which consists of the ego being immanent in all its manifestations, and of them existing *for the ego*, is not only pre-consciousness, on the basis of which consciousness and also purely *theoretical* activity may later develop, but it is also *pre-feeling*. Indeed, each element of existence is also a value in so

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far as it is a factor in the approach or movement away from the fulness of being. Included in the content of the life of a subject, each element of existence, together with its valuable aspect, exists for the subject as something *satisfying* or dissatisfying him. In the developed conscious life of a subject this side of his manifestations is expressed in more or less complex and diverse *feelings*, positive or negative, whereas on the lower levels of life they are expressed in the elementary experience of *accepting* or *rejecting*, which we termed *pre-feeling*, because due to its simplicity pre-feeling stands lower on the scale than the conscious feelings of pleasure or displeasure. Such elementary pre-conscious experiences may be termed *psychoidal* to distinguish them from conscious *psychic* states.

Thus the existence of manifestations for the subject, which we called his experiences, is not simply theoretical but also *practical* existence for him. This practical existence is expressed in his feelings, or at least by something analogous to feelings.¹

In the structure of real existence as we have described it, created as it is by the substantival agent, there are included the most important conditions of value, as the *meaningful aspect* of existence. These conditions are the connection between events by means of *relation*, the *transcendence* by events of their own limits, and their

¹ In S. Frank's book, *The Soul of Man*, this moment of experience is beautifully described; but it is observed as a symptom of the *life of the soul*, i.e. as belonging to the psychic sphere. According to my point of view, only those responses belong to the psychic or psychoidal sphere which involve time but possess no spatial form. (Published in Russian.)

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existence for the agent-subject as *his* manifestations and experiences. It is by virtue of this last condition that we may speak of the *existence of a subject for itself in its own manifestations*.

2. IMMANENCE OF EVERYTHING IN EVERYTHING

We must, however, immediately remind ourselves that in the world there is not only one, but a multitude of substantival agents, each one with his own peculiar sphere of manifestations and experiences. This contention is established by immediate observation, which shows that the different events represent manifestations of different agents. For example, if I am holding up a heavy book of music for an artist and listen to his singing, I immediately observe that attention is my manifestation, that singing is the manifestation of the artist, and that the pressure on my hand comes from the book.

The fact that many manifestations are directed *against one another*, that they possess a character of conflicting *opposition* and *mutual oppression*, serves as an indirect confirmation of the presence of many substantival agents. Such, for example, are the manifestations of hatred among people; such are the phenomena of physical mutual repulsion in space, etc.

Manifestations of different substantival agents are not isolated one from another. The real existence which an agent creates is correlated not only with other manifestations of the same agent, but with all the manifestations of other agents, forming one cosmos. The common framework of this cosmos is space, time, number, etc., forms in accordance with which each agent realizes his

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manifestations. The principles of these forms are non-temporal and non-spatial; consequently they are *ideal* principles. These principles are the subject-matter of the study of logic and mathematics. They differ from concretely-ideal principles, i.e. from substantival agents, by their limited definiteness, passiveness, and dependence. Indeed, these principles cannot form events by themselves, but only in so far as substantival agents create their manifestations *in accordance* with these principles. Therefore we can designate them as *abstractly-ideal* principles. *They are numerically the same* for all substantival agents. Consequently, agents in their existence are not isolated from each other. Each agent possesses his own creative power of action; but all agents together, as bearers of the same abstractly-ideal principles, are welded into a unit. This welding together of them may be called their *consubstantiality*.

The welding together of the agents of our kingdom of existence is profoundly different from that concrete unity which is thought of in the Christian dogma of the consubstantiality of the three Persons of the Holy Trinity, who lovingly accept and adopt all of each other's content, and therefore live *unanimously*. The consubstantiality which we discovered in the world creates only *abstract forms of unity*, or the general framework of the cosmos. This general framework might contain the unanimity of love, inimical conflicting opposition, or unions egoistically based on the common advantage. Therefore such consubstantiality may be called *abstract consubstantiality*.¹

¹ As to the meaning of the concept of consubstantiality in the metaphysics that deals with the existence of the world, see *The Pillar*

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Because of this welding together of the substantial agents in the form of abstract consubstantiality, the manifestations of each agent are correlated not only among themselves, but also with the manifestations of all other agents. Moreover, they are *coordinated* in such a manner that they exist not only for that agent who creates them as his own experience, but also for all other agents: in the world everything is *immanent in everything else*.

Each agent's transcendence of the limits of his own manifestations and his embracing of all other agents and their manifestations is still not consciousness of the outer world, but it is an important condition for the development of such consciousness. Therefore it may be called *pre-consciousness* (supra, p. 65). Due to this structure of existence the origination of consciousness and knowledge is possible on the higher levels of the development of life. Also in theoretical activity there is the possibility of intuition, the act of immediate contemplation and knowledge of the being of others; and in the practical life of feeling and will we have the possibility of sympathy and love—that is, taking to heart the experiences of others and struggling for them as if they were our own. But from the same source there also arises a possibility of that deep antipathy and hatred which are turned directly against the very roots of the life of some other being. On the lower levels of life this

and Foundation of Truth of Father P. Florensky (in Russian). Father Florensky's book is translated in part in Hans Ehrenberg's *Östliches Christentum*, ii, pp. 28 ff. For the differentiation of the two kinds of consubstantiality and application of these concepts to the cosmos, see my book *The World as an Organic Whole*.

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practical relation manifests itself as a lamentable psychoidal acceptance or rejection of another being, an acceptance or rejection which may be called pre-feeling.

3. GOD AND THE KINGDOM OF GOD

The world cannot contain the cause of its own being within itself, even though it consists of agents self-sufficient in so far as they create their manifestations in space and time, because these agents are connected by the relative consubstantiality which conditions a single *form* of space, time, etc. It presupposes a single creative source of its origin which causes agents to be members of one system of relations. This source of the world can be thought of only as a Super-Systemic, Super-Cosmic Principle, incommensurate with the world. Indeed, if It were connected with the world simply by the relation of partial identity and contradiction, It would be a *member of the system*, and again the question would arise as to a higher principle conditioning this system.¹

The Super-Cosmic Principle is given in religious experience as a Living Personal God. However, this produces no contradiction between reflective thought and religious experience. The principle which is incommensurate with the world certainly must be super-personal, but this does not prevent it from assuming also the character of *personal* being, especially in relation to the world. Its difference from the existence of the world still remains indubitable: a personal existent of the world cannot become higher than its personal form; it *is* a personality. On the contrary, the Super-Cosmic Principle

¹ See my book *The World as an Organic Whole*, chap. v.

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possesses personal existence, but is not limited to it. And if in Revelation it is described as Three Persons, our thought can accept this assertion, not trying, of course, to prove it, but trying only to comprehend it within the idea of a Super-personal Principle, to whom Personal existence is also accessible.

The super-philosophic idea of the personal life of the Trinity in the absolute fulness of Divine existence is of the utmost importance for all fundamental philosophical problems, and also for the problem of value. Indeed, the life of the Holy Trinity, the life of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost is a "unity without fusion, a difference without discrepancy," as N. F. Fyodoroff put it.¹ The individual uniqueness of each of these three Persons is the source of Their mutual enrichment, and not of Their oppression and impoverishment, because in Their intercourse *concrete consubstantiality* is fully realized. The Three Persons of the Holy Trinity, due to their perfect mutual love, full mutual acceptance, and complete mutual self-surrender, realize a perfect unanimity of spirit which creates the richness and fulness of their common life. The Divine life in its composition and content is a prototype of all the aspects of good in our earthly being. Theologians comprehend this profound significance of the Trinity for life by cold philosophical meditation, but the saints immediately experience the life-giving significance of the dogma in their religious experience. St. Sergius of Radonega, on the site of the future monastery, built the first Church

¹ N. F. Fyodoroff, *Philosophy of the Common Task*, 2nd ed. (in Russian).

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of the Holy Name of the Life-Giving Trinity as a symbol of *unity in love*, so that the people looking at this symbol would conquer in themselves the division of the world due to hate. The Trinity, as Love, and as the expression of the *corporate unity* of the Absolute Subject, was the object of immediate contemplation of the saint.¹

The *abstract consubstantiality* of substantival agents makes possible the *voluntary* realization by them of *concrete consubstantiality*. Due to abstract consubstantiality everything is immanent in everything else. All the manifestations of every substantival agent possess meaning not only for him, but also for all other agents as well. All that exists in the world complements the sphere of life of each being, enriches or impoverishes it, helps or counteracts it. Everything that enters the sphere of the life of a subject is not received indifferently, but produces in him a reaction of feeling, or at least something analogous to feeling in the form of acceptance or rejection. The creative activity of the substantival agent which is realized on the ground of the structure of the existence that has been discovered has a purposive character, and one that *works towards some end*. Being super-temporal, the agent is able to foretaste the valuable future as a possibility. He is able to develop conscious desire and feeling, or at least a psychoidal striving for it, and in accordance with this striving to perform actions in the present, for the sake of the future and on the basis of past experience ("the historical basis of reaction," to use the terminology of Driesch).

¹ See Father S. Bulgakoff's "The Beneficent Covenants of St. Sergius to Russian Theology," *Puti*, 1926, No. 5 (in Russian).

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Desire, and the activity which works toward some end, can be directed only to the realization of the positive value foretasted. The strivings for relative, derivative, or instrumental values are caused in the end by some deeper longing, by the final fundamental attraction for absolute intrinsic value. Such final intrinsic value, which contains all positive values and in which there is no *separation of value and existence* is the absolute fulness of being. Its symptom is a feeling of complete satisfaction, bliss. This absolute fulness of being is the real and final goal of every activity of every being. But it is given in God, and is God; consequently every being strives to *participate in the divine fulness of existence; it strives for deification.*

The theory of the striving of the world to God, as the absolutely valuable principle, is very common in philosophy. According to Aristotle, the world as a whole strives in love toward God as its final goal (see, for example, *Metaph.*, xii (L) 7, 1072). Dionysius the Areopagite (Pseudo-Dionysius) asserts that everything aspires to the Absolute which is the basis of perfection of every being (*Concerning the Divine Names*, i, 6, 7). A similar theory is developed by St. Maximus the Confessor (for example, *De ambiguis*, chap. xxxvii). St. Augustine says: "*Res igitur, quibus fruendum est, Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, eademque Trinitas, una quaedam summa res, communisque omnibus fruentibus ea*" (*De doctrina christiana*, bk. i, chap. v, 5). By the word *frui* he understands: "*amore alicui rei inhaerere propter seipsam*" ("to seek something for its own sake"; see also chap. iv, 4). Albertus Magnus, referring to Aristotle and Dionysius

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the Areopagite, says that God is "the final goal desired by everybody." "The Divine good is the goal of everybody"; even a stone "strives to be one; in the unity of its parts lies its preservation, and this unity is a shadow of the first principle which preserves and which in itself preserves and unites." All common cases of good are derivative from the fundamental. Thus, the goals *nearer* us are different, but the *final* goal is the same (*Summa theologica*, pt. i, tr. xiii, qu. 55, memb. 3). According to the teachings of St. Thomas Aquinas, God is the final goal of men and of all conscious beings; so far as unconscious beings are concerned, He is their final goal only in so far as they "have something in common with God" (*similitudo*, but not *imago Dei*, *Summa theologica*, pt. ii, i, qu. i, art. viii). Johannes Scotus Erigena sees the end of history in the state where "every being will reunite with the Creator and will be one in Him and with Him" without destruction and mixture of matter and substance (*De divisione naturae*, bk. v, 20).

In modern philosophy we find numerous examples of similar theories. I will only mention Vladimir Solovyof, who in his *Justification of the Good* indicates the theory that the fundamental stages of evolution are steps as the means of ascent to the Kingdom of God (chap. ix, 4).¹

As far as man is concerned, the theory that the true and final goal is *deification* (*θέωσις*) is accepted by almost all the Fathers of the Church who touched upon this question, especially by the Eastern Fathers.

¹ See my article, "V. Solovyof's Theory of Evolution," *Journal of the Russian People's University*, Prague, 1931. (In Russian. This article appears in German in *Festschrift Th. G. Masaryk zum 80 Geburtstag*, Erster Teil.)

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4. LOVE AND FREEDOM

An agent who stands in a relation of conflicting opposition to other agents, exhibiting strivings that by their very nature disagree with the strivings of other agents, i.e. egoistically exclusive strivings, actualizes a very poor content of existence, for he must rely upon his own isolated power alone. Instead of the absolute fulness, there appears an extreme scantiness of being. An extreme degree of this scantiness, known to modern science, is the existence of the isolated electron. A way of escape from the condition of isolation and scantiness may be achieved in so far as two or more substantial agents accept and adopt at least a few of each other's strivings; at least in a few relations cease conflicting opposition against each other, and combine their powers of action together. The unity and the integral character of the mutual action can be understood only as the acquisition by several agents of strivings more complex and rich in content than their own. These are the strivings of an agent who exceeds them in his creative and inventive abilities, and with him they form a union for a more or less long period of time. Each agent then becomes similar to an organ for the carrying out of some side of the mutual activity. An example of such unions would be: the unification of electrons and protons which makes the atom, next the molecule, then the cell, the multi-celled organism, society, etc., and finally the universe as a whole. Due to the coördination of their powers, each new level of unification shows a higher, more complex, and more diverse activity than that of the preceding

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stages. On the ground of abstract consubstantiality higher and higher levels of concrete consubstantiality are thus gradually realized.

The highest level of concrete consubstantiality is attained by means of uniting with God, and God uniting with the whole world. This union may become perfect in no other way than on the ground of *love for God and for all the beings of the world*, because love alone is the perfect acceptance and adoption of the existence of others. Agents, impregnated with perfect love for God and for all the world, form the Kingdom of God, in which they reach the absolute fulness of being and the utmost limit of perfection.

Love is possible only as the *voluntary* manifestation of an agent. Any constrained acceptance of the existence of others arises either from prudential motives, or from fear, or due to some egoistical striving in general. Hence, such acceptance can be only *partial*, since any egoistical manifestation is a partial existence, one not embracing the whole fulness of being.

Therefore *freedom*, together with love, *is also a necessary condition of the absolute fulness of being* and the finality of perfection. Only a free being may be perfect.

So there arises an important question for ontology as to whether the substantial agents possess freedom or not. This most difficult problem in philosophy requires a special investigation; this I have made in my book *Freedom of the Will*. In it I prove the freedom of the substantial agent by developing the dynamic theory of causality according to which the origination of any event is a *creative act* of an agent and is in no way forced by

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the external conditions. Everything that exists or happens outside the agent is only a *stimulus* for the manifestation of his creative activity, but cannot be the cause of changes in him. As far as the agent himself is concerned, all the *qualitative distinctions* which pertain to him, e.g. his character, are something derivative from his own activity. Beyond them stands the *super-qualitative* creative power of the agent creating qualitatively definite events. Thus, an agent *determines* events, but is *not determined by them*.

The freedom of agents, as an essential condition of the possibility of love, and hence of the perfection of the divine fulness of being, is at the same time the condition that makes possible evil in the world. The fundamental primary choice of the way of life by substantival agents lies in the fact that in striving towards the absolute fulness of life some of them manifest an unselfish love for this perfection in God, and becoming members of the Kingdom of God, commune with the fulness of His being through harmonious activity with Him and with all the members of His Kingdom; they become worthy of deification. Other agents set out to reach the absolute fulness of being, fully or partly outside of God, by way of activity in accordance with their own plan and choice. On this path are realized extremely variable and different levels of apostasy from God, and of egoistical exclusion.

Investigating the conditions that make values possible, we have arrived at several of the fundamental contentions of the metaphysical system developed in my book, *The World as an Organic Whole*. There I call the Kingdom of God or the kingdom of love also the Kingdom of the Spirit, while the realm of beings who exist in a condition

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of apostacy from God I term the kingdom of enmity, or kingdom of psycho-physical being. Holding the dynamic theory of matter, I defended in that book the theory that the physical processes of *repulsion* which create *impenetrable extended bodies* come into being on the ground of psychic and psychoidal strivings, strivings that contain at least in part an *egoistical* moment. Thus, impenetrable (relatively impenetrable) matter is the consequence of *falling away from God* and from the kingdom of perfect love. The members of the Kingdom of God are far from any manifestations of egoism; they do not commit acts of *repulsion* and therefore do not possess impenetrable bodies. Their *transfigured spirit-bearing* bodies consist of only such aesthetic spatial contents as light, sound, warmth, odour, etc., which are interpenetrative. In the Kingdom of God, therefore, there is realized not only a perfect *unanimity of spirit*, but also a perfect *intercourse of bodies*.¹

By the words "spirit" and "spiritual" I indicate here all those ideal foundations of the world, concrete and abstract, which serve as the condition of the possibility of the Kingdom of God, and also all those processes having special form which contain no egoistical exclusion and hence, even though building a spatial, spirit-bearing

¹ See my article, "The Resurrection of the Body," *Puti*, 1931. The theory that the impenetrable body is the consequence of falling away from God is often met in philosophy in different forms. It is developed, for example, by Origen, Erigena (*De divisione naturae*, bk. ii, 9); in modern philosophy by Renouvier and V. Solovyof. In the form of a psychological and subjective theory of matter it is found in Christian Science, which particularly stresses that matter is an illusionary concept conditioned by our egoism. In Russian literature it is found in the philosophy of P. N. Nikolaieff, *Research as to the Nature of our Consciousness*.

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body, form a unity possessing an aspect of highly organic wholeness. In the Kingdom of the Spirit: (1) every part exists for the whole, (2) the whole exists for every part, and (3) each part is the whole in some particular aspect of it.

This structure of the Kingdom of God necessarily leads us to the concept of *individual existence* as the most important condition, as well as a very essential moment of perfection. So now we will turn to the examination of the nature of individual existence.

5. INDIVIDUAL EXISTENCE

The individual is that which possesses uniqueness in being and in value. This uniqueness cannot be re-duplicated in the world. That which is individual is *singular* and *irreplaceable*.¹

Two types of individual must be distinguished: the *individual event* and the individual being or *individual*. The first belongs to the realm of the real; the second—to the realm of ideal being. Besides the characteristics of singularity and irreplaceableness, the concept of individual includes also the characteristic of indivisibility. The indivisibility which we here have in mind is not relative indivisibility (for example, the relative indivisibility which Rickert has in mind when he says that the Koh-i-noor diamond can, of course, be split into a multitude of pieces, but that individual which bears the proper name Koh-i-noor then will be no more), but

¹ The valuable aspect of the individual, precisely its irreplaceableness, is presented by Rickert. See also some considerations concerning it in G. D. Gurvitch's *Fichtes System der konkreten Ethik*.

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we have in mind *absolute indivisibility*. It belongs to that existence which cannot be split into pieces by any power or by any means. Such is the absolute indivisibility that is thought of, for example, in Leibniz's concept of the monad, or Democritus' atom.

The contentions stated contain only a hypothetical definition of the individual. In the traditional logic such a definition is called nominal. In the nominal definition we have in mind an object not as it is discovered to be, but only as it is supposed to be. Now we must decide whether we can transform this definition into a *categoric* (real) definition, i.e. show that objects fitting this definition really exist in the world.¹

We will try to obtain a solution of this problem by using as our starting-point the concept of value; although, since this is a fundamental problem, it may also be solved in many other ways. Values exist only in correlation with the absolute fulness of being, which we have already decided is the absolute intrinsic value, containing within itself the coincidence of value and existence. The absolute fulness of being is something singular and irreplaceable by any other value, i.e. it is individual. We have only to decide whether this individual principle belongs to the composition of being only as a possibility, or whether it is already a realized actuality.

The values of the world's existence, as well as the world's existence itself, exist only on the ground of a Super-Cosmic principle, and this Principle, in so far as it is God, is the absolute fulness of being. Thus, at least

¹ As to nominal (hypothetical) and real (categoric) definitions, see my *Logik*, § 51.

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one individual principle, that is, God, exists not only as a possibility, but as an actuality.

According to the Christian Revelation this absolute fulness of being is not one but three individual principles: God the Father, God the Son (Logos), and God the Holy Spirit. This, however, does not mean that there are three specimens of the absolute fulness of being. The three individual principles in the Christian dogma are thought of as impregnated with perfect love for each other and consequently as participating fully in each other's life, so that the absolute fulness of their existence is something that is united and is singular. It cannot be expressed adequately in the categories of the world order; the words existence, individual, etc., are used in application to it in an impersonal sense only by analogy. The forms of space and time are likewise unnecessary for this sphere: the Divine fulness of being is also fulness without action in time.

In the composition of the world, substantival agents, bearers of super-qualitative creative power in themselves, do not constitute the absolute fulness of being. Meaningful existence is reached by them only by way of creative activity *in time*, i.e. by way of realizing the real being that possesses qualities. This activity cannot be reduced merely to an act of contemplation directed on God, and upon the manifestations of other agents as alien existences. Such a communion of the agent with the life of others from outside, only by way of contemplation, would not be in him a personal experience of the absolute fulness of being as *his own* being. Meaningful existence may be reached only by way of personal creative activity which

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is meaningful. This creative activity, however, must not be isolated, but must be a combination of the creative power of the agent with the power of the Lord God and all other agents in so far as they follow the course of perfect union with God, i.e. in so far as they have love for God. Such a creative activity on the part of many agents on the ground of the loving acceptance of the existence of each other is a *collective* building of the single whole. In it the fulness of being as the personal experience of each of the participants in the building of the whole is realized. This is not a second specimen of the absolute fulness of being, standing beside the Divine fulness of being: this is the fulness of Divine being with the active collective participation of all God's creatures within it.

The falling away of many agents from God does not lead to diminution of the fulness of being of the Kingdom of God. Where the Divine eternity of life lies at the base, the joining to it or separation from it of single units does not produce increase or diminution. This joining or separation is an infinite gain or an infinite loss to the created agent, but not to God and the Kingdom of God.

The fulness of being in the Kingdom of God is not a super-temporal repose. On the contrary, the members of this Kingdom manifest the highest degree of creative activity, building infinitely complex new contents of existence all the time, however, without the oblivion of the absolutely valuable creations already made by them, and with the potential presence of the future in the present. In virtue of this immanence of the past and the future in the present the fulness of existence in the

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Kingdom of God suffers no diminution from the temporal form of its real aspect.¹

Every creative act in the Kingdom of God contributes to the composition of the Kingdom an infinitely complex new individual content, i.e. it represents something original that cannot be duplicated and has irreplaceable value within the limits of the world's existence. Indeed, every manifestation of the agent in the Kingdom of God possesses a character of active co-participation with the collective creative activity of all other agents, which is possible only by the contributing of a unique *new* action, correlated with all other contents in such a way as to form together with them one whole. In the Kingdom of the Spirit where there is complete interpenetration and where there is no oblivion, the repetition of what is already accomplished or is being accomplished would have no meaning for others or for the agent who is acting. Repetitions would have meaning only under the condition of a greater or less isolation of agents, i.e. in the kingdom of psycho-physical being. Thus, real processes can be fully individual only in the Kingdom of the Spirit. Since they are in the state of harmonious correlation with all other events, each of them possesses its peculiar destination and meaning in the whole, irreplaceable by any other events of the world. According to the definition of Frank, "the individual or unique being is something that is wholly or completely definite,

¹ As to the purposiveness of oblivion, i.e. partial death in the kingdom of psycho-physical being, and as to the impossibility of oblivion in the Kingdom of God, where every act is a realization of an absolute value, and as to the peculiar type of time in the Kingdom of God, see my book, *The World as an Organic Whole*, chap. vi.

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precisely in the sense that it is defined (in contrast to the logical, i.e. common definitiveness) not only by the super-temporal aspect of the all-embracing totality, but also by the concrete all-embracing totality in all its wholeness.”¹

All actions of the members of the Kingdom of God are individual, and, consequently, the agents of this Kingdom themselves are *individuals*. Each one of them has, because of his activity, a particular meaning for the whole; and also each one of them, being super-temporal, is absolutely indivisible.

The character of the individuality of the substantival agent is due not only to his activities, but also to his ideal essence. As a matter of fact every action in time and space represents the realization of a corresponding idea.² Thus the particular participation of the agent in the collective creative building of the Kingdom of God is expressed in his individual idea. This idea determines the place of the agent in the Kingdom of God; it determines his destiny in the world; his destiny the reaching of which is accompanied by his deification. Consequently such an individual idea is an “image of God” inherent in the individual. As an individual aspect of the collective union of the individual with all other individuals which are independent of him, it can be only the protoplasmic “thought” of the Creator concerning the individual whom He creates. The individual’s freedom of action is not trammelled by this ideal of his essence: the individual

¹ S. Frank, *Predmet Znania* (*The Object of Knowledge*), p. 415.

² As to the ideal bases of real existence, see my book, *Sensory, Intellectual, and Mystic Intuition* (soon to appear in print).

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idea is not the natural, but is the normative essence of the agent. He may voluntarily accept it for his guidance and work to realize it, but he may also reject the ideal of its realization.¹

An agent who has fallen away from the Kingdom of God does not lose his individual idea and his formal freedom: he remains a potential member of the Kingdom of God. Thus the whole world consists of individual substantival agents. Now we have only to discover the nature of their activities in the psycho-physical kingdom of being; we have only to find out whether their activities possess an individual character.

In our kingdom of being many actions are repeated many times over and with depressing monotony. They contain within themselves not only a moment of positive, but also a moment of negative value, and one may be replaced by another due to their impoverished positive value. Even if we do speak of the individual character of actions in this world, still it will prove to be a uniqueness which is profoundly different from the individuality of actions in the Kingdom of God. In most of the processes of a psycho-physical being a content which becomes predominant is not an individual content, but one that can be replaced or repeated many times over. And this is not surprising. Agents of the psycho-physical kingdom realize strivings which are more or less egoistically exclusive. They are in a relation of isolation and conflicting opposition to the great majority of other agents. Their actions do not at all represent the infinitely

¹ See *Freedom of the Will*, chap. vi, § 4, "Man's Freedom from His Own Character."

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meaningful aspect of the collective fulness of being. Being correlated with only a part of the content of other agents, excluded as they are from the whole, their actions are abstracted and possess an impoverished, diminished character. In this sense even a concrete event in the psycho-physical kingdom is a mere *abstraction* in comparison with the fulness of being in the Kingdom of God. Because of its egoistic character and conflicting opposition to its medium, such an action cannot and should not be the object of complete co-participation, i.e. an object of full experience for other agents who are outside of the union of agents who performed it (outside of the given atom, molecule, organism, society, etc.). But because of its simplified character (due to its separation from the universal whole) such an action may be repeated by other agents for their own sake, and partly in opposition to other agents through imitation or by independent invention. Thus the more an individual agent withdraws from the collective combination of powers, and the more he relies only upon his own creative power alone, the less he is able to realize his irreplaceable individuality, and to manifest himself as a unique, creatively original being. The greater his exclusive self-containment is, the greater then the impoverishment of his activities becomes, and the nearer will be his *approach to the state where his actions can be expressed in an aggregate of general abstract concepts*. The most extreme level of isolation known to us, that of the isolated electron, leads to the very elementary actions of repulsion and attraction which can be repeated a multitude of times in the same form. Instead of fulness there appears

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poverty; instead of complete independence and freedom there is an extreme dependence upon the external stimuli for action and the downfall of *positive material freedom*, i.e. *the downfall of creative activity*.¹

The way of escape from this impoverished state of life is achieved by way of evolution: agents, at least partially, cease conflicting opposition to each other and enter into unions which gradually become more and more complex. In these unions agents of the lower levels of development adopt the strivings of a more highly developed agent and combine their powers for the realization of his strivings under his direction. They become organs of a united and more or less complex whole. Thus an atom comes into being, then a molecule, a unicellular organism, a multi-cellular organism, society, etc. Each successive level represents the invention of a new and higher type of existence, making possible more meaningful and diverse life, richer in creative activities.

In the kingdom of psycho-physical being, comparatively poor in creative inventiveness, almost every such new form of life becomes an object of *imitation* and becomes a more or less *common type* of life: first there is existence in the form of oxygen, hydrogen, carbon, etc., then existence in the form of molecules of water, molecules of carbonic acid, etc., then existence in the form of the particular species of plants, animals, etc.

Each new level we have enumerated in the succession of life produces manifestations which are less and less definable by bringing them under a general concept: the

¹ As to the concept of positive material freedom in distinction from the freedom which is only formal, see *Freedom of the Will*.

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individual character of the manifestations becomes more and more prominent. We can look upon such a process of evolution as a gradual re-acquiring by the agent of the ability to realize his individuality. Evolution is a series of steps in the *individuation* of life. However, not every line of evolution has the character of a true ascent to the fulness of being. Substantial agents create new forms of life by means of *voluntary* creative acts: they may also enter upon paths that lead into blind alleys or lead to the substitution of quantitative richness for qualitative diversity. Such, for example, is one of the temptations of parasitism. Or after a series of pseudo-enrichments of personal life the paths may lead to especially grave forms of disruption, due to their inner contradictions.¹

However, no matter how high the attained level of individuation may be, still as long as there remains some form of disruption, some form of isolation of agents and their actions, with it there remains also the possibility of the repetition of essential aspects of the action. Therefore everything that belongs to the kingdom of psychophysical being may be *classified*, can be brought under general concepts and distributed into species, genera, and families. It is only in the Kingdom of God that such classification under general concepts loses all meaning, because classification does not express the essence of its different aspects.

Actions are repeated not only by different agents, but

¹ See my articles, "The Limits of Evolution," in the *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, London, October 1927, and "The Nature of Satan According to Dostoevsky," in *Dostoevsky*, i, Red. Doleenin, Petrograd, 1922 (in Russian).

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also by the same agent. The first class of repetitions is due to the disruption of the collective unity of agents, and the second class to the disruptions in the life of each separate agent.

Indeed, actions containing in themselves even the very least moment of egoistic exclusiveness and, consequently, the very least moment of conflicting opposition to other agents, do not give the fulness of existence; they are one-sided in their content and in their value. Therefore they lead only in part to satisfaction and in part they lead to disappointment. Their complementation by a simple simultaneous combination with other reciprocal one-sided contents is impossible. Since they are connected with conflicting opposition these one-sided contents stand not only in the relation of *ideal* opposition to each other, but also in the relation of *real mutual exclusion*. Moreover, even different compatible contents, i.e. those which are in the relation of only an ideal opposition to each other and not of real mutual exclusion, frequently cannot be realized simultaneously by the agent because his creative powers are limited, in so far as he is isolated from other agents.¹ Therefore, having experienced a one-sided satisfaction, the agent removes the experience to the realm of the past by oblivion and by changing not infrequently to an opposite one-sided content, e.g. from busy life in society to concentrated solitude. Later he again returns to the first type of activity, etc. Not only the separate actions of the agent, but whole systems

¹ As to the differentiation of *ideal* opposition from *real* opposition, connected as it is with self-exclusion, see *The World as an Organic Whole*, chap. iv.

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of life, and whole types, e.g. types of plants, animals, societies, and historical epochs, may possess the character of such one-sided opposition.

Returning periodically to his former activities, an individual does not simply repeat them, but sometimes he perfects them in accordance with his creative inventive ability in the sense of attaining a somewhat greater fulness of content. Usually, however, these changes are insignificant, so that the type of action remains the same. Any considerable step forward in the achieving of the fulness of content usually requires the removal of certain forms of egoistic exclusiveness and the transition to a new type of life, to a higher level of it.

Actions and types of life that can be repeated do not contain within themselves the fulness of being, and, consequently, always contain in themselves, beside positive, also negative values. Therefore not their whole concrete content but only some moments of their content serve as the object of striving, the purpose of action. If the totality of their value moments is the content of a general concept under which we may bring the given object (action, or a being with a certain type of life, etc.), then, from the point of view of a given purpose, one particular object may be replaced by another object of the same class, one loaf of white bread by another, one soldier by another in the constructing of a pontoon bridge, one professor of mathematics by another, etc. In relation to a definite purpose, comparatively poor in content, separate objects are viewed not as individual existences but as *specimens of the class* which may be replaced by each other. Sometimes an individual prefers

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to value even himself by his general qualities. Thus there are people who even in personal unofficial intercourse prefer to be called not by their name but by indication of their title, rank, or office. The weakening of the realization of individual personal being, due for instance to timidity, may reach the pathological form of the appearance of a double, which really or imaginarily crowds the individual himself out of life.¹

May we say of objects that can be substituted for each other that they still are individual, if we take them as singular concrete wholes? The fall of the rain-drop, or, still simpler, the movement of this electron the distance of one centimetre is a *particular* event. But does it fit into the concept of an *individual* event? The whole content of such a simple event may be expressed in a general concept, and therefore clearly does not contain in itself anything singular or unrepeatably unique. However, if we add to the content of its existence its relation to other objects, then it will appear that every event has a singular, unrepeatable place in the universe. This means we add its exact position in time and space, and also its possession by this or that particular agent, who, as was already said, even in the state of apostasy is still an individual, due to its normative idea. Moreover, since the whole stream of life in the universe forms a single

¹ See B. Visheslavtsey's "The Meaning of the Heart in Religion," *Puti*, 1925, No. 1. As to the problem of a double and its connection with problems of concrete ethics, see investigation by D. I. Tschizevsky, "On the Problem of the Double," in the book *About Dostoevsky*,¹ i, the collection of articles under the redaction of A. Bem. See also the article by S. Hessen, "The Tragedy of the Good in the Brothers Karamasoff by Dostoevsky," *Contemporary Annals*, 1928 (in Russian).

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whole, then every event in connection with the setting in which it happens (the place of the happening) possesses a particular meaning, i.e. an irreplaceable value for the whole stream of universal life. Thus any particular concrete event, even in the psycho-physical kingdom, is individual. However, there exists a profound difference between the character of individuality in the Kingdom of God and the character of individuality in the psycho-physical kingdom. In the Kingdom of God the individual character of the event is determined from within by its whole content, a content that has a character of embracing the whole world, whereas in the kingdom of psycho-physical being the individual character of an event is conditioned ultimately from the outside, by its form, or, to put it precisely—by its position within the whole. Let us call the first type of individuality—*absolutely individual*, and the second type—*relatively individual*. In the composition of the first there are no moments of negative value; in the composition of the second there is always a combination of positive and negative values.

The profound difference between concrete ideal-realism and the rational systems of philosophy is contained in the theory of the *principle of individuation* which we have expounded. According to the rational systems, the highest primordial bases of existence are the general essences, the *genera* and the *species*. From the essence of the *species* individuals are derived as something wholly derivative, by a multiplication of the essence, due to the irrational principle of the lower order, e.g. because of matter that adopts repeatedly one and the same essence of the *species* (*species-form*) and realizes

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it in different parts of space and the different periods of time. Thus the individual is reduced to the level of being a representative specimen of the *species*.

According to concrete ideal-realism, on the contrary, first-created being is composed of individual substantival agents. Each of them possesses an inherent individual normative idea of God as its first-created and world-embracing *haecceitas* (this-ness). Only in the state of apostasy from God and isolation from other agents does the individual lose the ability to manifest his individuality in all its fulness and reduce his life to the level of the realization of a general idea, temporarily transmuting himself into a specimen of some species, genus, etc.

Absolutely individual creative activity, original in content, unrepeatable and irreplaceable by any other existence of the world, is a realization of the *image* of God, inherent in the substantival agent, building in him the *likeness* of God, accompanied by deification by grace; this is active co-participation in the absolute fulness of being of God and the Kingdom of God.

This highest level of creative activity is reached by the path of love for God and for all His creatures, but not by egoistic self-containment. Thus *absolutely individual being* is not evil but good—it is the *highest positive value*. The identification of personal individual uniqueness with evil, as, e.g., in Buddhism, is the consequence of a misunderstanding; it is the consequence of confusing *individual originality* with *egoistic exclusiveness*, self-containment, and conflicting opposition to other beings. To avoid such confusion we should accurately distinguish ideal differentiating opposition from real

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opposition. Ideal differentiating opposition, not being complicated by real opposition, gives us contents of being, compatible with each other and interpenetrating each other like the different tones of a musical chord; it is a condition of the perfect fulness of being.

6. PERSONALITY. THE SPIRITUAL FOUNDATIONS OF EXISTENCE

The most important condition of the possibility of values in the world we have found to be the existence of substantival agents, each one of which is an individual possessing a unique idea of God as a normative essence. Each agent possesses a super-qualitative creative power which he can voluntarily exercise for the realization of his normative idea, and in so doing can become worthy of being a member of the Kingdom of God. An agent who has comprehended absolute values and the duty of realizing them in his behaviour is a *personality*. Even in the condition of the fall, even on the level of the electron, the atom, the molecule, the substantival agent still preserves all those data, the correct utilization of which may elevate him to the level of personal existence. Therefore even in such a low state an agent, although not a personality, still is a *potential personality*. Indeed, even on the lowest levels of existence an agent is an individual being, capable by means of purposive creative activity of rising gradually to higher levels, up to the level of actual personal existence.

Thus personality is the central ontological element of the world: the fundamental existence is the substantival agent, i.e. a potential personality or an actual

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personality. Everything else, that is, the abstract ideas and real processes, exists either as belonging to or else as something derivative from the activity of potentially-personal and actually-personal agents. Indeed, non-substantial entities, such as e.g. a dead branch of a plant, or such as a machine, utensil, etc., are derivative from the activity of potentially-personal and actually-personal agents: the dead branch was originally an organ of a living plant, the machine was built by man. Moreover, each one of these non-substantial entities, even a machine, consists of a multitude of substantival agents, molecules, atoms, which are potentially-personal beings.

A philosophical system that asserts the basic and central position of personal existence in the composition of the world may be called *personalism*. The acceptance of hierarchical grades of substantival agents, appearing in the process of their development, may be indicated by the expression—*hierarchical personalism*. Such a theory may also be called *panvitalism*, at least in the sense that it takes every existence to be a living being. When I make this assertion I mean by the word “life” a purposive, creative activity which possesses the character of existing for itself.

The greatest representative of personalism in the history of philosophy is Leibniz. In the philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, among the personalists we should mention the followers of Leibniz; for example, Teichmüller, Boström, Lopatin, Kozlov, Askoldov, and others. Different forms of personalism are represented in the systems of Renouvier, Lotze, Fechner, Wundt, W. Stern, the English philosopher F. C. S.

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Schiller, and many others. Personalism is very widespread in American philosophy. It is found, for example, in the theories of G. H. Howison, G. T. Ladd, B. P. Bowne, J. Royce, and others.

Personalism may be established in different ways. In this book we have approached it by investigating the conditions that make value possible, or more exactly, by investigating such conditions as existence for oneself, and the meaning of every being for other beings. But personalism may be established also by investigating the basic ontological problem—the conditions of existence in general. Personalism is developed in this way in my book, *The World as an Organic Whole*. In the systems of Leibniz, Renouvier, Teichmüller, Kozlov, Askoldov, and Stern we may find the fundamental metaphysical contentions which establish the fact that existence in the true sense of the word belongs only to the personal or potentially-personal subject; and that everything that is not a subject exists due to the subject as its basis.

Thus if Scheler says that values may also exist without the subject, since they exist everywhere in nature, we shall agree with him in the last part only of his contention. It is true, values do exist everywhere in nature, but it does not follow from this that they exist apart from the subject. In nature everything is permeated with subjective being. Everywhere, wherever there is *something*, necessarily there is also *somebody* present. This thesis of the necessity of the subject for the existence of everything else, I assert, of course, not in the sense of gnoseological idealism, e.g. not in the sense of the

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Kantian theory of knowledge, but in the sense of metaphysical personalism.

The conditions that make values possible may be expressed even more generally still. Values are possible only if the bases of existence are *ideal* and also *spiritual*. Indeed, there belong to the realm of the spiritually-ideal all those ideal elements and aspects of existence which serve as the condition of the possibility of the Kingdom of God. Such are, first, the substantial agents themselves, in so far as they are super-temporal and super-spatial beings, and secondly, their abstract consubstantiality, or all the abstract-ideal forms of the unity of the cosmos, the coördination of agents, etc. These spiritual foundations of existence condition the ideal, i.e. the non-spatial and non-temporal *mutual immanence* even of such sides of existence as real processes and events taking place in different parts of space and at different times. This ideal mutual immanence is the condition of the possibility of purposes, meanings, and aims. This immanence consists in the being A and the being B existing for each other, not by means of the mechanical interaction of push and pressure upon each other, not by spatial or temporal proximity and sequence, but by means of a unity which is independent of spatio-temporal connections or disruptions and mechanical relations. This mutual immanence conditions the ideal orientation of the being A to the being B, so that A becomes meaningful, and B becomes its meaning. Such connection exists, for example, between the intentionally-psychic and physiological processes of speech on one side, and the objects spoken of on the other side. Such a connection exists in

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a purposive act between a movement directed by an intentionally-psychic or psychoidal process and the purpose of the movement. Such a connection exists in every valuable meaning of one being for another, despite their spatial and temporal separation or the fact that they belong to different substantival agents. There is such a meaning when the pure blue colour of a light ray, or an aria sung by Chaliapin, is not indifferent to me, because although they are realized in reality outside of me, they are still ideally present also in the composition of my life, enriching or impoverishing it.

CHAPTER IV

The Fundamental Characteristics of Values

I. THE DEFINITION OF VALUE

The concept of derivative value can be defined easily: it is any existence in its significance for the realization of the absolute fulness of being or for moving away from it. The whole difficulty lies in the definition of primary, super-cosmic, absolute positive value. It is God as Goodness itself, the absolute fulness of being. It possesses within itself the meaning that justifies it, makes it an object of approval, gives it the absolute right to be realized and preferred above everything else. In this definition there is no decomposition into elements; there is only an indication of the basic source and a prolific, though still not complete, enumeration of consequences that flow from it for the mind and will that in any degree commune with it (e.g. vindication, approbation, the acknowledgment of right, preference, etc.).

Likewise the definition of derivative value does not contain an analysis into *genus* and *differentiae*. Although its grammatical form appears the same as that in the definition "A square is a rectangle with equal sides," we should not be deceived by this seeming similarity. In the definition of the square the concept of rectangle is the *genus* which contains the square as a *species*. That is the reason that the proposition "a square is a rectangle," taken out of the whole definition expresses truth. The structure of the meaning of our definition of derivative

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value is quite different: in it "existence" is not a *genus* which includes the concept of value. This may be seen from the fact that the proposition "value is existence" is false. The superficial similarity of this definition of value to the definition by means of *genus* and *differentiae* results from the greater discursiveness of language than thought. However, that we must not detach the concept "existence" from this definition and reduce it to a predicate of the concept "value" is also indicated in the linguistic expression of the thought by means of the preposition "in," in the phrase "existence in its significance." This combination of words indicates that value is an organic unity, including in itself as elements existence and significance. But although it is based on these elements, it represents a new aspect of the world, different from its elements.

Experience which forms a part of the composition of value always contains within itself a moment which in developed consciousness is given as feeling and may be expressed in such words as pleasant, noble, sweet, delightful, tender, sublime, or in such words as disagreeable, trivial, rude, hideous, and so on. Disagreeing with Scheler, I have already pointed out that value cannot be reduced simply to these moments. These moments are the symptomatic moments of value, which at the same time are values in themselves as existences which are experienced.

Significance and meaning represent the *ideal* aspect of value. Hence, every value is either wholly ideal, or at least contains an ideal aspect within itself. If valuable existence is itself ideal existence, then value is wholly

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ideal. Thus, for example, the substantival agent, as a super-temporal and super-spatial source of actions, is a fully ideal value. If the valuable existence is real existence, then the corresponding value is ideal-real value. Such, for example, is an aria performed by a singer. The idea of the aria, the idea of a shrine, the idea of an act, and so on, is wholly an ideal value that can be actualized. The aria as being performed, the completed shrine, or the act as being committed, are ideal-real values.

Derivative values in their meaning have in general two possible directions of orientation—towards the realization of the absolute fulness of being, or away from it. Thus, they have a different polarity, or they may be positive or negative. The former are good, and the latter are evil—good and evil in the broad sense of the words, i.e. not meaning by them simply moral good and moral evil.

In order to follow the subsequent exposition it is important to keep in mind that from now on I shall frequently use the word *good* instead of the long expression “positive value,” and the word *evil* instead of “negative value.”

According to the ontological theory of values which I am developing, existence itself is not only a carrier of values, but is itself a value, if taken in its significance. It is itself either good or evil. That is why the differentiation of *Güter* (good things) from *Werte* (values), used in modern German literature to express existence as something that is not a value, but is only a bearer of value and the values themselves, has no essential significance for the theory that I am developing.

The polarity of values is necessarily connected likewise

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with the polarity of their symptomatic expression in feeling—primarily in the feelings of pleasure and pain. Similarly, the reaction of will to values, expressed as attraction or repulsion, is also polar.

The fact that possibly there is a relation of feeling and will to values gives us no right to build a psychological theory of value. Value conditions certain feelings and desires, but is not a consequence of them.

The fact that there is a necessary connection between values and the subject—since every value is a value for some subject—gives us no right to say that values are subjective. Just as knowledge of the world presupposes consciousness, but from this it does not follow that the truth discovered is wholly conditioned by consciousness, so likewise, the valuable character of the world presupposes the existence of subjects, but from this it does not follow that values are wholly conditioned by the existence of subjects. Value is something that transcends the opposition of subject and object, because it is conditioned by the relation of a subject to that which is higher than all subjective existence, that is to the Absolute Fulness of Being.¹

Value is always connected not only with the subject, but, specifically, with the life of the subject. This may be shown in the very definition of the concept of derivative value by putting it thus: value is existence in its significance—experienced by the existence itself or experienced by others—for the realization of the absolute

¹ See, for example, Heyde's reference to the fact that connection with the subject does not transform value into something subjective, *Wert*, p. 50.

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fulness of life, or for moving away from it. By the word life I mean here purposive activity existing expressly for each substantial agent. From this it becomes clear that such an interpretation of value is *not biologism*. The physical-bodily life of vegetable and animal organisms is only one of the forms of life in general. The absolute life of the Kingdom of God requires the ascent from the biological-physical-bodily life and the acquiring of a spirit-bearing body.

2. ABSOLUTE AND RELATIVE, OBJECTIVE AND SUBJECTIVE VALUES

An *absolute* positive value is a value unquestionably justified in itself, and, consequently, possessing the character of goodness from any standpoint, in any relation, and for any subject. Not only is it itself always good, but also the consequences that necessarily issue from it never contain evil in themselves. Such good is, for example, the Divine absolute fulness of being.

A *relative* positive value is a value possessing the character of goodness only in a certain relation or for certain specific subjects. In any other relation or for certain other subjects such a value is in itself evil, or at least is necessarily connected with evil. Values in which good is necessarily connected with evil are possible only in the psycho-physical kingdom of existence, where agents are relatively isolated from each other by their greater or less egoistical self-containment.

We shall use the term subjectiveness to indicate that a value has significance for only one particular subject; the *significance of value for everybody*, that is, its signi-

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ficance for every subject we shall call *objectiveness*. Absolute value, as follows from its definition, is at the same time a value that is significant for everybody, i.e. it constitutes an *objective intrinsic value*.

The most important problem of axiology consists in *establishing the existence* of absolute values and the overcoming of *axiological relativism*, i.e. the theory holding that *all values are relative and subjective*. At first sight axiological relativism seems to be a firmly established induction from the observation of reality. Everywhere we look we see relative values. The rapid dash of a greyhound after a rabbit is good for the hound, but evil for the rabbit; in a besieged fort where the garrison is suffering from a shortage of food, the eating of a piece of bread by one of the soldiers is a blessing for him, but suffering for some other soldier; the loving of Vronsky by Anna Karenina is happiness for Vronsky, but unhappiness for the husband of Karenina (from the novel by Count Leo Tolstoy, *Anna Karenina*); the overcoming of Carthage by Rome is fortunate for Rome, but unfortunate for Carthage.

The assertion of the relativity and subjectivity of all values arises not only from such observations of reality as were mentioned above, but also on the ground of certain theories about the structure of the world, theories that establish this assertion, for example, as a deduction from an *inorganic* theory of the world. Indeed, according to the inorganic conception of the world, it consists only of elements separated from each other, self-contained in their existence, and capable of uniting into temporary wholes only on the basis of the external relations of

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spatial proximity and external actions, such as push or pressure. In such a world there are no common experiences; intuition as an immediate insight into somebody else's existence is impossible; sympathy and love as the immediate practical acceptance of somebody else's existence are also impossible. An *identical common good* with which all could be identically and commonly connected is *impossible there*. Every good in such a world is torn into many pieces and is consumed and destroyed by separate beings, each in himself and for himself, with a loss to the others. *Communal life* and action are *impossible* there. Impossible likewise is the absolute fulness of being.

In such a world, thought of as an aggregate of self-contained bits of existence, there is nothing that possesses the character of self-justification, nothing that would be of common value. Each self-contained subject accepts as a positive value his own limited life, or even some separate manifestation of it, and all that he meets in the world he evaluates as positive or negative only in accordance with the meaning it has for his own life or its manifestations. But this personal life itself, taken in its limitedness and a self-containment which are irremovable, according to such a conception of the world, lacks absolute worth. A subject understands that he places it as the supreme value not because it is intrinsically justified, but only because it is *his life*, and thus he has a reason to accept it as the supreme value *only for himself*. And every other subject accepts something else as the supreme value; namely his own self-contained and limited life or some manifestation of it. Certainly in such a world there would

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be no absolute values significant for all. Every value would be *subjective* and *relative*, that is, it would exist only from the standpoint of a given subject and only in relation to him.

With consistent development such an inorganic conception of the world rejects the *ideal aspect of the world*; consequently it rejects also world-embracing *meaning* and partial meanings as a special aspect of the world. It admits only the existence of *facts* (events in space and time) which are subjectively pleasant or unpleasant. With such a structure of the world it would be impossible to find an intelligent basis for the preference of one course of behaviour over another, to set *norms* of behaviour of which we could say that they contain within themselves an inner justification which is significant for all. Such a contention may be explained by the following imaginary argument between some vicious man, say a morphinist, and a moralist who stands on the ground of an inorganic, naturalistic conception of the world, and is thus unable to lay down the foundations for the superiority of right conduct.

The moralist: Your ruinous habit is destroying your mental abilities and you will no longer be a useful member of society.

The morphinist: Society is the sum of beings who are similar to me; each one is enveloped in the sphere of his own pleasant or unpleasant experiences. I don't see why I should sacrifice my own pleasant experiences in favour of another being or beings.

The moralist: Even from the point of view that takes into consideration only your own personal experiences,

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your behaviour is wrong: you will ruin your health and shorten your life.

The morphinist: I don't care for the ordinary life of a healthy man and the long, weary life of a turtle. One minute of a fuller life is more precious to me than years of normal living.

In this dispute the morphinist with his super-biological ideal of the fulness of experience, an experience which is not normal but still is superior to ordinary life, is defending a higher value than those ordinary blessings which *biological naturalism* can consistently promise. That is why all the arguments of biological-naturalistic morality will not induce him to give up his position.

Fortunately, however, the inorganic conception of the world is false, the view of the world that leads to axiological relativism and subjectivism, admitting in the world, as it does, only self-contained particles of irreformable, imperfect existence. God and the Kingdom of God actually exist as beings that are absolutely worthy and justified. And even our kingdom of psycho-physical being, although imperfect, still is an organic whole. No being is self-contained; intuition exists; true sympathy and love are possible; self-sacrifice and true heroism are possible. Every being can truly and immediately commune with the life of beings equal to himself, and also with the life of beings of a higher order, with the life of the nation, humanity, the universe. Moreover, each agent can become a participant in the Kingdom of God with its creative activity and the absolute fulness of being. In comparison with this fulness of being intoxication with narcotics is a piteous poverty of life.

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Each aspect of the Kingdom of God is filled with such grandeur, dignity, and nobleness, that having once admitted its actual existence in the Divine World and its possibility for ourselves it would be a shame to reject it. The only way to evade the norms fixing the behaviour that leads to this Kingdom would be to find sophistical arguments that would prove beyond any doubt that science has shown the existence of such fixed and irrevocable laws of the structure of being which exclude the possibility of such a Kingdom. In reality, however, the content of existence is not subjected to irrevocable laws: it is highly plastic, it is created voluntarily by the substantial agents themselves, and no science has ever proved the non-existence of God and the impossibility of the Kingdom of God.¹

Freedom is the greatest intrinsic worth of personal agents, indispensable for the realization of absolute positive values, but possessing hidden in it also the possibility of the negative course of life. Different degrees of loving harmony are voluntarily realized in the world, but likewise different degrees of separation, of conflicting opposition, and hostility. There exists united action in the Kingdom of God, where concrete consubstantiality, the complete organic integration, and deification are realized—deification that gives the absolute fulness of being. On the other hand the psycho-physical kingdom of being also exists, with different degrees of disruption in the organic integration and diminution of mutual immanence. However, even on the most extreme levels of egoistical self-containment there are still preserved at

¹ See *Freedom of the Will*, chap. iv, § 6.

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least abstract consubstantiality and some remnants of participation in the common life of the world, and also the possibility of regeneration and of becoming worthy to enter the Kingdom of God. Therefore, absolute values exist even for the agents of the psycho-physical kingdom, and constitute the final goal of their activity. Any attempt to reject absolute values leads to self-contradiction, because the absolute value of God and the Kingdom of God is the basic necessary condition of all relative values and even of *existence itself*.

The fact that absolute value is always a value experienced by some subject does not contradict its absoluteness, that is, its self-justification. The concept "absolute," when it has the meaning of a predicate or definition, is applicable to such objects as are in a *system of relations*. For example, if we assert the absolute movement of body A in its approach to body B, we do not deny that this movement is in relation to body B, we deny only those theories according to which the approach of two bodies, taken in its concrete fulness, could be expressed with equal right as "A moves toward B," or "B moves toward A."

3. ALL-EMBRACING AND PARTIAL ABSOLUTE

INTRINSIC VALUES

God is the Good itself, in the all-embracing sense of the word: He is the True, the Beautiful, the Moral Good, the Life, etc. So God, and specifically, each Person of the Holy Trinity, is the All-Embracing Absolute Intrinsic Value. The full mutual inter-participation of God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit in each

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other's life gives us the right to assert that the All-Embracing Absolute Intrinsic Value is not divided into three parts and does not exist in three exemplars—It is one in three Persons. More than that, each created member of the Kingdom of God is a personality worthy to commune with the Divine fulness of being because of the course of goodness chosen by it. It is a personality that has actually received by God's grace the ability to fit itself into God's eternal life and to actively participate in it. That means it is a personality that has reached deification by God's grace, a personality which despite its created character still possesses all-embracing absolute intrinsic value. Each one of these personalities is a created son of God.

And even each agent of the psycho-physical kingdom of being, in spite of the state of his apostacy from God and sojourn in the poverty of a relatively isolated existence, is still an individual, i.e. a being possessed of a unique normative idea, due to which he is a potential member of the Kingdom of God. Therefore, each substantival agent, each actual and even each potential personality, is an absolute intrinsic value, a value potentially all-embracing. Thus, the whole protoplasmic (first-created) world created by God is composed of beings who are not instruments to aims and values, but are absolute intrinsic values in themselves, and values that are even potentially all-embracing. It depends on their own endeavour to become worthy of the benevolent help of God and to elevate their absolute intrinsic value from the potentially all-embracing to the level of the actually all-embracing, i.e. to become worthy of deification.

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Only a personality can be an actually all-embracing absolute intrinsic value: only a personality can possess the absolute fulness of being. All other types of existence, derivative from the existence of the personality, that is the different aspects of the personality, the activities of personalities, the product of their activities—constitute *derivative* values, values that exist only under the conditions of the all-embracing absolute good. Above we gave the following definition of derivative value: it is existence in its significance for the realization of the absolute fulness of being, or for moving away from it.

It seems that it then follows that any derivative value is brought down to the level of only a means. In such a case we would have to think that, for example, the love of man for God, or the love of a man for other people is not a good in itself, but is good only as a means of reaching the absolute fulness of being. Similarly, beauty and truth would not be good in themselves, but only good as means.

The very apprehension of this thesis and the exact understanding of it necessarily produces a feeling of repulsion for its meaning, and this feeling is a good indication of the falseness of the thesis. Indeed, love for any being, if deprived of intrinsic value and brought down to the level of only a means, is not a true love, but a falsification of love hiding in itself hypocrisy or treachery. The falseness of this thesis is also brought to light by the fact that it makes the goodness of the Absolute All-Embracing Good itself incomprehensible. If love, beauty, truth, which are undoubtedly present in the Absolute All-Embracing Good, are only means, then what is the

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true good in the Absolute Good itself? Fortunately, however, our thought does not need to oscillate simply between these two alternatives of the all-embracing absolute value and instrumental value (the value of the means). The problem can be solved by using the concept of *Strahlwert* developed by W. Stern. We will express it for the purpose of our system as "partial value." In order to establish this concept let us say a few words about its meaning in Stern's system.

According to Stern, we should distinguish intrinsic values (*Selbstwerte*) from derivative values (*abgeleitete Werte*); these last in turn are either *Strahlwerte* (radiated values, or values of radiation), or *Dienstwerte* (instrumental values, means). Stern arrives at the concept of the radiated value in the following way. According to his personalistic system of philosophy, only personalities are intrinsic values; but personality is a *unitas multiplex* (a composite whole, a unity consisting of many parts). Personality is a whole containing within itself a multitude of moments—whether they be real parts, symptoms, phases of existence, ways of expression, spheres of action; each moment communes with the intrinsic value of the whole and so becomes a bearer of value, although not in itself an intrinsic value. An intrinsically valuable whole radiates its value into everything that belongs to it: therefore we can designate such a variety of derivative values by the term *Strahlwert*.¹ According to Stern morality, religion, art, law, health, etc., for example, belong to these "radiated values." "These are not primal values. On the other hand, however, they are valuable

¹ W. Stern, *Wert-philosophie*, p. 44.

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
not only because they are useful 'for something,' but in them flow and are expressed basic values" (p. 127).

Adopting the concept of "radiated value" developed by Stern, we will, however, have to modify it in accordance with the system of philosophy we are developing. We will also change the term and will call that which we mean by it, in distinction from absolute all-embracing intrinsic values—absolute "partial intrinsic values." In spite of their derivative character, in the sense that they cannot exist apart from a whole, they still remain *intrinsic values*. Indeed at the fountain-head of axiology we put the all-embracing fulness of existence, as the absolute perfection. That indefinable goodness and the character of self-justification with which the fulness of existence is thoroughly permeated also belongs to every moment of it because of its organic integrity. Therefore, each necessary aspect of the fulness of being is perceived and experienced as something which is good in itself, which is justified in its content as that which should be. Such are love, truth, freedom, beauty. All these aspects of the Kingdom of God with the Lord God as the head are impressed by the lineaments that are inherent in the Absolute Good. Such are the characteristics of not abiding solely within Himself, of not communing with any inimical conflicting opposition, of compatibility, of communicability, of existence for itself and for everybody, of self-surrender.

Thus, in God and in the Kingdom of God, as well as in the protoplasmic (first-created) world, there are only intrinsic values; there is nothing that is merely a means. Intrinsic values are all absolute and objective, i.e. they

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possess significance for everybody, since here there is no isolated, excluded existence. The classification and correlation of these values are expressed in the following table:



4. RELATIVE VALUES

Those values are relative which in some relations are good, and in other relations evil; they are evil because they are at least necessarily connected with evil.

Such double-faced values are possible only in the psycho-physical kingdom of existence, a kingdom consisting of agents that are in the state of apostasy from God and of greater or lesser separation from one another. To understand the nature of relative values and to establish their fundamental forms, we should distinguish the possible kinds of relations of creatures to God and to the Kingdom of God.

All beings strive for the absolute fulness of being. To attain this goal two diametrically opposite courses may be selected. One way is the all-surmounting love for God as the primordial Absolute Good, and love for all created

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agents as the potentially all-embracing good. This results in voluntary subordination to God, and the voluntary unanimity of spirit in the communal activity of all those beings who follow God. Agents who were guided in their behaviour primordially by this ideal become worthy of deification and entered into the composition of the Kingdom of God from the very beginning. They escaped the necessity of following the course of evolution that leads gradually to the highest level of good. Another course, of a character opposite to the first, is a proud aspiration personally to become a God and to reach the absolute fulness of being by subjecting all other beings to oneself. This is the ideal of Satan. It leads to rivalry with God; it meets unsurmountable obstacles in its attempts at realization, and in the case of impenitence it gives rise to a burning hatred for God and for every true good. By this course a progressive perfection in evil is possible and a movement further and further away from God and the Kingdom of God; this is—*Satanic evolution*.

However, a less determined falling away from God and the Kingdom of God is possible. One's striving to attain the absolute fulness of being may be connected with a love for one's own self greater than one's love for God and for other beings. It is not the proud desire to put oneself in place of God—it is only a preferential interest for one's own self, in the sense of concentration on one's own experiences and disrespect and lack of interest for the life of others. This is egoism—not Satanic, but earthly. It results in a separation of agents from each other and a state of being where each one is left to himself. This separation can reach such extremes of the

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poverty of isolated existence as is known to modern science, for example, in the state of a single, isolated electron.

"Everybody nowadays," says the *starets* Zosima (in *Brothers Karamazoff* by Dostoevsky), "strives to distinguish himself the most, wants to experience within himself the fulness of life, but from all his efforts there comes, instead of the fulness of life, nothing but complete suicide. For instead of the fulness of development of his essence he falls into complete isolation."

The poverty of the isolated life, as was said above, can be overcome only by means of the evolutionary process. It is the process by which the agent gradually learns to leave his self-containment at least partially, and to enter into union with other agents. He forms with them organically united wholes in which it is possible mutually to attain a greater complexity and variety of life than in isolated existence. However, the increase of power and the creative activity of life, acquired in such organic unions, is used in a great measure egoistically. It is used for the energetic struggle for existence against everybody who is not included in this particular union, so that the good of the elevation of life in one group of beings is accompanied by the evil of the oppression of the life of other beings. This unfortunate relativity of the good in the evolutionary process is full of significance: the moral evil of apostacy from God, that is, the evil of separation of agents, brings as its natural consequence various other kinds of evil, the sufferings due to the poverty of existence and of the mutual restriction of life of those beings who find themselves outside of the Kingdom of God—in the

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kingdom of psycho-physical being. This lower type of existence arose because of the incorrect, although voluntary, act of choice. Likewise, as it follows from the theory about the nature of the Kingdom of God, the rational perfection of this existence and, finally, the leaving of the lower type of existence by acquiring holiness and by communion with the Kingdom of God, are possible only by the *free* search for the right course by means of voluntary creative acts. Therefore, the whole of evolution in nature, from the agent who stands on the level of existence of an electron, up to man and even beyond man, should be thought of as a free creative process, but not as a process that is necessary and constrained by law. All the qualities necessary for the possibility of the creative process of the regeneration of fallen agents are preserved, as was shown above, even on the lowest levels of natural existence. There is present in each substantial agent a super-qualitative creative power; also there exists a connection between the agents in the form of abstract consubstantiality, and the ability of purposive creative activity, etc.¹

Even those agents which do not possess consciousness retain that relation to themselves and to the world which we named pre-consciousness, and thus their evolution is directed by a striving, perhaps only in the form of an *instinctive* tendency, to higher levels, to the absolute fulness of being. However, this movement toward the higher life is a free creative search; that is why the evolving beings of the psycho-physical kingdom can-

¹ Refer above; also to my article, "The Limits of Evolution," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, London, October 1927.

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not be graded and arranged into a series as beings progressively approaching one and the same goal. In the first place, there are many different paths that lead to the same goal. In the second place, there are possible detours from the right course of ascent, detours that lead to blind alleys in which further evolution cannot be realized. The only way out of such blind alleys is to leap over to a new path of progress. In the third place, Satanic temptations are also possible, and yielding to them leads to interruptions, to the temporary or final turning to a road of development that does not ascend toward God, but leads away from Him. However numerous the ways of progress are, it is possible mentally to lay out an *ideal type of evolution*, which is realized along the lines that lead, in spite of the different concrete content of the process, straight up to the threshold of the Kingdom of God. Such an evolution may be called *normal*. It is directed by norms that emerge due to the problem of growing in relative goodness up to the point of acquiring the ability to comprehend absolute values, of beginning to place them as the purpose of behaviour, and of reaching the limit of the psycho-physical kingdom, of reaching holiness which is rewarded by becoming worthy of deification, that is, entering the Kingdom of God.

Each step of this normal evolution represents a release from some aspect of egoistical self-exclusion. It represents a broadening of the life of the agent by the adoption of a group of alien personal or even super-personal interests into his own life as if they were his own interests (such assimilation Stern calls "introception"). Each step of normal evolution also represents the development of

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abilities that are necessary for the ascent to the all-embracing life, for example, the development of psychic activity from the psychoidal, the acquiring of new forms of perception (of sound, light, etc.), the development of consciousness from the elements of pre-consciousness, the transition from instinct to conscious will, the development of the capacity for intellectual intuition (mind), etc.

Each gain in normal evolution, each activity in its course, is a positive value in so far as it is existence in its significance for the ascent to the absolute fulness of being. Each manifestation of life in this normal process is not *only a means* of ascent, but also an *intrinsic value for the subject who is creating and experiencing it*. It is a moment of the *subjective* fulness of being. The number and variety of such intrinsic values is very great in such a relatively highly developed agent as the human ego, which has gone relatively far along the way of freeing itself from egoistical self-containment. Man lives a life common in part with the life of a multitude of lower agents subordinated to him, agents that enter into the composition of his body. Likewise, he lives a life common in part with the nearest higher agents to whom he is subordinated: with his family, with his nation, his church, etc. A great many activities in each of these spheres possess a character of intrinsic value for the subject. All the following activities are moments of the subjective creation of life: the biological functions of a healthy organism, for example, the partaking of food with a normal appetite and the digesting of it, physical work, rest after normal work, etc.; activities that exceed the limits of purely biological processes, for example, the

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acquiring of property, the managing and building of property (the building of a house, growing a garden, etc.); activities that are in the stream of life of the higher hierarchical union, for example, bringing up of children, intercourse with the members of one's family, participation in political struggle, defending of one's country, etc. Each one of these activities, as well as the objective contents themselves that such activities create (a healthy body, a well-made chair, a good snapshot, the physical alertness of his son acquired by a proper physical training, the growth of his political party, etc.), may be intrinsic values for a man. But, on the other hand, each one of these activities and each object created by them may also be lowered to the level of simply a means. Some ascetic may admit the biological function of eating only as a necessary *means* for spiritual activity, until the human body is transfigured. Ignatius Loyola, for example, developed a set of rules that teach us how to reduce the amount of food taken to a minimum, but without lowering the body to such exhaustion that spiritual life loses its freshness and energy.¹ More than that, each of the activities and the objects of these activities enumerated might be brought down to the level of simply a means, not only in relation to the absolute values, but also in relation to values which are likewise relative. An artisan may think of his professional activity and the products produced by it—furniture, shoes, clothing, etc.—only as a means for making a living, and not put sincere interest in his work. Similarly, a teacher of physical education might look upon his teaching and upon the physical

¹ St. Ignatius Loyola, *Das Exerzitienbuch*, 2nd ed., i, p. 245.

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development of the children that were entrusted to him only as a means of getting his salary and advancement, in case he is very successful. It is very doubtful, however, whether children could be safely trusted to such a teacher. Moreover, the interrelation of activities, their objects and their values, is so complicated that each of the enumerated activities and each of their objects might be at the same time and for the same agent an intrinsic value and also a means of reaching some other value.

All those activities in the kingdom of psycho-physical being which we have enumerated require more or less struggle with the beings who are outside of the agent or outside of that union in the interests of which he acts. Nourishment requires the violent breaking up of the whole of an alien vegetable or animal organism. The professional activity of man is accompanied by the destruction of the life of plants and animals, or by an interference through force with the flow of the processes of inorganic nature. The seizing of the psycho-physical goods for one's own nation leads directly or indirectly to infringement of the interests of other peoples, etc. In greater or less degree all these activities are connected with the struggle for existence, and even within each union harmony between its members exists only in some relations, but in other relations the members contest with each other. Such contesting relations are, for example, certain diseases of the organism, competition in trade and industry, exploitation of labour by capital, etc. There is no loving interrelation of all beings, no complete harmony of interests, no *communal* activity. Therefore, the experiences of some one agent or a group of agents

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could not be the object of the full active co-participation of all the rest. Even though these experiences and their objects are intrinsic values for some individual, they still belong to the sphere of relative, not absolute values. The proof is twofold. In the first place, they are justified only from the point of view of the psycho-physical kingdom of existence which consists of beings who themselves have brought about the splitting up of life into separate, relatively isolated streams. In the second place, inasmuch as their conditions or their consequences are connected with conflicting opposition to the lives of others, they are negative values—good in them is connected with evil. However, taken by themselves, isolated from their conditions and consequences, they are manifestations of preservation of life and of its growth, manifestations that prepare for the comprehension of absolute values and adoption of them. As steps in the growth of solidarity and harmony—if not yet love—as an increase of order and other similar values which might be called weak reflections of the absolute values of the Kingdom of God, they leap up to the threshold of this Kingdom and awaken a longing to give up the lower world and become worthy to commune with the higher world. In this sense, inasmuch as the final goal of all beings is the absolute fulness of being which alone can be the common goal, the manifestations of the normal evolution of each being are positive values also from the standpoint of all other agents. They are objective values *significant for all, even though relative*. Indeed, if he gains freedom from the subjective partialities that distort valuations, every agent is forced to accept the positive

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value of the health of all other agents, their prosperity, the well-being of their families, countries, etc., although these types of good, belonging as they do to the psycho-physical kingdom are only relative, that is, are also connected with evil. On account of this, their universally valid significance is different from the universally valid significance of absolute values. Perfect love, beauty, truth, the moral good, are *universally valid intrinsic values*, whereas the *relative good is universally valid, not as an intrinsic value*, but as something *instrumental*, as a necessary moment of evolution that leads to the threshold of the exit from the realm of evil. The different forms of the relative good may possess a character of intrinsic value only for their bearers and those agents of the psycho-physical kingdom who are near to them and who fight together with them for the preservation of life and the raising of its level. These are *subjective intrinsic values*.

5. NEGATIVE VALUES

Everything that is an obstacle to the attainment of the absolute fulness of life possesses negative value, or, in other words, the character of evil (in the broad, not in the ethical sense). However, it does not follow that evils, such as illness, aesthetic ugliness, hatred, treachery, etc., are in themselves indifferent, and are evil only in so far as they result in a failure to attain the fulness of being. As good is justified in itself, so evil is something unworthy in itself, something deserving condemnation; it is in itself the opposite of the absolute fulness of life, as the Absolute Good.

But in contrast with the Absolute Good, evil is not

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primordial and not self-subsistent. In the first place, it exists only in the created world and even there not in its protoplasmic (first-created) essence. Rather, it originates as a free act of the will of substantival agents, and derivatively as a consequence of this act. In the second place, evil acts of will are committed under the appearance of good, because they are always directed toward a true positive value, but in such correlation with other values and means of accomplishing it that evil is substituted for good. Thus, to be God is the highest positive value, but the usurping of this merit by a creature is the greatest evil. In the third place, the realization of a negative value is only possible by using the powers of the good. This dependence on the good and contradictory character of negative values is especially noticeable in the sphere of Satanic evil. So, we shall begin with the discussion of Satanic evil.

Satanic evil is the pride of an agent who cannot bear the supremacy of God and other agents over himself, and who strives to put himself in God's place and to occupy a preferential position in the world, a position higher than that of other creatures. This fundamental aspect of the Satanic will is expressed in different variations, for example, in Satanic ambition, in the Satanic love of power, in manifestations of hatred, envy, cruelty, etc. Such acts and conditions which, not only by their conditions or consequences, but in themselves, cause damage to other beings, possess the character of intrinsic value for the Satanic will. For example, for an ambitious person with the Satanic tendency, who is competing with other agents, the final goal is not simply perfec-

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tion of action, but *supremacy*, a victory over other agents. Similarly, for a cruel being, for a cat, playing with a mouse it has caught, or for a Sadist, the sufferings of a victim represent just that aspect in which he claims his superiority and domination of the world.

The evil brought into the world by earthly selfishness has an entirely different character: it is not in the act or condition itself which is the goal, but in the consequences of the act and in the means of achieving it. These consequences are considered by the agent himself, if he notices them (which happens rarely) as undesirable, and the evil means for achieving a goal in themselves are disliked by him. Thus a great majority of the people would gladly abandon the use of animal food if a satisfactory system of nourishment without slaughter could be developed and a state economy was adopted for the supply of such food. In taking a competitive examination for admission into an institution of higher learning a young man, if he is mentally normal, feels sorry for his classmates who fail and does not rejoice at their failure.

The difference between the Satanic evil will and the evil will of earthly selfishness in brief is this: from the point of view of the Satanic will, evil acts are themselves positive values, inasmuch as they *satisfy his pride*; whereas for earthly selfishness evil acts possess only *instrumental* value, remaining in themselves undesirable. In both cases the evil caused other beings is not the primary goal, but only the consequence of selfishness. In this sense even Satan himself is not a being who strives for the suffering

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of other beings just for the sake of that suffering.¹ However, the nature of Satanic selfishness is such that his aims include oppression of other beings by analytic necessity, whereas the aims of earthly selfishness are connected with acts and conditions that oppress the existence of others by synthetic necessity. The first is *absolute evil*, and the second—*relative evil*.

The difference between these two kinds of will can also be shown by the difference between Satanic and earthly ambition. For Satanic ambition *supremacy* as victory over other agents is the *intrinsic aim*; for earthly ambition the acquiring of supremacy is not an intrinsic aim, but a *means*. More specifically, it is either an indication of the perfection of an act performed, or a source of securing for oneself some other blessing (for example, a good position in society, favourable for untrammelled development of all activities of life, etc.).

Theoretically it is easy to separate Satanic and earthly ambition. But in practice frequently it is almost impossible to decide with which of the two we have to deal when we meet with the concrete manifestations of a man. By almost an imperceptible gradation competition leads quickly to the appearance of jealousy and hatred, which, as Scheler says, rejoice in the faults of the one hated and grieve when they notice any merit in him. Having adopted this course, a man proceeds to move along the edge of a precipice and he is ominously illuminated by reflections from the Satanic evil. The lives of great men and out-

¹ See my article, "The Nature of Satan According to Dostoevsky," in a collection of articles *F. M. Dostoevsky*, under the redaction of Doleenin, i. Scheler has a different opinion, see p. 369, N. Hartmann, ii, pp. 176 ff.

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standing individuals in history give us many examples of such a dangerous position. Just recall the rivalry between Fichte and Schelling,¹ the hidden jealousy in the relations of L. Tolstoy and Dostoevsky,² the devilish pranks Byron played on his wife, caused probably by the fact that she did not at once respond to his love before their marriage, and the bad treatment of Sushkova by Lermontov. We shall find the same phenomena in all spheres of our own life. In each university there are two or three pairs of professors who work in the same subject and hate each other from the bottom of their hearts. The same happens in the life of actors, politicians, church workers, etc.

Selfishness, Satanic as well as earthly, is the *fundamental* evil. It is a moral evil, actualized in different variations. As a consequence of it, inasmuch as it leads to the relative isolation of agents from each other, there arise numerous other kinds of evil that may be called *derivative* evils: such are physical suffering, illness, death, mental suffering and mental disease, aesthetic ugliness, a lack of complete truth, errors, etc.

If the world is the creation of a benevolent Creator, a world rational in all its details, then the question arises why evil does exist in the world, and what is the purpose of the different kinds of evil. The answer to this question I have given in my book, *Freedom of the Will*, and have briefly indicated it in this book also. The highest worth of the world, for the sake of which alone it should exist—

¹ Kuno Fischer, "Schelling," *Geschichte der neueren Philosophie*, vii.

² A. L. Bem, "Tolstoy in Dostoevsky's Estimation," *Scientific Works of the Russian People's University*, ii (in Russian).

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that is, its capacity to create the Kingdom of God—is possible only under the condition that agents have *freedom*. But freedom is connected not only with the *possibility* of good, but also of evil. An agent who uses his freedom wrongly, who has adopted the course of selfishness, brings evil into the world. The good of the love for God and for the creatures of God presupposes the *possibility* of the evil of selfishness, not requiring, however, its *actual existence*. Hence the actual existence of selfishness is a free and independent manifestation of the agent. It is a wrong which nobody forced him to commit, a sin that brings with it as a natural and due consequence the isolation of the agent, and with the isolation all the evils derivative from it: scantiness of life, disease, death, aesthetic ugliness, etc.

The fundamental evil, the evil of egoistic selfishness is a *voluntary* act of the agent, leading him to an “anti-transfiguration”; consequently evil is not a simple *shortage* of good, not merely a non-fulness of it, i.e. it is not non-existence. Evil is a certain kind of *content of existence*, it is an *esse* of which we have to say that it is *male esse* in distinction from *bene esse*. However, it does not appear in the world except by a wrong use of a great good—of free creative power. Moreover, it does not appear except in the pursuit of the greatest positive value, namely deification, however, along a wrong course. Consequently this *male esse* never can be evil throughout: it always contains in itself at least some remnants of positive value. St. Augustine was quite correct in his assertion that good could not be removed entirely from anything that exists, because then the existence itself

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would cease. A good being can be good throughout, but an evil being cannot be evil throughout.

The high rationality of the world is revealed in the fact that those agents only who are themselves guilty of selfishness and have doomed themselves to life in the psycho-physical kingdom of being are immediately touched by every kind of evil. Indeed, agents of the Kingdom of God are immune even from Satan: their unanimity of spirit excludes the possibility of a break in their bond, that is, it excludes the possibility of death. Their transfigured body produces no forces of repulsion and could not, therefore, be subjected to any violence by a push; the spiritual sufferings of humiliated pride, ambition, love of power, etc., do not exist for them, for they are free from these passions. Even a loving participation in our life cannot bring earthly grief and sorrow to the kingdom of the Spirit. The position of the members of the kingdom of the Spirit is similar to that of a physician helping his patient—a physician who knows the power of his art and science and has a miraculous insight into God's ways which reveals to him the meaning of human suffering and the certainty of the final conquest of the Good.¹

The unearthly calmness of the Sistine Madonna of Raphael is not "the ultra-aristocratic indifference to the sufferings and wants of our world," as it seemed to Belinsky,² but rather the perfect purity of a nurse who depends on God, who does not contract the contagion of fears and feverish deliriums of the patient, and who

¹ *The World as an Organic Whole*, p. 161.

² P. V. Annenkoff, *Literary Recollections*, ed. "Academia," 1928, p. 563.

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just by a touch of her cool and tender hand on his forehead brings peace and calmness to his mind and body.

The correlation of all beings and all events forming a *single* world can be explained by the fact that at the head of the world stands the Universal Spirit, a substantival agent that coördinates all the activities of all beings. He does not separate Himself from anybody; consequently, He belongs to the composition of the Kingdom of God. The Spirit only can be the source of such a whole, or the kind of a system all of whose parts lead to the realization of a truly all-embracing, unchangeable, eternal, and absolute purpose. In accordance with the nature of the Spirit, that purpose can be no other than to make the whole structure of the world and every event in it subservient to the development of *spirituality* in the entities of the psycho-physical realm and thus educate them for *reunion with the Kingdom of God*. The inclusion of every event in an all-embracing cosmic bond—resulting, from the point of view of the individual entity, in the most capricious and unexpected combinations—far from being the work of blind accident, contains a most profound meaning and has the character of moral necessity.¹ This gives rise to a world in which “every great cosmic event is adapted to the fate of many thousands of beings, to each in its own way”; “the cross-currents of all human lives in their interconnection must have as much concord and harmony with each other as the composer gives in a symphony to a number of voices which apparently interrupt one another.”²

¹ *The World as an Organic Whole*, p. 166.

² Schopenhauer, *Parerga und Paralipomena*, i.

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In this rational whole every evil painfully touching those beings who themselves bring evil into the world, serves them as a punishment, or warning, or inducement to repentance, etc. In this sense even evil possesses instrumental positive value: in the kingdom of evil beings it is used as a means of curing them from evil.

6. INSTRUMENTAL VALUES

In our psycho-physical kingdom of being there is an infinite number of activities, events, and contents of life, that possess only the character of a *means* for the realization of some positive value. Sweeping a room, the removing of a spot of grease from a dress with a cleaning fluid, the daily ride on the tram to the place of employment, the filling out of a questionnaire for the purpose of receiving a passport, etc., these are all instrumental values. They are possible only in a kingdom of being where there is separation and scantiness of life: they are activities and contents of existence that have no inner connection with the complex system of life as a whole, but only with some one limited element of it. They can be repeated and replaced, and they are valued not for their relatively-individual content, but only for their connection with the purpose that is apprehended as an abstract conception. The more actions there are in the behaviour of a being that have the character of simply a means and the more often they are repeated, the more the tone of such a being's life falls: there are more ordinary, uninteresting events.

As culture develops, a man more often sets up goals the attainment of which requires the realization of a

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long series of means before the goal itself may be realized. From this, however, we should not draw the conclusion that the development of culture must necessarily be accompanied by the lowering of the tone of life. The art of life lies in the ability to complicate the interests of life and to deepen its organic aspect so that means cease to be simply means and at least in some aspects contain intrinsic aims, or at least are permeated and attractively lighted by reflections from that intrinsic aim for the sake of which they are being realized. Thus, a scientist spending several years in preparation for a difficult scientific expedition, or a far-sighted politician like Bismarck, an active reformer like Peter the Great, could with enthusiasm be effecting the instruments for a distant purpose, seeing in each instrument some intrinsic aim, or at least a reflection of that far-removed intrinsic aim.

7. THE TRAGIC CHARACTER OF NORMAL EVOLUTION

In the psycho-physical kingdom even in the process of normal evolution the greater part of the activities is directed toward the realization of the relative good: my self-preservation and the preservation of my family, my country, of humanity as psycho-physical (not spiritual) wholes, are a good for these particular beings, but this good is connected in some way with evil for other beings. This is the reason that the higher the degree of freedom from egoistic self-containment the agent has reached, the more sensitive he is to the bringing of any evil into the world, the more often his position becomes tragic.

Even absolute values, under the conditions of psycho-physical life, frequently require, in order to guarantee

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access to them and to preserve the conditions that make it possible to use them, the kind of actions which destroy those relative values which have intrinsic value for some subjects. The conspirators who assassinated Paul I, the highly gifted reformers, such as Peter the Great, who destroy the old forms of life, the participants in civil wars, at times of great revolutions—people who fight for absolute values, are living a painful *tragedy* because they are bringing evil into the world in their struggle for the good.

Becoming a monk in a monastery does not give complete freedom from the evil which is inevitable in the kingdom of psycho-physical being. The life of a quiet cloister, even of seclusion, only decreases the number and variety of the manifestations of evil, but does not remove them completely.

One might try to calm his conscience by denying the Christian ideal of the absolute good by means of a dogma which asserts that absolutely *irrevocable laws* of existence condition the forms of life in which the relativity of good is inevitable, i.e. the connection of good with evil cannot be removed. Such self-justification is a Satanic temptation. In reality the absolute good can be realized, and in the Kingdom of God it is realized, but we have fallen away from it and have created a sphere of life which "lies in evil" and without transfiguration cannot be in its content a pure good. To face this truth bravely, without trying to conceal from myself the admixture of evil and the imperfections which even the greatest heroic actions possess in the psycho-physical kingdom, is possible only on the ground of the Christian conception of the world.

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Only the Christian conception of the world points the way to the ideal kingdom of being where complete freedom from evil is reached not by the quenching of life, as Buddhism holds, but on the contrary, by acquiring the fulness of life; and not through the annihilation of individual peculiarities, but through the all-embracing unveiling of them.

The sight of evil penetrating all the manifestations of life within the psycho-physical kingdom will not lead us to despondency and disbelief in the benevolence of the Creator of the world; it will not lead us to the "revolt" of Ivan Karamasoff and to the return of our "ticket" if we only realize that absolute values cannot be destroyed by any external power. The Kingdom of God, as we have seen, is inaccessible even to the blows of Satanic wrath. And even in our own psycho-physical kingdom only imperfect aspects and manifestations of existence, not the absolutely valuable existence itself, are destroyed, die out, and fall into the past. These imperfect aspects must perish sooner or later, so as not to interfere with the more perfect realization of the absolutely valuable nucleus that lies at their base. The love of Agnes, in Ibsen's *Brand*, for her child Alf does not terminate with his death. A true personal love is an ontological knitting together by growth of one super-temporal and super-spatial being with another, a union that is not destroyed by that profound change of body which is called death. The death of one of those who love may even elevate the *quality* of the communion with him: communion begins to take place as if immediately *in the heart* of the one who remains alive. This is what I. V. Kireevsky says about a

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deceased friend who was spiritually close to one of us: "the heart becomes a place where he dwells not only in thought, but he substantially permeates it."¹ And this is not surprising: our crude impenetrable bodies do make possible, it is true, *external* communion, but they are an obstacle to the establishment of the deeper *inner* connections. The conjoining of lovers, especially in the organic union of the family, determines their further destiny without interruption until they commune with the Kingdom of God where personal love receives for the first time its full realization. There the absolute love for one being, because of the ideal connection of all individual characteristics into a bond, potentially includes in itself love for all other beings. This is the reason that only in the Kingdom of God can love be realized in all its purity and without any egoistical partialities to diminish it.

Like love, beauty and the true experience of beauty, even in the form accessible to us in the psycho-physical kingdom, are also indestructible. Let us recall how Olyenin, in Tolstoy's *Cossacks*, as he was nearing the Caucasus Mountains, saw for the first time in all its grandeur the range of mountains covered with snow.

But the next day, early in the morning, he was waked up by the coolness in his post-carriage, and looked out indifferently toward the right. The morning was perfectly clear.

Suddenly he saw, twenty paces distant from him, as it seemed at the first moment, the pure white mountain masses, with their tender outlines, and the fantastic, marvellous, perfect aërial contours of their summits and the far-off sky.

¹ *Works*, ii, p. 290.

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And when he comprehended all the distance between him and the mountains and the sky, all the majesty of the mountains, and when he realized all the endlessness of that beauty, he was alarmed lest it were an illusion, a dream. He shook himself so as to wake up.

But the mountains were still the same.

"What is that? Tell me what that is!" he asked of the postilion.

"Oh! the mountains!" replied the Nogayets, indifferently.

"And so I have been looking at them for a long time! Aren't they splendid! They won't believe me at home!" said Vanyusha.

As the three-span flew swiftly over the level road, it seemed as if the mountains ran along the horizon, shining in the sunrise with their rosy summits.

At first the mountains only surprised Olyenin, then they delighted him; but afterwards, as he gazed at this ever-increasing, constantly changing, chain of snow-capped mountains, not piled upon other dark mountains, but rising straight out of the steppe, little by little he began to get into the spirit of their beauty, and he *felt* the mountains.

From that moment all that he had seen, all that he had thought, all that he had felt, assumed for him the new, sternly majestic character of the mountains. All his recollections of Moscow, his shame and his repentance, all his former fancies about the Caucasus—all disappeared and never returned again.

"Now life begins," seemed to be sounded into his ear by some solemn voice. And the road, the distant outline of the Terek, now coming into sight, and the post-stations, and the people—all seemed to him no longer insignificant.

He looks at the sky and remembers the mountains, he looks at himself, at Vanyusha, and again at the mountains!

Here two Cossacks appear on horseback, their muskets balanced over their backs, and rhythmically swinging as their horses gallop along with brown and grey legs intermingling; but the mountains! . . .

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Beyond the Terek, smoke seems to be rising from some *aul*, or native village; but the mountains! . . .

The sun stands high and gleams on the river winding among the reeds; but the mountains! . . .

From a Cossack station comes an *arba*, or native cart—pretty women are riding in it, young women; but the mountains! . . .

Abreks¹ gallop across the steppe, and I am coming, I fear them not, I have weapons and strength and youth; but the mountains! . . .²

The beauty of the snow-capped mountains, their grandeur, harmony, and virgin purity, is only a *symbol* of the absolute beauty, of the absolute greatness and pureness. Therefore, the mountains themselves are not eternal and should not be eternal, but the beauty that they express is eternal, and the experience of this beauty remains in the soul forever, not in its psycho-physical concreteness, of course, which really is not concreteness, but is only a broken abstractness; however, it does remain in its *meaning*. This meaning like an overtone continues to sing in the soul, giving to everything a new character of solemnity and greatness and invariably keeping up, perhaps only in the sub-conscious or super-conscious sphere, the *eros* for beauty.

The indelible trace remaining in the mind due to the experience of absolute values will never let the agent who has deviated from the normal course of development be satisfied with his position. He will always be tormented with the contradiction between his conduct,

¹ The hostile mountaineer who crosses over to the Russian side of the Terek for the purpose of theft or rapine is called *abrek*.

² From Tolstoy's *Cossacks* (translated by N. H. Dole). By permission of the Thomas Y. Crowell Company.

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full of evil, and the "eros" of the pure good, dimly revealed to him in the earthly experiences of absolute values. Sooner or later this contradiction will lead those who have lost their way out of the blind alley, will induce them to leave the "sad songs of earth"; and even Satan himself, exhausted by the suffering due to his duplicity and deceptiveness, will perhaps become disappointed in the gloomy vastness of hell.¹

Evil in the psycho-physical kingdom comes into being not only in connection with the realization of relative values, but even with the attempts to actualize the absolute values. There is, however, a profound difference between these two cases of the appearance of evil. The relative good, because of its very nature, is connected with evil for some beings. On the contrary, the absolute good by its very nature is a good for everybody, and if under the conditions of psycho-physical existence it is connected with evil for some agents, such evil really arises from the imperfect nature of these agents themselves, or from the imperfect actualization of the absolute value. Indeed, even such an activity as the performing of one of the greatest symphonies of Beethoven might mean suffering for a scientist in the adjacent apartment if it interfered with his concentration on some important

¹ Johannes Scotus Erigena says, referring to St. Gregory Theologus, that wrath is limited, so that after he has experienced it to the end a sinner will sooner or later turn to the course of good, so that in the end no evil will be left in anybody (*De divisione naturae*, v, p. 26). This hope of salvation for everybody can be founded not on the theory of evolution in accordance with law, but by the expectation of a *voluntary* conversion to the good on the part of all beings who have experienced the hideousness of evil and who have condemned their past conduct.

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and difficult scientific work. It also may be disagreeable to a person who is not engaged in any activity, if he has no ability to perceive music and hears only disorderly combinations of sounds, without comprehending the beautiful whole. In both cases evil arises not from the nature of the beautiful music itself, but from the limited character of the afflicted persons themselves who are the ones responsible for their limitations. However, there may be a third possibility: the performance of even a beautiful composition by the best artists cannot be absolutely perfect in the psycho-physical kingdom of being. Disagreeable squeaks, rattles, and noises are invariably mixed with the music, and torment a sensitive ear. In this case evil arises not from the nature of the absolute value itself, and also not from the limited nature of the afflicted beings, but from the imperfection of the performer and of the means of performance.

The doctrine that absolute values are indestructible and that the nature of absolute value itself is such that it will of itself never bring evil, might lead some uninvited "benefactors" of the human race, people with a revolutionary character, to the belief that they have a right to destroy all obstacles in their way for the sake of the absolute values for which they are fighting. (In reality their struggle is usually not for absolute values, but only for relative values, which they mistake for absolute values.) Certainly, such a thought is a Satanic temptation. Although only relative positive values are destroyed, and the process of normal evolution is impossible without such destruction, still a sensitive conscience forbids many such

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types of destruction, or, if it does permit some of them, it experiences the destruction as *tragic*. We will not go into this question any further, since it belongs in the sphere of ethics, and not in the general theory of value.¹

8. FALSE ARGUMENTS IN FAVOUR OF RELATIVISM

There are many factors which help to make the relativistic theory of values, i.e. the theory according to which all values are relative, the more common. In the first place, we should keep in mind, as was already pointed out, that the inorganic conception of the world necessarily leads to a relativistic axiology. Moreover, experience obligingly presents us with a multitude of facts which appear as a very convincing confirmation of this deduction from the inorganic conception of the world. Indeed, in the kingdom of psycho-physical being actually the greater part of the activities and contents of existence belong to the realm of the relative good, i.e. they are necessarily connected with evil. Moreover, for the agents of the psycho-physical kingdom the absolute values themselves are not objects of striving (also of contemplation and faith) without the possibility of their realization. The realization of the absolute values may be attained only in the Kingdom of God. The attempts at the realization of absolute values in the psycho-physical kingdom are connected with evil. Those who do not see that this evil does not arise from the nature of absolute value itself, but from its imperfect realization, or from

¹ As to the inevitable tragedy of the sinful life, see B. Visheslavitsev, *The Heart in Christian and Indian Mysticism* (in Russian).

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the imperfect use of it, come to the erroneous conclusion that absolute values do not exist at all.

Finally, there is one more important circumstance that furnishes a motive for relativism. We should distinguish, as Scheler has pointed out, between the norms of behaviour and the *values* corresponding to them, and keep in mind that one and the same value under different conditions can be the source of different, sometimes of even reciprocal norms. So, for example, the contention that "the personal value of one person is equal to that of another person" under different conditions can give rise to two reciprocal norms: "take care of others" and "take care of yourself."¹

9. THE ORDER OF RANK IN VALUES

From the definitions given above, and the doctrines expounded in connection with them, it follows that positive values are not equal; there are differences between them: differences of rank, differences of merit. First of all, it is obvious that instrumental values are lower than intrinsic values; then among intrinsic values absolute intrinsic values stand higher than relative intrinsic values. Then, in each one of these groups there are peculiar differences in rank: among the absolute intrinsic values all-embracing stand higher than partial; among the all-embracing values the primordial values, i.e. God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit, stand higher than the created values.

¹ M. Scheler, *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, p. 219; also other considerations of Scheler against relativism and scepticism in ethics, pp. 306-20.

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Among relative values the ranks are determined in part by the steps of normal evolution. Thus, for instance, on the earth the biological values are on the whole higher than the values of inorganic nature, the values of the social process are higher than the biological values. To classify values into groups according to their rank would be possible only by having a thoroughly developed theory of the system of values and such a complete table of them as was given by Münsterberg in his *The Eternal Values*.

Having no intention of developing such a system, it will suffice also in the doctrine of rank if I simply defend this theory. Many phases of the question have been determined by M. Scheler in his *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, also by N. Hartmann in his *Ethik*, and by W. Stern in his *Wert-philosophie*.

Heyde rejects altogether the difference of rank in values. He says that every value can possess different degrees: I may prefer a restful vacation trip to a small moral act; I may prefer the pleasure of a walk to the negligible aesthetic value of a theatrical performance, etc.¹ The examples cited by Heyde do not, in reality, compel us at all to give up the doctrine of rank in values, i.e. the doctrine of the difference in their inner merit. These examples only indicate that in selecting between several values under the conditions of psycho-physical being we have to be guided not only by the rank, but also by other qualities of values, for example, by the fact that the non-realization of some inferior positive value (say nutrition) leads to the appearance of different destructive negative

¹ Heyde, *Wert*, p. 186.

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values (illness, death, etc.).¹ From this it follows that the preference of a value must be determined by its rank only when the other bases are equal.

TABLE OF VALUES—A GRADATION OF RANK

I. *Intrinsic Values.*

1. *Absolute Intrinsic Values.*

A. *All-embracing absolute intrinsic values.*

(a) *Primordial* all-embracing absolute intrinsic values (God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit).

(b) *Created* all-embracing absolute intrinsic values (actual and potential members of the Kingdom of God).

B. *Partial all-embracing absolute intrinsic values* (acts and characteristics of God and of members of the Kingdom of God).

2. *Relative Intrinsic Values.*

A. Social relative intrinsic values.

B. Biological relative intrinsic values.

C. Inorganic relative intrinsic values.

II. *Instrumental Values.*

¹ See N. Hartmann's theory of the existence of two laws of preference: the preference of value because of its height, and the preference of value because of its strength, meaning by the expression "strength of value" the onerous character of the disvalue (*Unwert*) that becomes effective if the value is not realized (*Ethik*, English trans., ii, p. 455).

CHAPTER V

Subjective-Psychic Experience of Values

I. VALUE AND THE FEELING OF VALUE

Values make their appearance in the subject's consciousness only by way of the subject's feelings being intentionally directed upon them. When associated with the subject's feelings the values become values *experienced* by him. Even in the subject's pre-consciousness values are already connected with positive or negative pre-feelings. Thus, in our relations with other people, the moral purity of a young man, the tenderness of a girl, the courage, the dependability, the strength of a man, the quarrelsome character of a duellist, the sombreness of a melancholic, or the sternness of an "inquisitor" are usually given to us not only theoretically as existence which is the object of observation; but they are also experienced as values, as something worthy of existence or not, or something acceptable or not, by an infinite variety of feelings. We usually have no special words for the expression of these feelings, so that we have to name them descriptively by pointing out their object; for example, the feeling of purity, the feeling of tenderness, etc. Sometimes the feelings of an observer are like the feelings by which the observed person himself experiences his own manifestations and qualities. Such, for example, is the feeling of tenderness. Sometimes they are different from the feelings of the person observed; for example, the feeling of trust in a person who depends on his

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friend for something; and the feeling of the preservation of mood and will in the friend himself.

A similar richness of feeling also gives us a relation to nature. The perception of a landscape as a whole, the perception of each colour separately, of each sound, each smell, each taste, and the perception of them in different combinations—in consciousness all of these are clothed with the experience of various feelings. Likewise, all the mental and spiritual activities of man, as well as his biological functions, are saturated with positive or negative feelings. Pleasure and displeasure are the most common, but likewise the most elementary feelings. The beauty and fulness of life are, however, experienced not so much in the simple feeling of pleasure, as in the infinitely diverse and complex feelings mentioned above.

We cannot but agree with Scheler that feeling is a special kind of awareness in which values are given. Scheler calls his theory "emotional intuitionism," indicating by this term the immediate givenness of trans-subjective values in the feelings of the subject.¹ In distinction from Scheler, however, from the standpoint of our own ontological ideal-realistic axiology, according to which existence itself in its significance for the fulness of life is a value, we assume that the words "delightful," "exalted," "beautiful," or the words "noble," "trivial," "courageous," "cowardly," when we express by them our experience of an object, indicate the following complex fact of consciousness which has a subjective and a trans-subjective aspect: the subjective side consists in the fact that the observer experiences his own subjective "feeling

¹ *Der Formalismus in der Ethik*, pp. xi, 64, 261-9.

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of delight," "feeling of exaltedness," "feeling of beauty," "feeling of nobleness," etc., while the trans-subjective side is the perceived object of the outer world with its colours, sounds, and actions in that wholeness which gives it its specific merit and specific significance for the fulness of being, the significance which is experienced by the observer in the "feeling of delightfulness," the "feeling of nobleness," etc.

The awareness and the experiences thus far mentioned are not as yet knowledge. They have a primary *practical* importance as possible directors of our behaviour. But in order for them to gain *theoretical* importance, i.e. to become knowledge, intentional acts of cognition are necessary on the part of the observer. These intentional acts must be directed both upon the outer object and upon the feelings with which the object is clothed in consciousness. These acts are differentiation, abstraction, inference, etc., and they result in the *judgment of value*, *the knowledge of value*.

For most of our acts of behaviour it is sufficient to have a consciousness of values, or even a pre-conscious experience of them, and a cognition of values is not necessary. But at a certain level of development perceptual activity directed upon values is useful for the working out of a rational system of behaviour. Now, if we distinguish in this way the practical experience of values by means of the feelings, from the theoretical identification of them by means of knowledge, we may accept the emotional intuitionism of Scheler for the practical sphere of action, and at the same time, in speaking of the *cognition* of values, we may assert that

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it may be gained by a *theoretical intuition* similar to that by which all other knowledge is gained.¹

Therefore we may say with Heyde that valuation is not a special kind of knowledge, but knowledge about a certain object (op. cit., p. 155).²

2. VALUE AND WILL

A value situation, positive or negative, experienced as an actuality, or foretasted in imagination or judgment, etc., if it is in our power to control, is accompanied by a striving to cause it to remain, or to remove it; to make it real or to avert its realization. Values in themselves contain no force which could cause or create the strivings and actions of the subject. The dynamic moment of striving and action belongs to the subject himself, to the substantival agent, and to nobody else. (It would be better to say "nothing else" because the words "who" and "nobody" can be used only in application to substantival agents.) The illusion that value is itself a force³ springs up because the substantival agent is not an abstract bearer of power, torn away from his experiences, but a concrete individual whole, permeated with the fundamental striving for the absolute fulness of being. Therefore, everything that relates to the absolute fulness

¹ For the intuitional theory in gnoseology, see the "Introduction" to my *Logic* (translated into German as *Handbuch der Logik*).

² See also N. Hartmann's theory in his *Ethik* that value-knowledge is a *theoretical* activity in no less a degree than our knowledge about space (English trans., i, p. 219).

³ N. Hartmann, for example, says that value is power which causes existence to lose its balance and to strive beyond itself, *tendiert über hinaus* (English trans., i, pp. 272, 273). However, in iii, p. 219, he says that values have no power, that power belongs to the human will.

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of being, as its moment, as a means, or as something in counter-opposition to it, does not leave the agent indifferent, but becomes his experience, charged with force. However, if we mentally differentiate the experiences of the agent in time from the super-temporal agent himself, it is easy to see that the power necessary for the action is forthcoming not from the experience of value, but from the ego itself. Therefore the ego remains, or may remain, the ruler of the action.

It is true, in the psycho-physical kingdom the ego in the great majority of cases lowers itself into a condition of slavery, in so far as it is satisfied with the most common type of behaviour, the satisfaction of its passions, laziness, etc. A close scrutiny, however, reveals that this is only a relative slavery, for formal freedom (although not positive material freedom) is still preserved. This means that the source of actions is in the sovereign super-temporal ego itself, and that the actions are not determined at all with necessity by its temporal experiences.¹

The realization of a striving is an act of will. We are giving to the term "act of will" an exceedingly wide meaning. We use this term to designate every action which has a purposive character, independent of the fact as to whether the striving which lies at its base has a psychic or a psychoidal character. Therefore, we may assert that not only the whole life of man, but also the life of all the substantival agents of the universe, can be divided up into sections consisting of acts of will, or, at any rate, of the first few links of these acts. Thus *voluntarism* is a theory that is useful not only for the

¹ See *Freedom of the Will*.

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working out of a psychological system, but also for the understanding of all the processes in the universe.¹

According to this theory the whole world in its activity has a teleological character, not, of course, in the sense of teleological determinism, i.e. rational predetermination but in the sense of *voluntary purposive activity*. N. Hartmann's objections to world-teleology, in particular his assertion that world-teleology would take away from man the power of determining anything, because in such a case everything would be predetermined for him, are rather weak. The weakness lies in the fact that in discussing this question he has in mind only two possibilities: (1) teleological determinism, and (2) causal determinism. He misses the third possibility: free purposive activity, i.e. an indeterministic teleology in which it is possible to have false aims, unsuccessful attempts, trials, getting into blind alleys, with a return to the same place for new attempts, etc.

There is no constraining power in the composition of values, nor is there any actual necessity of realizing them.² Absolute intrinsic values possess an inner merit, and hence in loving them we realize that our love is intrinsically justified. This theory differs from that of F. Brentano in this way: we find the primary criterion of the good

¹ For a Voluntaristic Psychology see my book, *Die Grundlehren der Psychologie vom Standpunkte des Voluntarismus*. In this book the first step of action, the striving, is looked upon as a foretasting of the aim, and as accompanied only by the feelings of pleasure or displeasure. I would now correct this theory by pointing out that along with these feelings an infinite number of other feelings has to be introduced. (See chap. vi, "Pleasure and Displeasure," 2, "The Connection between Pleasure and Striving," p. 147.)

² See Münsterberg's objection to Rickert, pp. 51-7; Scheler, p. 210; Heyde, p. 74; Hartmann, *Ethik*.

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not in this internally justified love, but rather in the objective inner merit of the object itself that is loved.¹

Every subject possesses: (1) a *striving* for the absolute fulness of being, and (2) an individual *normative* idea, which determines that possible peculiar part he should play in the kingdom of complete realization of the absolute values. From this it is clear that absolute values are *immediately apprehended*—the representatives of transcendental idealism would say, “are apprehended *a priori*”—as something worth loving and realizing. This immediate consciousness is the basic moment of conscience.²

In the event of contradiction arising between different values, a thing which often happens in the psychophysical kingdom, the preference and realization of that value which lies on the course of the normal evolution leading to the threshold of the Kingdom of God are experienced as that which ought to be. Sometimes such preference may be expressed in norms, i.e. judgments limiting behaviour normatively. In the ideal unity of will and value, to the realistic experience of that which ought to be, there corresponds an ideal moment, an *ideal of that which ought to be*, necessarily connected with the eidetic structure of the will; and the will is governed by a normative idea of the individual participation in the absolute fulness of being. This is the moment which N. Hartmann calls *ideales Seinsollen* (Eng. trans., i, p. 247).

If the protoplastic (first-created) essence of the agent

¹ For Brentano's theory see his *Vom Ursprung der Sittlichen Erkenntnis*, *Philos. Bibl.*, p. 55.

² N. Hartmann, *Ethik* (English trans., i, pp. 67, 68).

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furnishes him with such a dependable means of choosing the right course as conscience and the ability to experience that which ought to be, then, it seems, he would be insured against mistakes. As a matter of fact, however, our behaviour in the kingdom of psycho-physical being is full of mistakes and false steps. How can this be? To answer this question let us remind ourselves that the will of the agent is free: the normative idea, conscience, the sense of duty, or the feeling of value does not necessitate action on the part of the agent, and does not cause his behaviour. The super-spatial and super-temporal agent manifests his creative power in different directions on his own account, relying on all his abilities and temporal experiences, but does *not subordinate himself to them*. Besides, the normative idea, conscience, etc., have no power to act so as to create new events and to make changes in the agent. He had before him, when he made his first act of selection, two values from which to choose. One of these was the highest value as God's existence, and the other was a value lower in comparison with God Himself, the value of an active participation of a creature in the Divine fulness of being on the ground of self-denying love for God and reverence for His perfection. Now it was impossible for the agent to prefer the highest value and to desire to become God himself. Such a choice is the preference of the value of one's own ego to the value of God. It creates an empirical character of selfishness, that is, it creates a more or less stable love for one's own self greater than one's love for God. Earlier we have differentiated two such types of selfishness: (1) pride which contests with God, which cannot

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bear God's supremacy and is striving to overthrow Him, and (2) selfishness which strives to possess all the blessings, but which does not contest with God, and is able to acknowledge His superiority and perfection, and even to love God and His creatures, giving, however, the preference to itself. The first type of selfishness is Satanic, the second is earthly and belongs to psycho-physical being.

It is possible that a deeper examination of Satanic existence would cause us to distinguish not only the two kingdoms of the world's existence discussed in my book, *The World as an Organic Whole*, the Kingdom of God and the psycho-physical kingdom, but three—adding to these two the kingdom of Satanic existence.

The thought that there exist beings who are jealous of God's superiority and contest with Him seems an amusing fiction to the ordinary human mind. But cases of this kind are often to be met with. Once I talked with a young poet who did not believe in the existence of God. After I had considered his illogical arguments and the emotional grounds upon which they rested, I ventured to tell him that his denial of the existence of God was probably caused not by reasons of the mind, but by a pride that would not permit the existence of a being who was unapproachably perfect. About two years later I received a letter from him in which he said that I was right, and that he had changed his views. Suzuki, the Japanese defender of Neo-Buddhism, says in his book, *Outlines of Mahayana Buddhism*, that if Buddhism is described as a religion without a God and without a soul, or simply as atheism, its adherents will not object,

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because the conception of a Supreme Being who is superior to His creatures and arbitrarily interferes with their affairs is extremely offensive to a Buddhist.¹ Amongst the followers of pantheism, amongst those who preach self-redemption, the salvation of self, and the incompatibility of morality with a religious belief in redemption by God, there are many persons deep in whose souls there lies a proud aversion to the admission of the existence of a being who is on an infinitely higher level than their ego.

Conscience and the consciousness of that which ought to be, or even an instinctive experience of it, condemn both kinds of apostacy from God. The good that is reached by these false paths represents only unimportant bits of existence instead of the absolute fulness of being. Hence, they do not give complete satisfaction. However, the pain of conscience and other sufferings do not destroy the freedom of agents and do not predetermine their behaviour in one particular fashion. Some agents respond to these sufferings by entering on the course of Satanic evolution, i.e. they respond with an even greater hatred of the good, and elaborate their activities which are in opposition to God. Other agents respond by seeking the paths of normal evolution. Actually, these paths have to be sought out with great difficulty. The apostacy from God and His Kingdom is, so to speak, an anti-transfiguration of the agent. As was shown above, earthly selfishness leads an agent to his relative isolation from all other agents. It leaves him dependent on his own powers alone. His union with all other beings remains

¹ Page 31.

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only in the form of abstract consubstantiality, pre-consciousness, and pre-feeling. Led by his selfishness, the agent does not participate in existences alien to him by means of a sacrificial experience of them. Rather he tears out of them only insignificant bits, suitable for his selfish use, and taking them alone out of pre-consciousness he includes them as a part of that with which he lives. Thus he lives in his own world which represents only parts chosen out of the whole universe of actuality. Creating for himself a relatively impenetrable body, and strengthening, by the body's actions and reactions, his connections with some particular sides of the world, he cuts himself off from other influences of the world. Thus, he increases still more the peculiarity of his own environment which is different from the environment of other beings. Possessing, due to his isolation, weak creative powers, and having created conditions that lead to the incompatibility of many values, he, on the one hand, suffers from the scantiness of his life; but, on the other hand, he finds a refuge in his isolated life from the problems that are beyond his power, due to his weakened condition. He does not live with all values, but only with a more or less narrowly outlined sphere of them. The narrowness of value-consciousness (*Enge des Wertbewusstseins*)—well characterized by N. Hartmann in his *Ethik*—is characteristic of him. In his tiny world made up of bits of the universe, the perspective for correct valuation is destroyed. Some elements are experienced in connection with powerful bodily reactions and passions, while others are crowded into the background. The first have their value over-emphasized; the

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others are unjustly under-estimated. If we add to this the weakness of the intellect, conditioned as it is by a weakness of power in a relatively isolated subject, if we add also his imperfect cognition of objects, the incompleteness of deduction and prognostication of consequences, the plentiful mistakes in knowledge—then it is seen more clearly that an agent in the psycho-physical kingdom is fated to make many mistakes in valuing objects, and many mistakes in preferring one value to another.¹

Under the conditions of a sundered existence, neither the *conscience* of relatively highly developed beings, nor the *instinct* on the primary levels of existence guarantees beings against mistakes. To these fundamental guides *experience* must be added to discover the path of normal evolution. Thus it becomes clear that in real existence there cannot be a clear-cut line of normal evolution. Trials, deviations from the correct way, getting into blind alleys, and the search for the way out of them, are unavoidable in the realm of evolution.

If it is taken into consideration that relative good is by its own nature connected with evil, and that even the absolute good is accompanied by evil under the conditions of the psycho-physical kingdom—even though this evil does not come from the nature of the absolute good itself—then the sad picture of the life of beings who are condemning themselves to the life of the psycho-physical kingdom is outlined still more clearly before us. Each

¹ Concerning some of the sources of such mistakes see Meinong's *Psychologisch-ethische Untersuchungen zur Wert-theorie*, p. 11; also Ehrenfels' *System der Wert-theorie*, p. 102.

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object, deed, thing, or being always calls forth *ambivalent*—the term of the psychiatrist Bleuler—or twofold reactions of feeling and will. On the one hand an object is experienced as pleasing, beautiful, etc., and so desirable, while on the other hand it is experienced as unpleasant, or dangerous, etc., and so undesirable. The uncertainty as to what to choose, the impossibility of being pleased by the customary, introduces difficult situations at every step. This is owing to the fact that every object is many-sided and, met in different surroundings, requires in the different cases different valuations and different decisions of the will. This is the reason why many subjects are inclined to believe in ethical relativism and subjectivism, and are led to a scepticism which undermines their energy in the battle for the good. However, in all this mixture, and, as it seems, capricious unstability, there are hidden everywhere objective values significant for all. If a savage does not care for a machine, and values a piece of mirror highly—this example is used by Kreibitz in support of the subjectivity and relativity of values—it only follows that the savage makes a *subjective choice* from the given *objective* values. It does not follow from the subjectivity of the choice that the *thing chosen* is subjective.¹

It is even more difficult to recognize the objectivity of values and the actual presence of absolute values than to defend the objectivity and absoluteness of truth in gnoseology. This is owing to the fact that in the conditions of our life complex, different and contradictory feelings permeate all our experiences of value. But in order to

¹ See Scheler, pp. 211, 275.

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hold a straight course of conduct in the direction of the Kingdom of God with God at the head of it, it is no less necessary to defend absoluteness and objectivity in axiology than it is to defend absoluteness and objectivity in gnoseology.

PART II

*Characteristic Features of Value as the
Absolute Fulness of Being*

CHAPTER VI

The Nature of Consciousness

THERE has been latent in the whole conception of value presented in this book a unique theory of consciousness. Since value is always connected with a subject or person, there is no value possible apart from life and those activities that are either conscious or an undeveloped basis of consciousness.

It is quite clear that the metaphysics of this axiology are a transfigured Neo-Platonism, a Platonism that is transformed and remoulded in many of its vital conceptions. The theory of consciousness is one of the notions that are most vitally changed; but the change brings it more nearly into line with the organic side of the Platonic tradition. It now becomes a conception that is harmonious with the metaphysics, ethics, and aesthetics of even traditional Neo-Platonism; for there was present in the older conception an ambiguous theory of the mind. The relation of sense-knowledge to the universals immanent in the *nous* or higher faculty of the mind was conceived in such a manner as to lead to a paradox.

The Neo-Platonist admitted a kind of validity to our sense-experience by making it a lower kind of knowledge.¹ Through the operations of the imagination and of "sympathy" the soul gave meaning to the sensations.²

¹ Inge, *The Philosophy of Plotinus* (2nd ed.), i, p. 222; Plotinus, *Enneads*, 6. 7. 7.

² Inge, *op. cit.*, i, p. 223; *Enneads*, 4. 4. 40.

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As there were intellectual distinctions even in sense-perception so there seemed to be an activity of thought present even there. But sensation was uninteresting because spirit alone could adequately know the world. The object as perceived by sensation did not exist in the soul.¹ Our perception of the object is merely an image or a dream of the soul. Now spirit can know the world because it participates in the higher world of spiritual reality. Thus sense-knowledge is merely a step towards the knowledge of participation and has validity only in so far as it leads to spiritual perception. Yet there was a kind of reality granted to the world of physical objects existing in time and space, but there was no valid knowledge of it possible. We know the realm of spirit because we participate in it. We have mathematical and intellectual knowledge because it is an aspect of the realm of spirit; but there is no adequate knowledge of the world of space-time activity. That is merely a knowledge of images. It was the disrespect for the realm of time, space, and movement which caused the Neo-Platonist to be no more concerned than he was by this paradoxical element in his theory of knowledge. He reduced the world of change to an illusory world; and yet he recognized that there was a kind of reality about the world of space and time. But he did not adequately account for our knowledge of this changing world which in a sense is real.

Because the spirit participates in the ultimate life of reality, the forms that are immanent in it are identically the same forms as those immanent in the physical object.

¹ Inge, *op. cit.*, i, p. 223; *Enneads*, 5. 5. 1.

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We must say that they are identical because the Neo-Platonist was a realist and not a nominalist. For him as for Aristotle, "where the objects are immaterial that which thinks and that which is thought are one and the same."¹ Now, if we follow this through, the categories of thought are identical with the categories of reality.² If this is true, there is no parallel between thought and object, at least as far as the categories are concerned. When we rightly think the object, we participate in the reality of the thing in so far as it is characterized by form and order. To be sure, we do not participate in the sensory qualities of the thing. The thing in so far as it embodies universals, and the thing as cognized, are not two but one.

Thus, there is an immanence of "all in all" as far as the intellectual forms are concerned. When rightly thinking the nature of an object, that object as intellectual form is actually immanent in my mind. Now some of the present-day scholastics have understood this, and have recently been opposing the sharp dualism and subjectivism of the Neo-Scholastics. Such a thinker is Gredt, who is critical of the thinking of the Neo-Scholastic Mercier.³ But as one reads Neo-Platonic authors he has the impression that the "forms" immanent in physical reality are not identically those immanent in the perceiving mind.

Neo-Platonism developed a very remarkable insight: it freed Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect as the "form

¹ Aristotle, *De anima*, 430a, 3; Inge, op. cit., ii, p. 49.

² Inge, op. cit., ii, pp. 56, 57.

³ *Unsere Aussenwelt*, pp. 9 ff.

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of forms" from Aristotle's sensationalism. By making the eternal forms immanent in the intellect of the knowing mind it gave an explanation to Plato's conception of the eternal ideas as inborn. We no longer have the forms explained by a mythological theory of memory, but rather a conception of the forms as actually immanent in the human mind.

But owing to the fact that sensations were considered to be images and not really of the stuff of knowledge, the reality of physical objects was supposed to be outside the mind of the knowing subject. Thus, the theory of epistemological dualism was used to explain the perception of sense-objects. But epistemological dualism naturally leads to the notion of a parallelism between thought and thing, and when this is done, the categories of thought themselves tend to be thought of as parallel to the categories of reality.

Thus, because of its theory of sense-knowledge, Neo-Platonism tended to make the categories of thought subjective. And so it came to think of the intellect as the inner organ which helped us to find the meaning of the external world. Now, rightly or wrongly, this interpretation was the one accepted by the Renaissance and Cambridge Platonists. The theory of inwardness swallowed up the conception of the immanence of the object as an intellectual form within the mind. It was this doctrine of inwardness and epistemological dualism that gave us our modern tendency towards subjectivity. And this subjective theory destroyed the possibility of the coherent and organic metaphysics of Neo-Platonism. The metaphysics of Neo-Platonism are a theory of the immanence

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of "all in all," if only an immanence to a small extent.¹ But one aspect of its epistemology leads to the theory of Leibniz, where the soul has neither windows nor doors. For Leibniz all my experience is immanent in my mind, but my experience is only a copy of reality.²

Most of modern thought has followed the theory that the whole content of the external object transcends human experience. However, if we follow out the suggestion latent in the doctrine of the immanence of the same universal in both thought and thing, and if we expand it by the doctrine of the immanence of "all in all," we have the conception of intuitionism as a theory of knowledge. Intuitionism makes the organic theory of Neo-Platonism effective in its epistemology.

By intuition we do not mean an irrationalism in the theory of knowledge, as Bergson does, nor do we mean that abstraction and analysis have no place in thought. Rather, we mean that all objects, processes, forms, and beings may be made explicit, under ideal conditions, as natively immanent in the consciousness of the knowing individual. Traditional Neo-Platonism made all universals immanent in the mind of the knowing subject. This was merely a beginning of the reformation of the whole concept of consciousness. If we carry out this reforma-

¹ This paradox is illustrated by Henry More's theory of an organic metaphysics connected with nominalism and the conception of our knowledge of all reality as phenomenal. See Mackinnon, *The Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, pp. 260, 261, 280.

² It was the new stress on observation in natural science that caused Neo-Platonism to become completely subjective. The world of change became significant in a manner quite foreign to traditional Neo-Platonism.

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tion, not only the forms are immanent but everything else is immanent in the knowing mind.

Now there is a philosophy of immanence in the theory of knowledge called "Immanentism," but it makes everything immanent in the knowing mind by reducing the theory of knowledge to a type of solipsism. The theory here presented as an aspect of Neo-Platonism is obviously not solipsism. Everything is, to be sure, potentially immanent in my mind, but my mind in addition to everything else is also immanent in every other individual's mind. It is the theory, then, of the mutual immanence of "all in all" for knowledge.

In such a conception there is no need for several faculties of cognition, since intellectual knowledge is not the only type of knowledge that involves immanence. Intellectual knowledge differs from sensory knowledge only in the object upon which attention is turned. The intellectual forms are immanent in reality, even in physical objects, and are cognized by attention being directed upon them. Even super-temporal and super-spatial concrete beings such as selves are known when attention is directed upon them.

Thus the faculty psychology of traditional Neo-Platonism disappears and is replaced by a functional theory of the psychic processes. The self or *ego* directs its attention upon different types of reality immanent in its consciousness. As a self it acts as a striving being. Striving is a feeling-willing process. The *ego* attends to different types and aspects of objects. Thus sensory experience and intellectual experience differ only because the objects to which the subject attends differ; but they

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do not represent a difference of faculty on the part of the attending subject.

Our analysis above has treated everything that is known or may be known as immanent in the consciousness of the knowing individual. If we wish to use the word consciousness to cover both the psychic processes of the self and the objects upon which attention is directed, we may say that the objects known, even though they be trees and flowers, form the objective side of consciousness. But the term psychic is a more sharply defined one. It means the mental activities of the self. Now, obviously, a tree or a flower is not a mental activity. It is that to which attention is directed when we perceive a tree or a flower, and, even as cognized or perceived, forms no part of the psychic content of consciousness.

So, when we study mind we are studying will and feeling as aspects of attention and we are studying the general activities of attention; but we are not studying sensations or perceptions as the "sensed" or the perceived. We are studying the processes of sensing and perceiving, for they are merely special kinds of attention, but not the content perceived. Psychology, which deals with the psychic, should not deal with the *sensa*, logical forms, or the perceptual content. These all belong to other fields of knowledge, and not to psychology.

Psychology deals with psychic events as the activities of a striving and attending subject, and should not be confused with the theory of knowledge, which deals with the general nature of objects immanent in consciousness in so far as they are a revelation of truth. To understand the nature of the theory of knowledge we must

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examine the complete nature of consciousness more carefully.

Consciousness is possible because the self is joined together with all other parts of the world by ideal forms, spiritual links that weld it together with the rest of the world. Not only consciousness is made possible by these spiritual links, but other types of spiritual activity as well—such as the creative activity that has been made possible by space, time, causality, number, etc. These forms also have logical significance, as we shall see further on.

But consciousness is made possible by the knitting together of the self and its world by a form of connection that makes everything immanent in everything else for knowledge. This connection is called gnoseological coördination. It merely asserts this mutual immanence of subjects in knowledge. Consciousness thus involves at least a subject and an object, and the ideal connection between them. Thus consciousness transcends the limits of individuality, and involves super-individual connections. But the psychic or mental side of knowledge involves only the activity of the subject directed upon the object. Consciousness thus involves more than the psychic.

Now, the theory of knowledge is interested in the objective side of consciousness. Judgment is possible because the intentional acts of the self may be directed to something immanent in consciousness but not a part of the psychic life of the knowing individual. Judgment is also possible because the content of reality immanent in consciousness is knit together by ideal forms. These

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ideal forms are a part of the real world, quite independent of any act of cognition on the part of the knowing subject. They are forms that knit together the world itself into a unity.

Now judgment and inference are possible because the objective side of consciousness is the real world, or at least some aspect of it; and because the real world is bound together by ideal forms. Since the world is connected by ideal forms, it is possible, in discriminating any particular content of the world immanent in my consciousness, to pass from one aspect or particular of it to another. If a given aspect of reality, when scrutinized, is found necessarily to lead to another aspect of reality due to its connection with it, the first of these aspects is the logical ground of our cognizing that aspect of reality called the consequent. The category of ground and consequent is a logical, not an ontological category, but as a logical category it is possible only because of the ontological connections or ideal moments of the real world.

If we understand ground and consequent in judgment we have the clue to the theory of inference. The two premises of the syllogism are the logical ground of the conclusion as a consequent. This novel theory of the nature of inference may be so developed that non-syllogistic inferences may be incorporated without any violence to the general logical theory. Thus we can account for those types of reasoning which had previously seemed inexplicable except on the basis of the newer symbolic logic.

It should now be clear that if the concept of imma-

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nence, which is one significant phase of Neo-Platonism, is allowed to develop to its logical conclusion it will transform the entire concept of consciousness. But this change brings psychology and the theory of knowledge into a coherent connection with the metaphysics of Neo-Platonism. The world becomes more explicitly an organic whole in the light of this new theory of consciousness.

It must be admitted that the first steps in the development of this new theory of consciousness were not made explicitly as a transformation of Neo-Platonism. Its author was labouring to construct an authentic psychology and epistemology. It was only later that he discovered how near his theories were to those of Solovyof, who had developed epistemology as an internal critique of the Neo-Platonic position. It was then that this new theory of consciousness became the basis of a Neo-Platonic metaphysics.

The theory of value developed in this book is metaphysical; but it is the concept of consciousness in its new role which makes possible a theory of meaning, and this theory of meaning is metaphysical and not psychological. It is this theory of meaning which is the clue to the whole concept of value.

CHAPTER VII

Meaning—Value as Meaning

I. THE PERSON AND THE "IMAGE OF GOD"

WE have found that consciousness is based on the immanence of "all in all" for contemplation. The self may turn its gaze upon either the temporal or the eternal. That which is gazed upon is the objective side of consciousness. But the psychic life itself is temporal. Now psychic activity is only one side of the creativity of the self. It also creates in terms of body, it produces that which is space-filling as well as temporal in its nature. This, like psychic activity, is also possible because of the mutual immanence of subjects through other forms besides the one of epistemological coördination. But personality as temporal and as spatial is something that is not temporal or spatial. The core of personality is that which is super-temporal and super-spatial. This core is a reality that lies outside of space and outside of time. It is metalogical and hence does not fall under the laws of logic. It is not subjected to the laws of identity, non-contradiction, and the excluded middle. It is a non-conceptual reality. It cannot be conceptual because it does not fall under the laws of logic. Hence it has no essence; and in this respect is like the Absolute Himself. The Absolute is beyond the realm of essence.

This super-essential core of personality is the source of personal life as psychic and as physical manifestations. It is the will or source of action. It is the creative centre

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of personality; that which gives attention and strives. Striving, attention, and feeling are all the creation of this self or core of the personal life. The psychic events and physical events are real; they are not illusions; but they are creations and not the original being or agent. For this reason the self is free from its own character; the self can renounce its own creations in time, just because it is metalogical.

Now we can understand the theory of experience, or life. The self attends; the self feels; the self acts. But that which the self sees, hears, and acts upon is that which is beyond its own psychic activities—at least in such cases where it is not introspecting. In the case of introspection it is aware of its own creative activity as a mental life in time. But when it is giving attention to a tree or a house or even its own body it is aware of something that is beyond its own mental life. This leads once again to the theory of coördination in knowledge. The self attends to something that is beyond its own mental life. This something is united with the self in a unity that is unique to consciousness. Attention is founded on a coördination of selves within the world. In this way only is experience possible. Of course this coördination is necessary if intelligent action is to be possible.

The self can also physically act in the world. That is due to the fact that the self creates not only mental events but also physical events. It creates an impenetrable body which is uniquely its own. Of course this body which is uniquely mine is not to be confused with that large body of head, arms, legs, etc., which is usually called mine and is really a body that is due to the creation

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of many selves. That body is the product of the myriads of selves who coöperate to make human life possible. This theory is similar to that of Leibniz, with this exception, that these monads have windows. Also these monads differ from those of Leibniz in having a core of personality which is to be distinguished from the mental life in time.

This theory is not unlike that of Professor James Ward as developed in the *Psychological Principles* and *Realm of Ends*. Ward held that there was a coördination between the self and the objects of its experience. He called it the duality of subject and object that is the necessary form of all experience. But Ward differed from this theory in making the objects of experience states of the psychoplasm rather than the actual objects of the extra-somatic world. Ward thought that the external world was mirrored in the psychoplasm of human experience. This psychoplasm was really the structure of the immediate environment of the human monad within the brain.

Let us return to the problem of the super-essential self which is the core of personality. The casual reader finds a reference to the *image of God* or that unique idea of God which forms the essence of the particular personality and stands in contrast with the empirical nature of personality. He might be led to think that the image of God is really the essence of the self in so far as it is out of time over against the empirical essence as the personal life in space and time. This is a false interpretation: both the image of God and the empirical character refer to the life of personality within the temporal realm. The

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true self or core of personality is super-essential. The empirical character is the character that I actually do create in time. It may be very, very evil or it may be more perfect. This *φύσις* or empirical character is transformed into a deified character when it is lived according to the image of God of which the super-essential self is the bearer.

Strange as it may seem, the image of God is that which gives the human personality its true identity. The image of God is not the empirical character. The image of God is the norm of what the given individual should be. It is realized in the experience of that person who is a member of the Kingdom of Heaven. Because the self, as a super-essential being, is connected with a normative idea, it has an identity that is all its own. But the image of God is not creative; it is the self that is creative. The self may reject or it may accept this essence as the norm for its activity. But the essence is that which makes it unique; it points out the place that the self ideally holds in the eternal Kingdom of Heaven.

2. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF MEANING

In one sense the whole of this book has been furnishing a new definition of meaning. The particular theory of experience here developed is a unique theory of meaning. This theory of meaning is essentially bound up with the theory of value which it is the aim of the book to define.

The first thing that is essential to meaning is the fact that the states of one person's mental life may be experienced by another person or the physical creation of one

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person may be experienced by another person. This is the mutual immanence of A and B. In other words, B is an object of A's experience and is directly experienced by him. In such a case B is a meaning for A. We always have meaning when an object enriches my experience by being present in the field of my attention and exciting my interest in it. Not only is a person a meaning for another person, but also the physical creations of one person have a meaning for him and for others. "We have . . . meaning when the pure blue colour of a light ray, or an aria sung by Chaliapin, are not indifferent to me, because, although they are realized outside of me, they are still ideally present also in the composition of my life, enriching or impoverishing it" (supra, p. 98).

But to define meaning in this way is not enough. We must make a second implication of the theory clear to ourselves. If the self were not coördinated with the physical world and with other selves it could not experience them. It is related to other beings and hence it can experience them. We have found that this experience of another is meaning.

The peculiar form of relation involved is one that means that every connected event transcends its own limit and becomes through its relation to other events consubstantial with them. The term consubstantial means "of one substance with." Events transcend themselves in a substance that does not destroy their individuality but does unite them within a being that is more than the mere plurality so united. We shall find that this theory of consubstantiality develops into the highest criterion and explanation of value itself.

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But most important of all is a third implication: meaning also involves the existence of events as the manifestations and experiences of a subject which creates them. Thus not only does B have meaning for A, but the manifestations of A have meaning for A himself: the subject has meaning for himself in his own manifestations. The reason for meaning being so vitally connected with the super-essential substantival agent is that the subject is that which creates meaning through its own activity. It is the subject which by its activity transcends its own being through the forms which it bears. These forms are its connections with other agents. These connections are the expression of the agent's abstract consubstantiality with which it was endowed in its very creation.

We should now see that meaning always has an ideal aspect. This is due to the fact that meaning always involves relations. These relations are ideal because they are the residual of the ideal relations of the Kingdom of Heaven. But more than this, a self or substantival agent is always involved in meaning. The manifestations are always manifestations of an ideal being. It is this ideal being that gives them unity and causes them to be related to that which is beyond themselves because it involves in itself some consubstantiality.

So there is an ideal aspect always indirectly involved in the meaning even of events. Thus, if we are dealing with a creation in time and space, such as a song, we have the ideal relation involved in the form or essence of the song and we have its relation to its creative source, the substantival agent. If we treat the event within itself

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we have an abstraction, but even so, there is always an ideal element left, the ideal form of the event and the relations by which it transcends itself. But if the self as an object of experience has meaning, then we have value that is completely ideal; or if we consider an ideal essence as having meaning we have a completely ideal value.

Due to the strongly cognitive character of modern philosophy we are inclined to consider meaning primarily as a cognitive matter. Now the theory of meaning that has been expounded in this chapter must be carefully distinguished from any theory that makes meaning merely that which is known. A content considered merely as known is not a meaning. It is not the "light ray" or "an aria sung by Chaliapin" merely as intuited that are meanings for the mind so passively contemplating them. No, A is a meaning for B when B is not indifferent to A, when A enriches or impoverishes B's life.

Meaning is a relation that involves more than the coördination of knowledge: it involves the relation of significance for personality in its larger sphere. For, with the theory of consciousness here developed, everything known may enter the sphere of the knowing individual's life. The whole world ideally forms part of the sphere of every subject's life. Not only his own activities, physical and mental, are meaning for him, but anything that comes into his life may have meaning for him. This leads us to a very interesting problem, the problem of concrete consubstantiality, or meaning that draws persons very close together.

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3. GOD AND THE WORLD

The Absolute has an existence that is completely independent of the created world. The Absolute has neither essence nor value. It is super-essential and timeless; It is beyond the realm of value. But like the human self which is also super-essential, It has a life. This life of the Absolute is the God of religion. The God of religion is God manifesting Himself as the Trinity.

The Trinity is of a threefold nature. Three Beings live coöperatively a single life. But the Trinity is not the whole of the reality of God. The core of the life of God is the super-essential Absolute which creatively manifests Itself in the life of the Trinity. Just as the super-essential core of human personality creatively works through the mental life, so the Absolute creatively works through Its life which is the Trinity.

Even so the Divine Life is not the same as human personality. It has a concreteness unknown to human personality. It is a union of three in one and so is analogous rather to the Kingdom of Heaven than to the life of the single human personality. Each member of the Trinity is an individuality which, united with the other two, creates the concreteness of the life of the Godhead. This concrete life of the Trinity is the life of complete value. It involves ideal relationship in perfect coöperation and harmony. Each member of the Trinity has an absolute value as one aspect of the whole of the life of God.

Value in its creative and original form is the life of the Trinity. The human individual has value because he

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can in some sense coöperate with the life of the Trinity. The Kingdom of Heaven may be considered the body of the Trinity Itself. Because it was created there is a distinction between it and the Trinity; but as a creation it is the body of the Trinity. The Kingdom of Heaven in one sense is the expression of the Trinity, and as the Body of Christ, the Logos, it is the body of the Father and the Holy Spirit besides.

Using this as a clue, we can see that value lies primarily in the Trinitarian life of God; but secondarily in the Kingdom of Heaven as the Body of the Trinity, for the Church Triumphant, or the Kingdom of Heaven, is Its Body. The Kingdom of Heaven is therefore distinct in structure from the inner life of the Trinity Itself. The Kingdom is a complex organization of many agents forming and creating a common life in space and time. The common life of the Trinity is above space, and above time. It is only the Body of the Trinity that is spatial and that is temporal. However, since the Kingdom of Heaven is the Body of the Trinity, the principle of unity within the Godhead is the principle of unity within the Kingdom of Heaven.

The principle of unity in the Godhead is a very old one in Christian thought. It is termed the perichoresis or circumincession. Each member of the Trinity has a distinct individuality; but due to their union through the Absolute they coöperate in such a way as to live one undivided life, a life of concrete fulness and joy. The principle of perichoresis is that of individuals united together in a larger life that is more than individual. The Trinity is a super-individual unity. God is not a person,

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but He is the union of persons in one super-personal life. The Absolute is beyond the distinction of number; It is that which makes possible the concrete life of the Trinity as a unity of three in one. So we find within the dogma of the Trinity a principle of union in which individuality through a coöperative life becomes something that is super-personal.

It is usually not recognized that the theory that God is a person is relatively novel in Christian thought. Even the Protestant reformers did not assert it. It is probably the product of Deism and really the denial of the Christian doctrine of the Trinity. For traditional creedal theology God is a unity of three personalities or, if you will, three hypostases,

God in Three Persons, blessed Trinity.

The Kingdom of God is a unity that is analogous to that of the Trinity within the Godhead. The principle of perichoresis explains the unity of all the myriad personalities of the created world within the Kingdom of Heaven. This even brings the terminology of the Nicene Creed into logic and metaphysics. Thus we may name the unity of individuals even within this realm of imperfect life by a term that is really derived from the Nicene Creed. The term is consubstantiality. It is to be remembered that the doctrine of the Incarnation was defined by the Nicene Creed by asserting that the second member of the Trinity was consubstantial or of one substance with the Father. The theory that was rejected at Nicea was that of Arius, the theory that the second member of the Trinity is like the Father in

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substance rather than consubstantial or of the same substance as the Father. Thus we see that according to the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity the three Persons unite to make one substance. The substance of the Godhead is not three, but rather one; yet it is the union of three hypostases.

If we apply the principle of consubstantiality to the Kingdom of Heaven we have one substance within the whole of the Kingdom. But all the selves that make up that Kingdom are united as individuals into that one consubstantial life.

But this is not the whole of the theory of consubstantiality. All the selves of the entire universe were endowed in their very creation with a bond that united them to all other selves. Epistemological coördination, space, time, number, etc., were a part of their endowment as created beings. This endowment cannot be destroyed, although its sphere of application may be narrowed. This is a part of the unity of the Kingdom of Heaven, since it makes possible the coöperation with God and with other selves which is the very essence of the close-knit unity of the Kingdom. But this one aspect of the Kingdom is possessed by all selves. Hence we may say that there is a slender connection that connects every self of the whole universe with the Kingdom of Heaven.

At their creation the selves were all endowed with creative power, with abstract consubstantiality, and with "the image of God," but they were not determined in their choice of creative life, or the sphere of meaning which they would make their own. Some selves chose

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God as the meaning of their life. Love for him and for each other was the end of living, the true Meaning of life. They became the members of the Kingdom of Heaven. Others chose themselves or some narrow sphere of life as the meaning of existence, and they made up our world, the world of evil, sin, and sorrow.

Abstract consubstantiality is necessary for all existence. It is the original endowment of the creature. But concrete consubstantiality is quite different. It involves a relationship of coöperation where one purpose and one all-inclusive meaning brings all persons into one common life. God as the Supreme Meaning of life is our next problem.

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To understand concrete consubstantiality we must appreciate the whole conception of *body* in relation to our problem.

A *body*—and I am using the term in the sense of an animal or a vegetable organism—is a unity in a plurality. If we conceive of it as the product of many substantial agents producing it as their joint action we realize that such an organism has a concreteness unknown to an electron or a molecule. Now this unity is due not alone to space, time, causality, etc., but also to the fact that the activities of all the agents that make up the body are united by one dominant purpose. We are using the conception of Leibniz with the change of making the monads equipped with open doors. The purpose of the organism as a whole, its unity as a body, is due to the directive purpose of the dominant monad.

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Now, the meaning of the organization as a whole is to be found in the dominant monad in so far as it gives meaning to the life of every other monad in the whole body. Its life is the meaning for every monad in the body because the life of the organism as a whole is the larger life of every unit in it. Every monad exists for the whole, and the purpose of the whole is the concrete meaning of life for all the members of that body.

Now we are in a position to understand the conception of the Kingdom of Heaven as the body of the Trinity, and its bearing on the problem of concrete consubstantiality. God is the supreme meaning for the Kingdom of Heaven because He is the head of that body, while the selves of the Kingdom of Heaven are its members. The life of God is the directive life of the Kingdom of Heaven; the eternal purpose of the Trinitarian life of God is that which gives purpose to the Kingdom of Heaven. It is a completely self-justified meaning because It produces perfect unanimity and love, and is in Itself a concrete interplay of unanimity and love. Thus, the concrete life of love within the Trinity is self-justified, but It receives a secondary confirmation in the love that It awakens within Its body, which is the Kingdom of Heaven.

Now, we may say that God is the absolute intrinsic primordial value because He gives meaning to that perfect consubstantiality of the Kingdom of Heaven. And nothing else can or does give such concreteness to the Kingdom of Heaven. We may say also that all our values are positive in just so far as they move towards a completeness of consubstantiality. Then clearly, values

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are positive in just so far as they bring individuals closer and closer to the Kingdom of Heaven. And to bring the meaning of life closer to the Kingdom of Heaven means to bring life more and more under the dominance of the purpose of God. The world will become good and beautiful and true when God is "all in all" for the life of every creature. The Divine life is the life of love, a love of the members for each other within the Godhead, and love for all created beings. Thus, when God becomes the supreme meaning for a being, that means that every other creature has a meaning as an object of the Divine Love. So the fulness of life for every creature is a life of complete and active love for God and for all other beings.

CHAPTER VIII

Truth, Beauty, and Goodness

I. GOD AS COMPLETE MEANING

Positive value is meaning in relation to the Absolute Meaning; it is measured by the Absolute Fulness of Meaning and is a participation in the All-Embracing Meaning Itself. In its concreteness value becomes satisfactory only as meaning becomes more and more a participation of the related content in the life of God Himself.

Thus any positive meaning is only possible because in experience there is a Ground of all meaning, the meaning of the subject and of all its objects, and because this Ground is the measure of the fulness of the meaning of any value-experience.

This helps us to understand the concept of value from the side of experience. The self can never make judgments of value until it has experienced value as an aspect of its life. Due to the immanence of "all in all," everything in the world complements the sphere of the life of each being. In the wider sense, my fuller life includes everything with which I come into contact. Everything comes into the sphere of my life as a factor of it. And as we have already seen, God Himself is the true meaning of my larger life. However, that does not mean that everything enters the sphere of my own creations, the sphere of my inner life. But owing to the fact that everything enters the sphere of my life and is

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experienced as worthy or unworthy in terms of God as the All-Embracing Meaning of all being, God is the primary experience of value. Positive Meaning exists where objects and events are experienced as worthy or unworthy in terms of the Ultimate Meaning. All of this is a part of the sphere of my life because my fuller life includes God as its ultimate meaning and all agents as potential members of the Kingdom of Heaven as a part of its completed nature.

Final Meaning is the experience of God as the Fulness of Meaning and everything else in relation to that Final Meaning. Hence everything that enriches that fuller life of ours, the whole of the created world, is a positive value, and everything that mars it is a negative value. But I can only realize it as a value in so far as it becomes concretely experienced as a part of my larger life. This does not mean that the evils in this larger life of mine are my intentions, my inner creations. But it does mean that I am in relation to the whole world as if it were my body. In fact, in a larger way it is my body. I sometimes experience the sickness of my body as my sickness in the larger sense, and yet it is experienced as something which was not due to me and was not my wish or desire. When my body is sick I experience the pain as in a larger sense my pain. However, the disease and pain may not be due to my failure. Yet the sickness is meaningful because it has a relation to my life. In the same way everything in the universe has value for me as I experience it in relation to its marring or improving aspects of my wider life, the life lived in the Fulness of the Divine Meaning. Although nothing is experienced as value unless

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it bears a relationship to my life, yet this is not individualism in axiology because my life only has positive meaning through its relationship to Ultimate Meaning.

This concept has been expressed most magnificently by F. D. Maurice in his description of Our Lord's relationship to the man "possessed by an unclean spirit." The expression is somewhat theological, but the thought is quite valid.

"There was a time in our Lord's life on earth, we are told, when a man met Him, *coming out of the tombs, exceeding fierce, whom no man could bind, no, not with chains*. That man was *possessed by an unclean spirit*. Of all men upon earth, you would say that he was the one between whom and the pure and holy Jesus there must have existed the most intense repugnance. What Pharisee, who shrank from the filthy and loathsome words of that maniac, could have experienced one-thousandth part of the inward and intense loathing which Christ must have experienced for the mind that those words expressed? For it was into *that* He looked; *that* which He understood; *that* which in His inmost being He must have felt, which must have given Him a shock such as it could have given to no other. I repeat the words; I beseech you to consider them; He must have felt the wickedness of that man in His inmost being. He must have been conscious of it, as no one else was or could be. Now, if we ever have had the consciousness, in a very slight degree, of evil in another man, has it not been, *up to that degree*, as if the evil were in ourselves? Suppose the offender was a friend, or a brother, or a child, has not this sense of personal shame, of the evil being ours, been

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proportionably stronger and more acute? However much we might feel ourselves called upon to act as judges, this perception still remained. It was not crushed even by the anger, the selfish anger, and impatience of an injury done to us, which, most probably, mingled with and corrupted the purer indignation and sorrow. Most of us confess with humiliation how little we have had of this lively consciousness of other men's impurity, or injustice, or falsehood, or baseness. But we *do* confess it; we know, therefore, that we should be better if we had more of it. In our best moments we admire with a fervent admiration—in our worse, we envy with a wicked envy—those in whom we trace most of it. And we have had just enough of it to be certain that it belongs to the truest and most radical part of the character, not to its transient impulses. Suppose, then, this carried up to its highest point: cannot you, at a great distance, apprehend that Christ may have entered into the sin of the maniac's spirit, may have had the most inward realization of it, not because it was like what was in Himself, but because it was utterly and intensely unlike? And yet are you not sure that this could not have been, unless He had the most perfect and thorough sympathy with this man, whose nature was transformed into the likeness of a brute, whose spirit had acquired the image of a devil? Does the coexistence of this sympathy and this antipathy perplex you? Oh! ask yourselves which you could bear to be away; which you could bear to be weaker than the other! Ask yourselves whether they must not dwell together in their highest degree, in their fullest power, in any one of whom you could say, 'He is perfect; he is

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the standard of excellence; in him there is the full image of God.' Diminish by one atom the loathing and horror, or the fellowship and sympathy, and by that atom you lower the character; you are sure that you have brought it nearer to the level of your own low imaginations; that you have made it less like the Being who would raise you towards Himself."¹

We experience God as complete meaning. He gives meaning to everything else in so far as those other things participate in Him. Everything that has interest for me actually belongs to the sphere of my life. And as Maurice's passage shows, everything should enter into the sphere of my life as belonging to the wider area of myself. It is in this way that the experience of value is possible, and, indirectly, it is the way in which the judgment of value becomes possible.

We can best understand the judgment of value and even gain a larger knowledge of the nature of value itself if we examine the problem of truth.

2. TRUTH AS THEORY AND TRUTH AS VALUE

If we are to understand truth as a value, a meaning that has significance, we can best make it clear to ourselves by understanding theoretical truth, and then contrasting the two types.

As we have already seen, objects of which we are aware, whether they be physical objects, ideal forms, or spiritual beings, are immanent in the consciousness of the subject aware of them, although—except in the case

¹ *Lincoln's Inn Sermons*, Sermon XII, on "Christ made Sin for Us," pp. 185 ff.

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of self-consciousness—they are not created by the awareness of the subject. They exist as realities that are not dependent on my psychic processes for their being, and are known as having a reality apart from my consciousness. Thus consciousness contains material objects, ideal forms, and spiritual beings, although none of them are a part of the subject's psychic life.

The knowing process is psychic, but the objects known need not be psychic at all. If I am aware of a passing train, that train is immanent in my consciousness, but is not a creation of my mental activity. The train has an existence quite apart from my mind, but in the relation called knowledge it is immanent in my consciousness. In knowledge the object is connected with a knowing subject by an ideal relation which makes them mutually immanent in each other. Thus knowledge involves the subject, the object, and the relation between them. An object is not an aspect of knowledge, unless it is known. If truly known, it is known as it is; but as known it is immanent in the consciousness of the knowing subject. It would be false to say that the object known is in any way created by the knowing subject's mental processes; but as known it is always immanent in a subject's consciousness and forms the objective side or content of that consciousness.

This special relationship which we find in knowledge makes knowledge possible. It is a relation where all is immanent in all for contemplation; and we would enjoy such complete contemplation except for the imperfections of our bodies which keep us from enjoying it. This theoretical immanence of "all in all," this possibility of

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universal awareness, is an *ideal* relation, a connection of the immanence of "all in all" that makes intuition possible. Along with space, time, and number, it belongs to the abstract consubstantiality of every subject with every other subject in the world.

We now see that an object as known is an object related to a subject by a special relation; but this connection alone does not give the subject knowledge. There is no knowledge until the knowing subject correctly discriminates the characteristics of the object of which it is aware.

Truth is found in the knowledge situation in which the object is seen as it is. Truth is the object known as it is. However, truth is not the object as it is, but the object known as it is. So truth involves the relation of an ideal coördination; it is the object in a very special type of relation, the relation of explicit knowledge. Without the subject there would be no truth, and yet the subject does not constitute the truth. Truth is the object made explicit in its full nature; but it is the object made explicit to the gaze of a subject. But truth as theory need not be more than the object made explicit in its full nature to the contemplation of the knowing subject. Theoretical truth considers the object solely in its own nature.

So much for truth, considered in its logical and epistemological aspect. Now truth as value likewise is not subjective, but it is experience in a sense that truth as theory is not. The nature of theoretical truth is the object in its original being made explicit to the contemplation of a subject. But the nature of truth as value is

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the real as meaning, in opposition to that which is shadowy and unsubstantial, the real as opposed to the unrealities of life. The Truth is that which gives life meaning as eternally real and abiding in opposition to that which perishes in the using; it is the real in contrast to that which promises a reality which it does not have. God is the Truth because He is the Fully Real, and the meaning of the completeness of reality lies in Him.

Truth as value like theoretical truth involves the relation of subject and object; but it is not that slender relationship where the object is merely perceived as it is. Rather it is the meaning of the fuller life itself as that which is substantial and real rather than something dreamlike and unreal. Truth is the concrete, the substantial, as the richness of life. It is God who is the Completely Real, just because He is real in the highest degree of consubstantial life. He is the substantial value, *the Truth*, for all other beings, since there is Truth for them when they are united through Him in "one body and one Spirit."

3. GOD AS THE GOOD

God is goodness in so far as the coöperative life of the Trinity is the end of all action of created beings. That mutual participation of life within the Trinity is goodness. And as a complete outpouring of love it becomes the love which is the meaning, the true positive meaning of life for every creature. Now of course God must be related to the creature to be a value for that creature, but it is not the creature who gives value to God but God who gives value to the creature. God would not be

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the supreme value for the creature if there were no relation to the creature, just as an object could not be truth unless it is made explicit in the consciousness of the subject. But the psychic activity of the subject does not constitute theoretic truth. Theoretic truth is literally the nature of the object made explicit in the consciousness of the subject. So there is no value apart from subjects, but the value is not of the nature of a contribution that the subject makes to the object, when the object is adjudged to be valuable, but the contribution that the object makes to the fuller life of the subject. So, God awakens my love but He is not the supreme value due to my love. My love is awakened because He is the supreme end of my life. I do not make Him valuable, but He makes my life valuable because of His worth. Hence God as the Good is the end of my life, as a coöperative life of love which gives me value in so far as I participate in it. And I participate in it in so far as I share its love for all created things.

4. BEAUTY TRANSIENT AND ETERNAL

Beauty, like goodness, and like truth as a value, is the completion of life, and in its fulness is to be found only in God. Beauty is perfect expression. Of course, perfect beauty would be goodness and truth perfectly expressed, as revealed in God and as mediated in the complete life of the Kingdom of Heaven. It is a wholly self-justified value. Hence it cannot be found completely revealed within our world, full as it is of evil and opposition. Beauty can only find a faint echo within our world.

Our material creations are necessarily imperfect in

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character. Matter as impenetrable and resisting cannot be good. That does not mean that all space-time life is evil. The life of the Kingdom of Heaven has a higher type of space than is known within our system of time and space. The space-time creations of the Kingdom of God are perfect because they have no shadow of evil in their composition. The material of their composition is the perfect life of love and truth.

But in our life here and now, within the sphere of sin and death, we can only create that which is partially beautiful. The best that we can do is to try to express, to give some hint of, the beauty that is to be found in the life of the Kingdom of Heaven. That is the reason that our beauty is always of the nature of a symbol.

"I saw no mortal beauty with these eyes," is the motto of Michelangelo when he attempts to mould the imperfect materials of this world in such a way as to make them shine with the light that he has seen glow with perfect brilliance in the world of eternal beauty.

The mountains perish, the hills pass away, the green grass withers, the flowers fade, the beauty of man is turned into the ugliness of death: all the creations of man or of nature perish. They are but passing symbols of a beauty that never fades, of a glory that never dies. There is a light never seen on land or sea, the brilliance and the radiance of which inspires the man who would cause the temporal forms of this world even faintly to reflect the radiance of a world that knows no dimness and no tarnish. Hence we express in a transient form, in mere symbols, that which is eternally beautiful.

The world of nature contains much beauty: there is

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the beauty of inanimate nature and the beauty of animate nature. Even animals that are very cruel exhibit a great deal of beauty. The question that naturally arises is why so much beauty exists in animals and humans that seem to have a character that is far from being in accord with goodness. The answer to our question lies in the fact that the beauty of our world is for the most part only a matter of the surface: it does not penetrate deeply enough into the structure of life to transform the inner nature of the object that exhibits it. The cruelty of nature has not been transformed by beauty: the beauty is very superficial and does not touch the core of life.

Perfect beauty is completely expressed Absolute Goodness and Truth. Hence the beauty of nature, which is merely an expression of matter that has not yet become good, is merely an expression of a very slight amount of the good. The task of the artist is the transfiguration of matter so that it reveals to us the nature of the possible change that it may undergo in being made completely beautiful. The artist shows us what can be done with the material world. He indicates that it may be transfigured into the radiance of true beauty. But he does not completely transform: he merely touches the surface of matter. He gives us a clue as to the possible transfiguration of the world.

In so doing he indicates that the beauty which he creates, the beauty that only transforms the surface of matter, is a suggestion of that beauty which is the complete transfiguration of the creation of life. Space and time in their highest forms may express the true beauty which is the Life of God and the Life of the Kingdom

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of Heaven. Our artistic creations and the beautiful objects of nature are both alike: they are a transfiguration of matter so that it reflects the realm of Eternal Goodness and Truth. They are "broken lights" that suggest to us the Eternal Light.

The beauty of nature, even when it is a beauty that is expressed on the surface of a life that is evil, gives us a hint of what can be done with life; but it does not commit us to the position that that which has superficial beauty is good in its "inward parts." Thus beauty and goodness are inseparably bound together, but every object that has superficial beauty is not of necessity good. It is only when beauty completely transfigures a life that it can be called completely good; and it is only when a life is completely good that its expression is complete beauty. Such beauty and such goodness exist only in the Kingdom of Heaven.

CHAPTER IX

Physical Relativity and Absolute Values

IN recent centuries values have almost always been considered relative, but the physical world absolute. To be sure, this relativity of value was largely a matter of human morals; but even so, it is surprising how widespread an implicit Utilitarianism has been in the thought of modern philosophy. Even Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, was one of those philosophers who explicitly developed Utilitarianism. Yet it was a Henry More and others of his type of thought who believed in the absolute attributes of the ineffable God. It was in the realm of these absolutes where his true values lay. It was not clear to him that his theology should have a definite connection with his theory of morals. It was the relativism of Aristotle's *Ethics* that seemed to him a solution for the barren and arbitrary conceptions of Calvinism. Utilitarianism was an escape from an arbitrary absolutism in the field of morals.

Deism is a natural heritage of the Western world. It is a natural development of one phase of a very ancient theory of value. Deism, we are usually told, is a natural theology that grew out of the scientific development of modern physics. It was the attempt of the thoughtful mind of the eighteenth century to conceive God and His relation to the world in terms that were consistent with the developing insights of physics. What was it in Deism, based as it was on an abstract science, that gave it its

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sense of satisfaction with the world? It was a highly developed, though implicit, conception of the absolute. It was an implicit conception of value. God was all-wise, all-good, and all-powerful; man and the physical world, as His creations, were also basically and fundamentally good and beautiful; the world also had an absolute character.

This conception of the final adequacy of physical existence is one of the most striking conceptions of Western thought. It has become a folk heritage of the Western world, and goes back in its origin through Augustine to an ancient Semitic belief. Augustine tells us in his *Confessions* that before he was a Christian he believed that the disgusting objects of the physical world, such as vipers and reptiles, were things of evil. After he became a Christian he realized, so he tells us, that all of these were the creation of a good God and were in themselves good and altogether perfect.

“And to Thee is nothing whatsoever evil: yea, not only to Thee, but also to Thy creation as a whole, because there is nothing without, which may break in, and corrupt that order which Thou hast appointed it. . . .”

“And I perceived and found it nothing strange, that bread which is pleasant to a healthy palate is loathsome to one distempered; and to sore eyes light is offensive, which to the sound is delightful. And thy righteousness displeaseth the wicked; much more the viper and reptiles, which Thou hast created good, fitting in with the inferior portions of Thy Creation, with which the very wicked also fit in; and that the more, by how much they be unlike Thee; but with the superior creatures, by how

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much they become more like to Thee. And I inquired what iniquity was, and found it to be no substance, but the perversion of the will, turned aside from Thee, O God, the Supreme, towards these lower things, and casting out its bowels, and puffed up outwardly."¹

The Deist inherited this view; he was convinced that the world in which he lived was in a general way perfect. Read the pages of Voltaire and you find him telling us that the Lisbon earthquake was not cruel or diabolical but as it should have been.² It is the duty of man to learn the nature of this benevolent and kindly aspect of nature. The interesting thing about this view is not only its optimism, but its failure to understand the very highly problematic character of human life in both its individual and its social aspects. Deism is based on physics and is only to a moderate degree concerned with specifically human problems. But its optimism is of the same sort as that which is characterized in the general trend of Western thought.

We thus see that for the thought of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries the physical world had an absolute character. The general background for the thoughtful man was the type of absolutism that grew out of physics. Even the nineteenth century struggled in vain to escape from this basic form of absolutism that really grew out of mathematics. Phenomenalism as developed out of Kant by Comte also had within it the absolutes of the Newtonian physics.³ Most of the conceptions of the

¹ Augustine, *Confessions*, bk. vii, chap. xiii, chap. xvi.

² Brightman, "Lisbon Earthquake: a Study in Religious Valuation," *American Journal of Theology*, October 1919.

³ Kant, *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft*.

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absolute that we find in the nineteenth century, with the possible exception of those of Fichte and Schopenhauer, assume what is assumed by Deism, that the natural order is ultimately good. They are all fundamentally the type of absolutism that really makes the forms of the natural world in some real sense final. Thus it was that the God of Deism is relatively unimportant; and in the case of Spinoza and Hegel there is no God apart from the world.

It should now be clear that the absolute developed by modern thought tends to be the absolute of the world order as it now is. The most convincing form of this absolute appeared in the Newtonian system. There we encounter the absolutes of absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion. The absolute of space was the same absolute as Henry More, the theologian and philosopher, admired.¹ It is not alone the common-sense realist and the traditional physicist who defend the Newtonian position; it is also those who in some sense believe that the physical order is absolute. The Newtonian physics practically makes the laws of Euclid's geometry into laws of physics. To be sure, there is a relativity as far as observation is concerned; but the world, as it is, is contained within the frames of two absolutes and in a real sense, due to them, is absolute itself. You remember that Newton took over much from Galileo, and it would seem that Galileo was a man who was not speculative in tendency. Newton himself thought that it was obvious that we must ultimately deal with absolute space, absolute time, and absolute motion. It was Newton who said:

¹ Mackinnon, *Philosophical Writings of Henry More*, p. 294.

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"Hypotheses non fingo."¹ The absolute character of space, time, and motion seems self-evident to these thinkers.

Most philosophers do not realize how much the new theory of relativity has really changed the outlook for most systems of modern thought. I suppose it is true that the follower of Berkeley is fairly safe as far as the criticism and the change of perspective that emanate from the new theory of relativity. But the follower of Berkeley is really a nominalist as far as scientific law is concerned and cannot in any case be a genuine believer in absolute time and in absolute space. This is clear from Berkeley's mathematical writings and *Principles*. But for those who accept the physical world as in some sense trans-subjective and non-mental the physical world is deprived of its absolute character by the new theory. It means that existence in so far as it is physical is relative and not absolute. There are many theorists who even consider that every existent is relative, that is, is constituted by the relations in which it stands to other existents.

If the theory of relativity is true, and evidence is accumulating very rapidly to confirm it, then we no longer have even absolute time. Of course it is true we have general laws of nature that are valid; but these laws are formulated with the explicit assumption that all points of reference are equivalent for the formulation of the general laws of nature. But that does not mean, for example, that the time-interval will have the same

¹ *Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica*, section at the end of the volume.

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magnitude for different systems of measurement. Rather it will be different; but the general laws ascertained by observation will be the same. Thus, for example, the same event may have a different time-duration for various observers. Each one of these time-intervals is valid. The general laws are valid for all points of reference, but that does not mean that the time and the space will be the same for each observer of the same event. Thus a special time must be assigned to each inertial system.

It is hard for us to realize that this theory means that every physical existent is relative. If we take space, time, motion, velocity, and mass as the formal constituents of physical existence, then in dealing with any object we must assert from what standpoint the existent reveals such and such characteristics. No absolute attribute can be ascribed to it in terms of space, time, motion, mass, velocity or any other characteristic used by theoretical physics. A physical existent is a many-faced object relative in its physical characteristics. In place of the Newtonian physical system with its absolute characteristics of space, time, and motion we have bodies that have become more independent of each other than in the Newtonian system because they are no longer parts of an absolute system;¹ yet they are relative in terms of the relations to each other.

Is value also a variable? To the modern mind, particularly to the mind of Western Europe, it seems self-evident that it must be. Formerly we always tended to make value, at least ethical value, more relative than

¹ Russell, "Relativity: Philosophical Consequences," *Ency. Brit.* (13th ed.), xxxi, pp. 331 ff.

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physical existence. The great mass of thinkers have made values subjective. Merely look over the list of modern thinkers and you will be surprised to find how many of them make values dependent upon feeling, or the bodily state, or human interest, or individual development. Pragmatism joins hands with realism and idealism in making values relative. One of Miss Calkins' last articles was one in which she made values subjective,¹—and she an Absolute Idealist! One wonders in reading her and even Professor Pringle-Patterson if they did not have two value theories: one a theory of human values, the other a theory of absolute values.² This higher kind of value seems to be merely existence taken in its totality. Bradley and Bosanquet undoubtably equate existence and value. This dualism between absolute values and relative human values we found implicit in Henry More's system.

Max Scheler and Nicolai Hartmann give us a new type of absolute. They give us values that are qualities, material qualities that may be added to existents. These qualities are borne by existences. In a sense values exist in their purity only in a very unreal sense. It would be better to say that pure value subsists rather than exists. An existent *per se* is not valuable, it only bares values. Pure value may have reality apart from existence. We see that this conception is very close to the theory of tertiary qualities espoused by some of the English and American realists. The difficulty with this theory lies in

¹ "Value—Primarily a Psychological Conception," *Journal of Philosophical Studies*, October 1928.

² Temple, "Some Implications of Theism," *Contemporary British Philosophy*, i, pp. 414 ff.

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the fact that it deprives existence itself of intrinsic worth. If we are dealing with a beautiful object we ask ourselves, and I think legitimately, if the picture itself is not beautiful apart from the adding of a quality called beauty. If we take the position that a tertiary quality is the only value we must ask ourselves whether there is not a value that lies in the bearer of the quality in addition to the quality borne. This point was made clear above in *Part One*.

It seems to be a fundamental insight regarding value that all objects and all persons do not have positive value. The attempts that have been made to give positive value to all that exists have been the most prolific soil in which relativistic theories of value have grown. Pragmatism, Utilitarianism, and all forms of value-relativism have been quite right in pointing out that some objects are incapable of being considered positively valuable, even *sub specie aeternitatis*. It seems to some of us that they look worse, the better the perspective. All that glitters is not gold; there are negative values, as humanity has gradually learned to its sorrow.

If there are negative values then there must be a point of reference, and if it is absolute, it must be valid for all. The position we are taking in this book is one that considers physical reality as trans-subjective and non-mental in its reality. Now since human life is bound up with physical existence, our value-problem is closely connected with the problem of the physical world. We are faced with the struggle for existence, with physical injury, and with the competitive problem due to the limited amount of physical goods. These factors are acute in the

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value-problem for they seem to force relativism upon us.

I suggest that the relativity of physical existence stands in sharp contrast to absolute value. If we accept this thesis it cuts the ground from under all conceptions based on the assumption that if there are absolute values they must be found in physical being or human life as we know them, conditioned as they are by the very relativity of all physical nature. The terrible havoc wrought in our traditional English and American theology and philosophy by the new discoveries of biological science is to be explained by the fact that such thought as that of the *Bridgewater Treatises* considered physical nature and the body of man to be perfect. But Helmholtz, who was no atheist, tells us that the eye is a very imperfect optical instrument and we are all well aware of the loss and tragedy that exist in the whole realm of the struggle for existence. It would take a very calloused mind to sing the *Te Deum* while watching a hawk slay a dove, a cat tease a mouse, or the rage-filled armies of the last war destroying themselves and modern civilization. The world in which we live is not a world of absolute values. Even when we do good we find that it is relative owing to the fact that the good that we do is infected with evil.

This relativity of human morality due to the relativity of physical nature should be made clearer. Possibly we can do so by using several concrete examples. Suppose a reformer is faced with the evils of the slave trade, or, better, the evils of slavery itself. He works to have the slave freed and concentrates his mind upon the good he is doing; but it is inevitable that in creating a public sentiment to have the slaves freed he creates hatred and

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the destruction of certain human values. I think it is now quite generally agreed that the British West Indies suffered enormously, both culturally and economically, when slavery was abolished. I use this illustration because it involves abolition of slavery without the use of war and therefore it does not involve so drastic a change. But if we take into consideration that many reforms are carried out by the use of extensive force, then we realize that whenever we do good we are faced with the creation of evil as well.

Suppose a man finds that to do justice to the young lady to whom he is engaged and to his own life he must break the ties that bind him to his own home. We say he is justified, but very often evil is wrought by his act: he does harm to his parents. Or suppose a man has many obligations. If he does one thing he is prevented at the same time from doing something else that should be done. By the very condition of space and time values are made relative. Thus a theory of value that is sound must recognize the truth of our present-day stress on relativism.

The tragedy of our day is that Utilitarianism joined with Hegelianism has developed a new kind of absolutism. We find it in Bolshevism and Fascism. Our new social absolutism is attempting to escape the relativity of human life by a false Value-Absolute. In the case of Bolshevism this is particularly pathetic. As it holds the human mind to be merely a mirror of the material world, then it must hold that the material world is absolute. That is the reason it has no sympathy with any form of relativity in the field of physics. It seems to be closing its eyes to a very obvious truth.

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We now see that our lives, lives conditioned by those forms of space and time exhibited in this world, are relative. Human life only exhibits relative value. We do not find, and we cannot find, our Value-Absolute within the earthly sphere. I believe that Newton following Henry More had a sound instinct. He thought that in some way God gave us the true Value-Absolute. But I do think he was wrong in conceiving our space and time as the absolute attributes of the Divine; for our world is more chaotic than he thought it to be. It seems to me that we must seek our absolute beyond *this* world. It must be concrete existence, something much more than a mere quality or an abstract form. The argument against the abstract concept of absolute value we have already developed in connection with the theory of Scheler and of the followers of Realism.

The thesis we are developing is that value as absolute goodness, truth, and beauty, must be concrete and beyond the world if it exists at all. Such a being would have absolute value for all beings who directly apprehend it. We must remind ourselves once more that we must not expect to find it among the objects of this world, nor to find it adequately manifested in the world. The reason that most thinkers are opposed to the theory of the mystic who holds that we can see God as the Absolute beyond all the species and types of reality known in this world, is because we wish the mystic to define the Absolute.

We forget that in reality an absolute cannot be defined. All that Newton did in his definition of absolute space, time, and motion was to presuppose their existence and

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then merely use synonyms to describe them. They are final categories that cannot be defined in terms of something not themselves. At bottom they are really the indication that the absolute is not the relative. "Absolute space, by its own nature without relationship to anything external, always remains like unto itself and immovable. Relative space is any measure or changing dimension of that space, which is defined through our senses by its location in regard to bodies and is commonly used in place of immovable space—thus the dimension of subterranean, aerial, or celestial space is defined by its location in relation to the earth."¹ The definition of the Absolute cannot give us a higher genus under which to classify it. If the Absolute transcends the world it cannot be defined in terms of the world. God is the Ultimate from which the logical forms are themselves derived. He is the concrete of which the thin forms of earthly existence are merely broken threads of life.

If the Godhead has absolute value, does it then mean that human personality must necessarily be instrumental in its value, or merely relative? Of course it might be true that only God could have absolute value. Then there would be absolute value but finite personality could never participate in it. However, Plato has pointed out the right way to handle this problem. He holds that by participation the individual obtains value. If we use this clue we can hold that we share in the absoluteness of God by coöperative life with Him. If value is the concreteness of life, then perfect coöperation with God produces an organization in which a personality shares, or

¹ Newton, *op. cit.*, Scholium to Definition Eight.

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better, participates in the absolute value of the Divine.¹

The Christian has attempted indirectly to deal with this problem by his conception of the Trinity. Most of us do not realize that in the speculation of the Greek Church, the Church from which the theory of the Trinity emerged in its maturest form, the Trinity was conceived as the concrete fulness of life although each had an individual existence. Thus the Trinity became the type of what communal life of persons may be.

Our theory means that each individual gains absolute value by complete love for God and complete love for man. The love for God is the way of participating in the Divine Life. Our psychological theories of love leave to one side the conception of love as a life of participation; but in fact it is a way of transcending the self in a perfect unity with that which is loved. If we completely love God we are no longer merely ourselves; we become united with the absolute life of God Himself. But our love for God is always a love that presses out in many directions and carries with it an organization with all other life. That is the truth in that Romanticism which in English thought so frequently united with Neo-Platonism. However, I do not mean to suggest that our life becomes absorbed in the life of God. Just here lies the value of the Christian theory of the Trinity. It recognizes that there are three individuals in the Godhead but that these individuals even as individuals are united in one life. So we are knit together in one common life if we share the life of God. We are part of the fellowship of another which is also the fellowship with the Absolute.

¹ *Supra*, pp. 61 ff.

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In the ideal order each individual has an absolute position in the whole. Hegel was wrong when he gave a positive value to all that exists: some existents are moving away from the fulness of being. But his conception of what the world is does give us a faint hint of that ideal order which Kant called the *realm of ends*,¹ and which we may call the Kingdom of Heaven. Each individual ideally has some universal function in the whole. So also each member of the Trinity is the whole of the Godhead from one particular point of view. Thus the individual has an absolute participating value. Because he shares in the life of the absolute he has a participating absoluteness in the life of the realm of ends.

How does this all relate to our conception of physical relativity? The answer has been implied already. Human life is relative because of the relative nature of all life in space and time. Hence if we are to conceive of ourselves ever participating in the ideal concrete order we must either hold that the realm of ends is outside of space and time or else hold that there is a higher type of space and time than that known to the order in which we now live. Very often the Christian or the Neo-Platonist holds that the "realm of ends" is a timeless and spaceless realm. That was the position of Plotinus and even of some of the Christian Fathers. However, it is quite possible that we have not exhausted the whole realm of possibilities in assuming the eternal life must be timeless. Two modern Platonists² have suggested a cumulative theory of

¹ *Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysics of Morals* (Abbott's trans., p. 51).

² Lossky, *The World as an Organic Whole*, pp. 88-90; A. S. Alexeyev, *Mysl i Deistvitelnost* (Thought and Reality), p. 307.

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time connected with a theory of space which holds that the approach to one point does not necessarily mean the leaving of another point. If such theories are thinkable they may throw light on our problem. If they are valid the life of the realm of ends may be a special type of spatial and temporal existence. It is to be hoped that their future work may throw light on this difficult problem.

Does such a theory take into account the problem of beauty? Yes, but since it insists that physical life is relative and that our present physical life does not have absolute value it holds that no physical object is absolutely beautiful. Hence, until a higher life of the body is reached the physical can only symbolize but cannot embody absolute value. The beauty of the mountains, the beauty of a flower, the beauty of a picture, is not perfect beauty. Each of these relatively beautiful objects points to the transfiguration that has been wrought in some bit of physical existence.¹ Thus by being a relative value, participating to some degree in the absolute life of beauty, it can symbolize the complete beauty that lies beyond it. Only when life and physical existence are completely transfigured can they express that perfect life which shares in the absolute life of God. This theory makes music a supremely great art because it so marvellously suggests the infinite reaches of life. And it is to be remembered that it was just this theory of art that inspired Michelangelo, da Vinci, Raphael, and the marvellous writers of Russian church music, acclaimed by some to have com-

¹ Eugen N. Trubetzkoy, *Altrussische Ikonenmalerei*.

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posed the most beautiful church music of the modern world.¹

According to our theory the relativity of the physical world can only be escaped by transfiguring it and thus sharing in the absolute existence which is the absolute value.

¹ Norden, "A Brief Study of the Russian Liturgy and its Music," *The Musical Quarterly*, July 1919.

CHAPTER X

The Fulness of Life

IT would seem absurd even to the most bigoted soul not to seek life as a fulness and richness of existence. The Don Juans, the Goethes, the Heines, the Byrons, as well as the saints, have sought life in its fulness—as they thought. Goethe thought that by tasting every type of experience even at the expense of others he would make his life full and rich. He drained the cup to the bottom and tasted it to the full as he thought, drinking dregs and all. Even if many souls had to suffer for him, yet that was necessary that he might have the fulness of life. Some tell us that even the saints must crush others if they stand in the way of the soul that moves on toward perfection. If men stand in our way as we strive on to the life of solitary fellowship with God, where beauty, truth, and goodness are our blessed heritage, then we must thrust them aside, for our fuller life is that which is all-important.

But how thin is the conception of a Goethe, a Heine, or even those who make the life of the saint that of crushing others for his own perfection. The life of the selfish seeker of his own salvation is not the fuller life. It has not that beauty, that radiant charm that only the deeper, unselfish life can yield.

Now according to the conception of life implied in our theory of value, life in its fuller aspects, in its richness and fuller development, is not the seeking of one's

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own salvation for himself alone. The fulness of life is not "self-perfection" in the sense of making oneself complete over against other souls. Rather it is the seeking of perfection through union with God and with the Kingdom of God. In myself I am not the bounding walls of even a possible perfect life. It is only as my fuller life expands into the life of God and the Kingdom of God that I become a being of worth. My fuller life is God and the Kingdom of God; it is not mine as my own creation. It is my fuller life because I am an organ of its life. Even the Kingdom of God is value only because It is the Body of Christ and because through it His purpose and His life flow. "I am the vine, ye *are* the branches: He that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing" (St. John xv. 5).

Now this doctrine of value as the fulness of life, and the fulness of life as the participation of the creature in the Life of God Himself, and the participation as a corporate life of the Kingdom of Heaven—this doctrine, I say, is a conception that is found in its classic form in the Fourth Gospel. It is in the Gospel according to St. John that there lie hidden the germs of that concept of value which unites the virtues of individualism and universalism in axiology, and brings together the value of God, the ultimate group, and the individual. Yet this theory is critical of every attempt to set up any group in our earthly order as a substitute for the Kingdom of Heaven. To the casual reader its pages may appear naïve and unphilosophical, but that is due to the fact that so little of its inner meaning has been assimilated by any philosophy of the past. In

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many respects it is like Neo-Platonism, and much of it can be illuminated by Platonic doctrines, but in many other ways it is very different.

Now we have already seen that the Neo-Platonist had a developed theory of knowledge, but one that had a paradoxical element, an element that led towards subjectivism in the realm of epistemology. For he held that the immediate objects of our sense-experience are mental images, although he also assumed the objective validity of the categories of thought. Thus the most elemental ideas of geometry are *known* through notions latent in the mind, rather than through forms that are immanent in observed reality.

For the Neo-Platonist there is a concrete spiritual reality, the Good or the Absolute. We do not apprehend it by an objective mystical experience, but rather by seeking God within our own breast. There is a mystic spark of the divine in each soul, an inner organ of the divine. Through this inner light, this centre of the soul that can never be contaminated, the *Fünklein*, as Meister Eckhart later called it, we intuit the divine. It is what Plotinus refers to in the Fifth Ennead as "the Interior Man," to use Mackenna's translation.¹

Now the Gospel according to St. John approaches the problem in a very different manner. Although St. Paul is saturated with inner mysticism, the author of the Fourth Gospel has a much more natural theory of the process of apprehending the Divine. The language is

¹ 5. 1. 10. Some of the Neo-Platonists did not espouse this doctrine; but our exposition is true of Plotinus and many of them.

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that of seeing and hearing. ". . . If thou wouldest believe, thou shouldest see the glory of God" (St. John xi. 40). "Hereafter ye shall see heaven open, and the angels of God ascending and descending upon the Son of man" (i. 51). "He that hath seen me hath seen the Father" (xiv. 9). "Even the Spirit of truth; whom the world cannot receive, because it seeth him not, neither knoweth him" (xiv. 17).¹ It is a naïve theory of knowledge, you say. In one sense it is, but in another sense it is not. The Gospel espouses a naïve theory of sense-perception, but also a theory of the direct and objective apprehension of spiritual facts. "A little while, and ye shall not behold θεωρεῖτε me, and again a little while and ye shall see ὁψεσθε me" (xvi. 16). E. A. Abbott says of this passage, "The disciples repeat the saying in perplexity. It is repeated again by Jesus in His reply to their questionings with one another. In each of the three cases the same distinction is observed, apparently indicating that 'behold' means 'behold with the bodily eye' but 'see' means 'see spiritually.'"²

The glory of the Gospel according to St. John lies in its grasp of the fact that both our sensory and spiritual knowledge are a direct and outward apprehension of reality. Spiritual knowledge is not the grasp of the divine within us through an inner core of divinity. The Divine is not a part of our nature, but is that which we grasp when we see "the heaven opened." Thus there is, in

¹ The conclusion of this passage, not given here, brings out a point we shall deal with later, i.e. the fact that "abiding in" is higher than seeing.

² *Johannine Vocabulary*, § 1597. By permission of the Macmillan Company and the Cambridge University Press.

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St. John's¹ rejection of the Pauline metaphysic of knowledge with its inner light, a return to the simpler position of the sayings of the Synoptics. This makes possible a return to Jesus' own concept of Faith.

According to the Old Testament, faith is not a cognitive act. To the writers of the Old Testament there was no doubt at all about the existence of God. Faith was a personal confidence in the character of God.² In Jesus' own thinking faith seems to have a similar meaning. There was no doubt in His mind about God's existence. Faith was for Him a personal trust in God and His tender love for all men. Men showed faith in our Lord Himself when they trusted His personal character and kindness.³

St. Paul was saturated with the conceptions of the Hellenistic world, and his theory of knowledge was much like the Neo-Platonic one: there is an inner light, a spark of the divine in each man's breast.⁴ St. John returned to a more direct system of knowledge, a system that has caused many thinkers to consider him naïve. But naïve he is not. His theory is complex but very simply stated. For St. John, knowledge seems to be above "believing"; but Faith as an abiding in the Father is above knowledge.⁵

The achievement of value is only possible by coöperation with God Himself through the Life of the Trinity.

¹ In using this expression I do not mean to commit myself on the question of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel.

² *Johannine Vocabulary*, §§ 1469-71.

³ Inge, *Faith and its Psychology*, pp. 8, 9.

⁴ Col. i. 27; 2 Cor. iv. 16; Rom. ii. 15; Rom. vii. 22.

⁵ *Johannine Vocabulary*, § 1479, § 1629.

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Value is only possible through concrete consubstantiality or an "abiding in" the Life of God. Thus the achievement of value is above the mere recognition of it. This is only possible, St. John maintains, because of our personal confidence in the divine Goodness as truly the Good and the Truth, and a mutual coöperative life with God. The doctrine of perichoresis grew out of the Fourth Gospel, and it is the clue to the whole theory of value.

The Gospel of St. John is a gospel of the fulness of life. "I am come that they might have life and that they might have it more abundantly" (St. John x. 10). But the abundant life was a life of the fellowship of one disciple with another, just as the Son had His abundant life in His association with the Father. It was the doctrine of the perichoresis that made St. John's conception of the fuller life a social one. For the Platonist it is the flight of the alone to the Alone that makes life rich and full. But for St. John the branches are parts of one organism through the life of the Divine Son and the Holy Ghost. The doctrine of the Church and the Sacraments in the Fourth Gospel is a theory of the presence of the divine in human life in a similar way to the consubstantiality of the Persons of the Trinity. This is also a Synoptic conception and seems to represent Jesus' own thought. "For where two or three are gathered together in my name there am I in the midst of them" (St. Matt. xvii. 20). The presence of the divine in the world, the very fulness of life, comes through the Trinitarian Life of the God-head present in human life through a corporate life which means fellowship with God. "Abide in me, and I in you. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except

The Fulness of Life

it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me" (St. John xv. 4).

Bishop Westcott has caught the same message in the Fourth Gospel. "The true unity of believers, like the unity of Persons in the blessed Trinity, is offered as something far more than a mere moral unity of purpose, feeling, affection; it is, in some mysterious mode which we cannot apprehend, a vital unity. In this sense it is the symbol of a higher type of life, in which each constituent being is a conscious element in the being of a vast whole. In 'the life,' and in 'the life' only, each individual life is able to attain perfection."¹

It is this perfection of the fuller life which gives a joyful meaning to all existence. It is the felicity that makes life true, beautiful, and good. It is the radiance of a goodness that shines forth in beauty, the fineness of the life of virtue which has transfigured all human endeavours by finding their meaning in the Kingdom of Heaven. This is a joyous life that makes thin earthly pleasures seem poor and insignificant.

¹ Bishop Westcott, in his *Commentary on St. John* (xvii. 21). By permission of John Murray, publisher, London.

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